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 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became the undisputed preeminent 
power in the international system. In 1990, its economy was roughly 26 percent of the world’s 
GDP.1 Militarily, its qualitative and quantitative advantage was unrivaled and its reach 
unprecedented (Wohlforth, 1999). Unconstrained by the lack of a geopolitical competitor, the 
U.S. adopted an activist foreign policy that has been dubbed liberal hegemony (Ikenberry, 
2009). The goal of this grand strategy was to instill “democratic governance within nation-
states, individual rights, free markets, a free press, and the rule of law” (Posen, 2014, p. 6).   
 The U.S.’ preponderance would not last. Over the preceding decade and a half, the 
United States’ relative advantage has declined (Layne, 2012). Additionally, the U.S.’ traditional 
allies have also witnessed a decrease in their hard power capabilities (Regilme & Parisot, 2017). 
This has negatively affected the liberal international order the United States has built.  
 While these developments would be destabilizing enough, non-traditional powers have 
seen a rise in their relative power. This phenomenon has been dubbed “the rise of the rest” 
(Zakaria, 2011). Examples of countries that fall into this category are Indonesia, South Korea, 
Chile, and Mexico (Amsden, 2001). Some of the larger states within this group - like India, Brazil, 
and Turkey - have begun to wield more influence in the international system (Kubicek, Dal, & 
Oğuzlu, 2016; Zangl, Heußner, Kruck, & Lanzendörfer, 2016).    
 
1 The US economy, using current US dollars, was approximately $5.963 trillion. The world’s GDP was roughly 
$22.656 trillion (World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files) 





 Foremost among this group of rising states is China. Between 1980 and 2007, China’s 
GDP rose at an average rate of 10 percent per annum. To put that in perspective, the world’s 
average growth rate was 3 percent and the U.S.’ was under 4 percent (Knight & Ding, 2012). 
With this new economic clout, China has been attempting to gain more influence in the 
international system. In conjunction with financial incentives, the country has been developing 
its soft power capabilities (Hartig, 2016). In contrast to these benign developments, China’s 
military has also developed significantly in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 
Geopolitically, it has also been attempting to develop an exclusive security zone that includes 
the South China Sea (S. F. Jackson, 2016; Tangredi, 2013).  
   These structural changes in the international system have spurred new conversations 
within IR. These dialogues can be divided along several lines. This work will focus on two of 
them. The first, is the debate as to whether a power transition is occurring.  
 Power Transition Theory envisions the entire international system being organized by a 
single state. This dominate state is defined by its material preponderance. It uses this hard 
power advantage to incentive states into following its rules and regulations. For power 
transition scholars, the United States has been the dominate state since 1945. Recently, 
however, there has been a debate as to whether a power transition is occurring. This 
conversation has been provoked by the U.S.’ decline, in conjunction with China’s rise. The 
question at the heart of this conversation is whether China will replace the United States as the 
system’s dominate state (Allison, 2017; Chan, 2007; Lemke & Tammen, 2003; Levy, 2008). 





 In addition to the power transition debate, the second dialogue focuses on the polarity 
of the international system. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Russia were both 
considered poles. Thus, the international system was defined as bipolar. Once the Soviet Union 
fell, the United States became the only pole in the system. As a result, the system’s structure 
was categorized as unipolar (Krauthammer, 1990).   
 With the U.S.’ recent decline, a debate about the current structure of the international 
system has developed (Zala, 2017). Some argue that the system is still unipolar (Brooks & 
Wohlforth, 2016; Kopalyan, 2017). Others perceive the system to be bipolar with China having 
risen to the level of a polar power (Maher, 2018; Tunsjø, 2018). A third group contends that it is 
not just China that has reached polar status. Rather, a number of states have developed to the 
point where the system is multipolar (Dee, 2015; Kupchan, 2012). In the opposite direction, 
there is also the idea that the U.S.’ decline will precipitate a shift towards a non-polar system 
(Haass, 2008). Under this school of thought, the U.S. is no longer the unipolar power and 
neither China nor any other state will be able to reach polar status.  
 These two dialogues, both precipitated by the U.S.’ relative decline, can be divided 
along their contrasting understanding of the structure of the international system. For power 
transition scholars, the entire system is under the leadership of a single dominate state. The 
United States has led the system since 1945, but with its decline, China might be on the path of 
overtaking it.  
 For PTT, there is a clear process that leads to a change in international leadership. A 
dominate state, because of its material advantage, establishes rules and regulations that 





govern state interaction. As a result of the mechanism that is the law of unequal growth rates, 
the dominate power’s material advantage erodes as another state’s power increases. This will 
lead to dissatisfaction and a hegemonic war. If the dominate power losses said war, then a 
power transition will transpire.  
 Rather than a transition in international leadership, the second conversation focuses on 
a shift in the system’s polar structure, i.e. the number of poles in a given system. The problem is 
that there is a gap in the literature since there is not a theory that explains how and why the 
structure of the system transitions. In other words, there is not an explanation as to how and 
why the system changes from multipolar to bipolar. The reason why a theory has not been 
developed stems from the fact that there is not a clear set of attributes or an established 
threshold for determining polar status (Oren, 2016; William R Thompson, 1986). This inability to 
determine when a state reaches or declines from being a pole, means that polarity scholarship 
does not have a transformational logic (Ruggie, 1986). Consequently, most of the research on 
this topic entails comparing the differences between two static systems (Wohlforth, 2011).  
 This is a significant deficiency because the structure of the system has changed at least 
twice. The first change occurred after World War Two, when it shifted from multipolar to 
bipolar (R. Brown, 1993). The second shift took place after the Cold War and the fall of the 
Soviet Union. At that point, the system transitioned from bipolar to unipolar (William R. 
Thompson, 2006). Furthermore, there is not a theory to apply to the current international 
system, which might be going through a transition or has recently gone through one.  





 As a result of this need, the current work will focus on developing a theory that explains 
how and why the structure of the international system transitions. It will be dubbed Polar Co-
option Theory (PCT) (Tepper, 2014). Rather than argue that the system’s structure has changed 
only twice, PCT contends that the number of poles equates to the number of states which have 
authority over an empire (Jorgensen, 2013). Like an imperial power, a polar power acts as an 
institutional hub that establishes rules and regulations that it then imposes on the lesser tier 
states, or spokes, it has authority over (Galtung, 1971; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 
2009; Ikenberry, 2011, 2012; Motyl, 2001; Tilly, 1997).    
This conceptualization leads polar co-option theory to conclude that there have been 
five polar co-options since 1800. In the Western Hemisphere, the Spanish Empire collapsed, 
which first led to an expansion of Britain’s authority (first co-option) and then to the 
development of the United States’ territorial order (second co-option). In North Africa and the 
Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned between France and Britain (third co-option). 
After World War II, the global empires of Britain and France were replaced by the U.S. and, to a 
lesser extent, the USSR (fourth co-option). With the culmination of the Cold War, the world 
witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the further expansion of the U.S.’ territorial 
order (fifth co-option) (Painter, 1999; Westad, 2005). 
It is hypothesized that during each of these polar co-options, a clear pattern of events 
unfolded. This has led PCT to predict certain occurrences that together make up the polar co-
option process. This recurring phenomenon is made up of a single mechanism, which leads to 
three steps. The sole mechanism is the variability of authority. The subsequent steps are a 





pole’s loss of authority over its spokes, a rise in the level of fear among the system’s poles, and 
then a co-option.  
To better layout the polar co-option process, this work will proceed as follows. The first 
chapter fleshes out PTT with more specificity than was done here. It also provides a critique 
that includes, but is not limited to, the point made in this introduction. Namely, PTT’s 
conceptualization of a dominate state and the belief that it organizes the entire international 
system.   
  The second chapter presents polar co-option theory. The first section will pertain to the 
theories basic understanding of the international system, which is markedly different than 
PTT’s. The second section lays out the hypothesized polar co-option process. It provides the 
theory’s mechanism, steps, expected recurring features, and results.  
 Chapter three focuses on PCT’s conceptualization of a pole and its effect on the lesser 
tier states it has authority over. First, it will further explain PTT’s basic understanding of a 
dominate state and its effect on the international system. While using PTT’s dominate state as a 
foil, PCT’s characterization of a pole will be presented. The most important difference between 
the two theories’ units of observation is how they affect lesser tier states. Since PTT adheres to 
the assumption of state sovereignty, the dominate state only alters the interaction of states at 
the international level. The polar powers, as a result of practicing imperialism, affect the 
domestic structure of the spokes they have authority over. 
 As previously mentioned, the literature on polarity has not been able to develop a 
theory about structural change. The main reason for this is the lack of precision with the 





concept of a pole. Since there is still a debate as to when a state reaches or descends from 
polar status, it is difficult to determine how, why, and when there is a transition in the system’s 
structure. To try and rectify this gap in the literature, chapter three will provide a number of 
attributes a state needs to satisfy to be considered a pole. These qualities of a polar power 
correspond with the literature on imperialism.  
 While the depiction of a pole in chapter three portrays a static ideal type, chapter four’s 
aim is to provide a more dynamic understanding of the polar power and the polar co-option 
process. As a result, a typology of poles will be introduced. These categorizations are based on 
two criteria. First, is the directionality of a pole’s authority, i.e. whether it is decreasing or 
increasing. The second, centers around a pole’s intentions during the polar co-option process. 
With this understanding of what affects polar status, PCT identifies four different kinds of poles: 
a moribund pole, a status quo pole, a prospective co-opting pole, and a co-opting pole.  
While explanatory examples of PCT and a pole’s effect on lesser tier states will be 
presented in chapters three and four, chapter five will provide an empirical example of the 
theory. It will cover France’s and Britain’s loss of authority over their spokes, which led to the 
expansion of the U.S.’, and to a lesser extent, Soviet Russia’s territorial orders.  
 A short conclusion will then follow. The topic of this section will be twofold. First, PCT 
will be retold but in a condensed form. Second, the topic of whether a polar co-option is 
currently occurring will be discussed. During this historical episode, the United States is cast as 
the moribund pole losing authority over its spokes while China is the prospective co-opting pole 
seeking to establish its own territorial order. It is the supposition of this work, however, that a 





polar co-option is not underway since the U.S. itself has led the movement away from the 
liberal international order it has built. Furthermore, China will be unable to develop its own 
territorial order because of economic, legitimacy and geopolitical constraints.   
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How do international orders transition? In IR, there is a clear theoretical understanding 
of how this phenomenon proceeds – Power Transition Theory (PTT). The theory was first 
articulated in the late 1950s, by Kenneth Organski in his World Politics (A. F. K. Organski, 1958). 
Organski’s work and his theoretical insights spawned a research program that over the last sixty 
years has crystalized its understanding of the international system as well as the mechanism 
and steps of the power transition process.1  
These facets of PTT are discussed in the first and second sections of this chapter. The 
third section demonstrates why there is a need for a new theoretical understanding of how 
international orders transition. Specifically, PTT’s basic understanding of the structure of the 
international system is critiqued as well as its final predicted step in its hypothesized power 
transition process.    
 
 
Power Transition Theory’s Understanding of the International System 
 
 
 Before we can understand how power transitions occur, PTT’s basic assumptions need 
to be fleshed out. What follows is a brief overview of the entities and processes the theory 
presupposes (Wagner, 2016).     
 
1 There are power transition theorists in the Organski tradition (Organski & Kugler, 1981), (Tammen, Kugler, & 
Lemke, 2016); long-cycle theorists (Modelski, 1987), (Modelski & Thompson, 1988); and a realist adaptation 
(Gilpin, 1981). 
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For PTT the most important actors are states.2 These states, which populate the 
international system, form a hierarchy.3 This hierarchy is based on the distribution of material 
capabilities. For PTT, the most important source of power is traditional hard power. 
Measurements such as a state’s GDP and the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
“are regularly employed by PTT studies” (Rauch, 2017, p. 643). In addition to these 
components, population size is also frequently used to approximate state power (Levy, 2008). 
The logic is that a “larger population represents greater capabilities” (Lemke, 2008, p. 779).4  
 The state that sits atop the international system’s hierarchy is called the dominate state. 
Two prominent PTT scholars explained, “At the top of the hierarchical pyramid is the dominate 
nation that, for most of its tenure, is the most powerful nation in the international order. Today 
that nation is the United States, and its predecessor was England” (Kugler & Organski, 1989, p. 
173). The dominate state has two defining characteristics. First, it has a relative advantage in 
the three measurements PTT uses to approximate state power: GDP, CINC score, and 
population size.  
Secondly, the leading state organizes the entire international system based on its 
preferences. In other words, “The rules of the international system are selected by the 
 
2 For an application of PTT and non-state actors see (Lemke, 2008) 
3 This is in contrast to structural realism, which posits that the international system is anarchic.  
4 While these are the traditional measures of power, some PTT theorists have argued that different criteria should 
be used; for example, Sample has argued economic figures broken down into a per capita basis should be the 
determinate when discussing a state’s wealth (Sample, 2017). Others have tried to develop a more sophisticated 
measurement of a state’s power based on three key indicators: extraction, reach, and allocation. Tammen and 
Kugler explained, “Extraction approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national 
output to advance public goal. Reach gauges the capacity of governments to mobilize populations under their 
control. Allocation evaluates the share of public revenues provided to competing national priorities” (Kugler & 
Tammen, 2012, p. 2). While these are possibly better measurements for national capabilities than GDP or a CINC 
score, the three measurements are still concerned with hard power.  
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dominate state and enforced by the state….[it does so by] establishing rules and norms that 
govern international interactions” (De Mesquita, 2013, p. 197). The dominate state does this 
because it believes it will receive “a disproportionate share of the spoils” produced by the 
system (Renshon, 2017, p. 67). In other words, the dominate state organizes the international 
system out of its own self-interest, which is based on its rational calculations (Gilpin, 1981).5  
 Below the level of the dominate state, are the great powers. As the name implies, 
“these are very powerful countries that cannot match one on one the power of the dominant 
nation, at a given point in time, but have the potential to do so at a future time” (Kugler & 
Organski, 1989, p. 173). In the nineteenth century, when Britain was the dominate state, 
France, Russia, the United States, and Germany were the great powers.  
 While the dominate state and the great powers populate the upper tiers of the 
international system, PTT also identifies middle and small powers. In the current system, some 
middle powers are Australia, Canada, South Korea, Indonesia, Argentina, Turkey, and Mexico 
(Gilley & O'Neil, 2014). States such as Vietnam, Singapore, Kuwait, Oman, and Denmark are 
considered small states (Almezaini & Rickli, 2016; Larsen, 2005; Tang, 2018). While middle and 
small powers are relatively weak compared to the dominate state and the great powers, their 
alignment can affect a number of facets of foreign policy; for example, the power projection 
capabilities of the dominate state or a great power (Selden, 2013). Furthermore, middle and 
small powers historically use the competition between the top tier states to their advantage. By 
playing the more powerful states against one another, middle and small powers are able to 
 
5 This is in contrast to structural realism, which posits that states pursue the goal the survival because the anarchic 
structure of the international system compels them to (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 2010).  
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extract more concessions, which is in line with PTT’s assumption that all states are acting out of 
their own self-interest (Kassab, 2017).  
 Overall, PTT subscribes to the foundational belief that single unit states populate the 
international system. The structure of the system, however, is hierarchical as these states are 
tiered based on their material capabilities. At the top of this theoretical pyramid, sits a 
dominate state that possesses a disproportionate amount of hard power. As a result of its 
preponderance of material capabilities, it is able to establish rules and regulations that organize 
inter-state interactions. The dominate state organizes the system because it believes it is in its 
best interest. Furthermore, lesser tier states adhere to the dominate state’s prerogatives 
because they also believe it is in their self-interest.   
 
The Process of a Power Transition 
 
 
 Transitions in the international system are rare occurrences. According to PTT, the 
system has only transitioned once since the beginning of the 1800s – from Pax Britannica to Pax 
Americana.6 While there has only been one power transition since the nineteenth century, PTT 
has been able to crystalize a clear process it believes will result in a change in international 
orders. This process entails one mechanism and three steps. The mechanism is the law of 
unequal growth rates. The steps are: the loss of the dominate state’s material advantage, 
dissatisfaction, and then hegemonic war.   
  
 
6 While Modelski identifies more than one transition in international leadership during the history of the 
international system, only the U.S.’ replacement of Britain occurred after the 1800s (Modelski, 1978).    
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A Stable Environment  
 
 
It is theorized that before the power transition process begins, a stable environment 
prevails. This is organized by the aforementioned dominate state. As a result of its material 
preponderance, the dominate state establishes “an international order with rules that direct 
political, economic, and military interactions” (Lemke, 1997, p. 24). In addition to establishing 
the rules of its international order, the dominate state provides certain benefits. These benefits 
can be categorized in two ways. First, the dominate state solves collective action problems, 
which is a public good (Snidal, 1985). For example, maintaining a stable currency and assuring 
the free flow of capital and trade (C. Kindleberger, 1986). In regards to public goods, it is 
generally assumed that lesser tier states benefit more than the dominate state because the 
latter bears the burden of upholding the public goods; whereas, the lesser tier states accrue the 
benefits while free riding (Olson, 1965).  
In addition to public goods, the dominate state distributes private goods. These goods 
are provided to the dominate state’s allies and are used as a means to instilling stability in the 
dominate state’s order. Some private goods are victory in war and increased economic growth 
(Bussmann & Oneal, 2007). In terms of the former, a dominate state will come to the aid of an 
ally which is under military duress. With regards to the latter, a dominate state can establish 
rules which increase the flow of economic resources to its allies. 
Overall, the dominate state provides the rules which govern the interactions between 
states, maintains the burden of upholding public goods, and distributes private goods to its 
allies so they support its international order. This environment, which the dominate state 
engineers, is stable. This stability is maintained as long as the international system is in 
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equilibrium as the “more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, 
political, and economic arrangements” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 11). In an ideal configuration, it is not 
only the dominate state that bears the burden of maintaining the international order. Lesser 
tier states, recognizing the benefits they accrue from the stable system, also work to maintain 
it.  
 
Power Transition Theory’s Mechanism  
 
 
The Law of Uneven Growth Rates  
 
 
PTT assumes, that after the dominate state engineers a stable environment, there is a 
period of relative peace. This stability is based on the hard power supremacy of the dominate 
state and its ability to provide public and private goods (DiCicco & Levy, 1999). Its comparative 
advantage is not static, however, and it is predicted that it will diminish overtime. The 
mechanism which leads to this decrease, and begins the power transition process, is the law of 
differential growth rates (Gilpin, 1981). As one IR scholar wrote, “the power relations among 
states are not permanent, and differential or uneven national capability growth rates ensure 
that the international distribution of power will shift” (Geller, 1996, p. 127).   
What is meant by “national growth rates?” For PTT, domestic level variables provide the 
foundation to the international system’s balance of power. These variables are not static but in 
a constant state of flux because of the law of unequal growth rates. As previously mentioned, a 
state’s power is based on its material capabilities, which can be approximated through 
measurements like GDP, CINC score, and population size. Lower-level variables, however, affect 
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these measurements. For example, skills of the population, quality of the infrastructure, and 
access to capital can all affect a state’s power (De Mesquita, 2013, p. 201). As a result, these 
domestic level variables are subject to change, which, in turn, will affect the distribution of 
material capabilities among states at the international level. In other words, PTT assumes that 
because of the law of unequal growth rates some states will witness an increase in their power 
as others decrease. This is because domestic level variables, which aggregate into a state’s 
power, fluctuate over time and between states. This invariably leads to a dynamic environment 
where the distribution of power is constantly changing. 
 
Steps of the Power Transition Process 
 
 
Loss of the Dominate States’ Material Advantage 
 
 
The first step of the power transition process naturally flows from the theory’s 
mechanism. As a result of the law of unequal growth rates, PTT expects the dominate state’s 
advantage in material capabilities to relatively decline in comparison to other states in the 
system. In conjunction with the dominate state’s decline, some great powers will see a relative 
increase in their material capabilities. In particular, there will be one great power that sees a 
substantial increase in its power vis-à-vis the other states in the system (Gilpin, 1981; Kugler & 
Organski, 1989). Overtime, this great power will accumulate enough material capabilities that it 
will reach near parity with the dominate state.  
With the loss of the dominate state’s material preponderance, it will no longer be able 
to supply public and private goods to the same degree. Furthermore, the great power that is 
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seeing its material capabilities grow the most, will start supplying its own private goods. These 
fluctuations in the system’s balance of power, caused by the law of unequal growth rates, will 





Currently, PTT’s mechanism has been identified - the law of unequal growth rates. This 
mechanism leads to the first hypothesized step of the power transition process: the decline in 
the dominate state’s material supremacy as well as the rise of a peer competitor. These factors 
alone do not precipitate a power transition. Rather, a second step has to transpire – 
dissatisfaction. As previously mentioned, when the dominate state has a substantial relative 
power advantage, it establishes a stable environment. This situation is made up of several 
components; for example, the rules and regulations that govern state interaction and the 
benefits each state accrues from the system.  
The problem is that this environment is based on the distribution of power at a certain 
moment. Following the law of unequal growth rates, the distribution of power is going to 
change. This can lead to dissatisfaction as the states that are rising believe they should be 
accruing more benefits than the environment engineered by the dominate state is providing.7 
Importantly, the single state whose relative power is increasing the most, has to be dissatisfied 
with the stable environment for a power transition to occur. If it is satisfied, then the fastest 
 
7 Power transition theory’s second step, dissatisfaction, has been problematized. First, scholars have questioned 
why a state would be dissatisfied with an international order that has been increasing its relative gains (De Soysa, 
Oneal, & Park, 1997; Lemke & Reed, 1998). Second, it has been difficult for scholars to agree on a definition and/or 
measurement for satisfaction/dissatisfaction.  
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growing great power will further integrate itself with the existing international order (Friedberg, 
2005; Ikenberry, 2008, 2012).8 On the other hand, if this particular great power is dissatisfied, 
then it will embark on a revisionist foreign policy and develop into a rising challenger (Davidson, 
2016; Thies & Nieman, 2017).  
 Once a great power embarks on a revisionist foreign policy, there are certain behaviors 
that are expected. First, there is an institutional component. It is argued that revisionist states 
are more likely to not be a part of or to leave international government organizations (IGOs) 
(Chan, 2004). This will negatively affect the stability of the international system as IGO 
membership has been shown to contribute to peace (Oneal & Russett, 2015; Russett, Oneal, & 
Davis, 1998). In addition to this destabilizing behavior, there is a military facet to revisionism 
and it is anticipated that international conflict will intensify. This is because revisionists states 
“will employ military force to change the status quo” (R. L. Schweller, 1994, p. 105). 
Additionally, the dominate state and its allies might be willing to use force in order to prevent 





As a result of a revisionist state’s lack of IGO ties, its willingness to use military force, 
and the possibility that states preferring the status quo will respond with their own military, 
PTT views war as the final step in the power transition process. Not just any war, however, but 
 
8 There is also the notion of power shifts, which argue that rising states can be satisfied with the dominate state’s 
international order while still desiring more of a say on how the system is run (Stephen, 2012), (Schweller, 2011), 
(Hopewell, 2015), (Zangl et al., 2016) 
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a hegemonic war between the dominate state and the rising challenger (Gilpin, 1988, 2017). 
Hegemonic wars are generally seen as the most destructive of wars because the aim of the 
conflict is so profound. As one IR scholar wrote, a hegemonic war is about “crowning a new 
hegemonic king and wiping the global institutional slate clean” (R. Schweller, 2014, p. 143).          
While the concept of hegemonic war might seem straightforward, PTT’s articulation of 
this step has been less than precise. For PTT, there is a crossover period, which is particularly 
turbulent. This occurs when the rising challenger is narrowing the gap in material capabilities 
between itself and the dominate state (Goldstein, 2005, p. 83; Rousseau, 2006, p. 26). Some 
scholars estimate that a crossover begins when the rising challenger has 80 percent of the 
material capabilities of the dominate state (A. F. Organski & Kugler, 1981). 
Though a crossover period has been hypothesized as being a particularly turbulent time, 
why it is so fraught with danger is not clear. Rather, there are two strains of thought. The first, 
is that the declining dominate state will be the initiator of the conflict (Geller, 1992). This is 
because it recognizes that the “difference in their respective growth rates places the dominate 
state increasingly at a disadvantage relative to the challenger” (De Mesquita, 2013, p. 203). As a 
result, it is in the best interest of the declining dominate state to launch a preventative war to 
maintain the status quo (Elman & Elman, 2003; Levy, 1987). In other words, the dominate state 
reasons that it is in its rational self-interest to strike the rising challenger before the latter 
surpasses it.  
 The other perspective is that the rising challenger initiates the conflict (Cashman, 2013, 
p. 413). The reason is the belief that as the rising challenger’s material capabilities increases, it 
will perceive the risk of going to war as decreasing. At a certain point, it will come to the 
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conclusion that the expected benefits of winning the war and establishing a new international 
order is higher than the perceived risk of starting the war (Gilpin, 1981; Lemke & Kugler, 1996). 
Though the rising challenger will eventually overtake the dominate state, it is impatient and risk 
accepting. This leads it to initiate a hegemonic war with the aim of accelerating the power 
transition and bringing the benefits it accrues from the system in line with its rising capabilities 
(Levy & Thompson, 2011).   
 
Results of a Power Transition  
 
 
 If the rising challenger wins the conflict, then it will begin to organize its own stable 
environment. In other words, it will establish rules and regulations, which could be markedly 
different than the ones espoused by the previous dominate state. Additionally, a victorious 
rising challenger will alter the distribution of private goods by shifting the allocation of the 
system’s resources towards its allies and away from the former dominate state and its coalition. 
Lastly, as the former dominate state no longer has the means, the successful rising challenger 
will start to uphold the public goods that are needed for a stable international order. Once all of 
these elements have been satisfied, a transition has occurred.  
 
Why a New Theoretical Understanding of a Power Transition is Needed 
 
 
 While PTT is logically coherent and parsimonious, it has two significant flaws. First, PTT 
identifies two dominate powers – Great Britain and the United States. After examination, 
however, neither country meets the theory’s requirements to be designated as such. Second, 
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the theory’s third step – hegemonic war – and the supposition that it precipitates a power 
transition is not corroborated by the historical record.   
 
The Problem with Power Transition Theory’s Understanding of a Dominate State 
 
 
 Within PTT, the dominate state is defined by two characteristics. First, it has a significant 
relative advantage in material capabilities. Second, the dominate state organizes the entire 
international system by establishing the rules and regulations that govern the interactions of 
lesser tier states. Under examination, both attributes are not assignable to the two dominate 
states identified by PTT – Britain and the United States. 
 In terms of material advantage, Britain does not qualify during its supposed period of 
dominance. As previously mentioned, PTT traditionally uses three measurements to 
approximate state power: GDP, population, and CINC score. In all three categories, Britain did 
not hold a significant advantage or was surpassed by one or more of the great powers during its 
Pax Britannica.  
 According to PTT, the UK’s dominance began after its victory over Napoleonic France – 
around 1815 (Gilpin, 1981; Spiezio, 1990). At this time, Britain should have had a substantial 
relative advantage in GDP, population, and CINC score when compared to the great powers. 
This is simply not the case. Regarding GDP, in 1820, France and Russia had a larger economy 
than Britain – $38, 434, 000 and $37, 710, 000 compared to $36, 232, 000.9 France and Russia 
were also more populous than Britain – 30, 250, 000 people and 48, 600, 000, in contrast to 20, 
 
9  All GDP figures are from Maddison, A. (2006), The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and 
Volume 2: Historical Statistics, Development Centre Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris 
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686, 000.10 The only measurement that Britain had a relative advantage when compared to 
France and Russia in 1820, was its CINC score. While Britain had a .3165, France and Russia had 
a .1233 and .1609, respectfully. The figures for 1820 are displayed in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 
The GDP, Population Size, and CINC Scores for the Leading States in 1820 
 GDP Population CINC 
UK 36, 232,000 20, 686,000 .3165 
France 38, 434,000 30, 250,000 .1233 
Russia 37, 710,000 48, 600,000 .1609 
            
 
 PTT supposes that because of differential growth rates, the dominate state’s lead in the 
three measurements power will decrease over time. Britain, however, did not have a 
substantial lead over France and Russia in the beginning of its supposed period of dominance. 
Instead, it increased its relative advantage as the nineteenth century progressed. Despite 
Britain’s increase in material capabilities relative to France and Russia, it was met by two new 
challengers – Germany and the United States. In 1870, Britain had the largest economy with a 
GDP of $100, 179, 000. The US and Russia were not far behind, however, with economies 
measured at $98, 374,000 and $83, 646, 000. Though Britain’s economy was the strongest, its 
population size of 31, 257, 000 was diminutive compared to Russia’s 84, 500,000. In fact, in 
1870, Britain’s population was second to last, with only Germany being lower. Once again, the 
 
10 All population estimates and CINC scores are from the Correlates of War Project’s National Material Capabilities 
(v5.0) - Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.  
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singular measurement Britain had a substantial relative advantage in was its CINC score of 
.2416. France and Germany, with their scores of .1273 and .1060, were a distant second and 
third.11 The figures for 1870 are shown in Table 1.2.  
 
Table 1.2 
The GDP, Population Size, and CINC Scores for the Leading States in 1870 
         GDP           Population          CINC 
UK 100, 179,000 31, 257,000 .2416 
France 72, 100,000 38, 440,000 .1273 
Russia 83, 646,000 84, 500,000 .0812 
US 98, 374,000 39, 905,000 .0989 
Prussia 71, 429,000 31, 194,000 .1060 
 
 
 Even though Britain was economically surpassed by the United States during the 1870s 
and never held a population advantage over the other great powers, it’s supposed period of 
dominance was not challenged as PTT expects. Rather, it would have to wait until 1913 for the 
rise of a revisionist challenger – Wilhelmine Germany. By this time, Britain did not have a lead 
in any of the three measurements of state power identified by PTT. In fact, in 1913, the UK 
ranked third or last in all three measurements of power. Interestingly, Wilhemine Germany was 
also not a leading contender for most powerful state in the system.  
 
11 While army size is not a traditional measurement for PTT, it should be noted that, Britain “‘failed’ or rather chose 
not to transform [its economic supremacy] into hegemonic capacity” (Hobson, 2002, p. 306). Since Britain had the 
economic resources to create a continental style standing army, however, scholars conclude that “the gap 
between London and continental powerhouses such as France, Russia, and Prussia remained small” (Wohlforth, 
1999, p. 21) 
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 In terms of GDP, by 1913, the United States had an economy estimated to be around 
$517, 383, 000. In contrast, Germany’s was $237, 332, 000 and the Britain’s was $224, 618, 000. 
As with previous years, Britain did not compare favorably with the other great powers’ 
population sizes. On the eve of WWI, the two most populous states were Russia - 170, 900, 000 
- and the United States - 97, 225, 000. Britain’s was second to last – 45, 648, 000. At this time, 
even Britain’s lead in CINC score had dissipated. The United States’ score of .2199 was 
substantially higher than Britain’s .1127 as well as Germany’s .1433. Table 1.3 contains the 
figures for 1913.  
 
Table 1.3 
The GDP, Population Size, and CINC Scores for the Leading States in 1913 
          GDP     Population          CINC 
UK 224, 618,000 45, 648,000 .1127 
France 144, 489,000 39, 770,000 .0680 
Russia 232, 351,000 170, 900,000 .1161 
US  517, 383,000 97, 225,000 .2199 
Germany  237, 332,000 66, 978,000 .1433 
 
 
 Despite the fact that some scholars contend that Britain’s dominance would continue 
until World War II, its material advantage based on PTT’s measurements of power had 
substantially eroded by 1913 (Spiezio, 1990). It did not have the leading economy, it was not 
the most populous state, and its CINC score was a distant third compared to the leading states. 
As discussed, the 1913 figures are not an aberration or an indication of Britain’s decline. Rather, 
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in 1820 and 1870, it did not have a substantial advantage in GDP and its population was on the 
lower end of the spectrum. As a result, it is justifiable to conclude that PTT’s conception of a 
dominate state, based on a substantial relative advantage in GDP, population, and CINC score 
does not apply to Britain during its supposed period of dominance.  
For PTT, a relative material advantage is not the only attribute of a dominate state. It 
also establishes and enforces rules and regulations that affect state interaction at the 
international level. It is possible, Britain fulfilled this criterion of a dominate state. 
PTT contends that the main characteristic of Britain’s era of dominance is its 
promulgation of a free trade economic system and the establishment of open markets (Gilpin, 
1981; Stein, 1997). In other words, during Britain’s period of dominance, it instilled and 
enforced rules and regulations that lead to a free trade regime. Under examination, this 
conclusion proves to be problematic. First, Britain’s repeal of its Corn Laws and Navigation Acts 
did not lead to a global free trade regime as generally viewed (Tena-Junguito, Lampe, & 
Fernandes, 2012). This is because the other great powers did not reciprocate Britain’s lowering 
of its tariffs. Other nations began to lower their tariffs only after the introduction of the “most-
favored nation” clause in trade treaties. This practice began with the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty 
between France and Britain in 1860. This device was not a British invention. Rather, it was 
France that first initiated free trade talks with Britain and eventually became the “hub of a 
European network of free trade treaties that institutionalized the most-favored nation 
principle” (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2013; Lacher & Germann, 2012, p. 109). In essence, there was 
a free trade regime that occurred during Britain’s period of dominance, but it was not the 
primary mover nor the state which constructed an intricate trade network – it was France.    
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  While free trade policies were established when Britain was supposedly the dominate 
state, it was only for a few select decades. As mentioned, scholars argue that the Cobden-
Chevalier Treaty of 1860 ushered in a free trade regime. In contrast, Britain’s period of 
dominance theoretically began after its victory over Napoleonic France around 1815. These two 
dates are in conflict. Though Britain’s hegemony started around 1815, the reduction in tariffs 
and the ushering in of a free trade regime did not begin until around forty-five years later. As a 
result, for the first half of Britain’s period of dominance, the rules and regulations associated 
with it did not exist. 
 Furthermore, while a free trade regime did come to pass after the 1860s, it was brief 
and not all encompassing. First, the U.S. and Russia did not lower their tariffs and their 
economies remained protective throughout the century (O'rourke, 2000). Second, by the late 
1870s, most of the states which were part of the free trade regime reversed course and 
reenacted protectionist measures. After its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, France 
denounced the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty and reestablished protectionist policies (C. P. 
Kindleberger, 1975). As one historian put it, “Except for Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium 
there was virtually no independent country in the late nineteenth century that was not 
protectionist” (Bryan, 2010, p. 22). This is despite the fact the Britain’s period of dominance is 
supposed to last for at least another forty years.  
Thus, the nineteenth century free trade regime supposedly enacted and upheld by 
Britain was neither initiated nor centered around it, did not encompass the entire international 
system, and lasted only for a brief period. Coupled with the earlier analysis of Britain’s material 
capabilities based on PTT’s traditional measurements of power, it is difficult to designate it as a 
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dominate state as it did not fulfill either of the two criteria specified by PTT. It was neither the 
most materially powerful state nor did it enact and enforce rules and regulations that organized 
the interactions of the entire international system.  
Britain is not the only dominate state identified by PTT. After World War II, Britain’s 
period of dominance ended and the U.S. became the preeminent state in the system (Kugler & 
Organski, 1989). In terms of material capabilities, the United States’ GDP in 1950 - 
$1,455,916,000 - was substantially larger than the other great powers. The USSR’s and Britain’s 
economies stood at $510,243,00 and $347,850,000, respectfully. Its population was a relatively 
close second – 152,271,000 - to the USSR’s – 180, 075, 000. The U.S. also had a significant 
relative advantage in CINC score at the start of its period of dominance. In 1950, it had a score 





Once again, PTT contends that the dominate state’s material advantage will dissipate 
relative to the other great powers. For the most part, this did occur during the U.S.’ supposed 
period of dominance. By 1973, the USSR’s economy was growing at a faster rate than the 
Table 1.4 
The GDP, Population Size, and CINC Scores for the Leading States in 1950 
 GDP Population         CINC 
US 1,455, 916 152, 271,000 .2844 
USSR 510, 243,00 180, 075,000 .1805 
UK 347, 850,000 50, 616,000 .0613 
France 220, 492,000 41, 736,000 .0332 
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United States’. It now had a GDP of $1,513,070; compared with the US’ $3, 536, 622. The 
USSR’s population, which was larger than the U.S.’ in 1950, remained in the lead with 
249,802,000 people. The US had a population of 211,909,000. Furthermore, by the 1970s, the 
USSR’s CINC score of .1674 had surpassed the U.S.’, which had a score of .1588. In 
corroboration with PTT’s expectations, the U.S.’ material advantage declined in relative terms 




While PTT’s conceptualization of hegemonic war will be discussed below, suffice it to 
say, the US and the USSR did not go to war as PTT predicts. Rather, after witnessing a relative 
decline in its material advantage, the U.S. would regain its lead by the end of the Cold War. In 
1990, its economy had risen to $5,803,200, while the USSR’s stagnated at $1,987,995. The 
latter’s population size of 281,344,00 remained larger than the U.S.’, which stood at 
249,907,000. The United State, however, regained its advantage in CINC score over the USSR - 
.1413 and .1295, respectfully. Table 1.6 contains the figures for 1990.      
 
Table 1.5 
The GDP, Population Size, and CINC Scores for the Leading States in 1973 
     GDP Population        CINC 
US 3, 536, 622 211, 909, 000 .1588 
USSR 1, 513, 070 249, 802, 000 .1674 
UK 675, 941 56, 223, 000 .0276 
France 683, 965 52, 131, 000 .0247 




The GDP, Population Size, and CINC Scores for the Leading States in 1990 
         GDP        Population                           CINC 
US 5, 803, 200 249,907, 000 .1413 
USSR 1, 987, 995 281,344, 000 .1295 
UK 944, 610 57,561, 000 .0251 
France 1, 026, 491 56,735, 000 .0201 
Germany 1, 264, 438 79,402,000 0.024 
Japan 2, 321, 153 123,478,000 0.055 
 
 
In terms of material advantage, the U.S. better fulfilled the requirements of a dominate 
state when compared to Britain. The U.S.’ GDP was always substantially larger than its closest 
competitor, its population size was not significantly less than the USSR’s, and its CINC score was 
either in the lead or was not markedly behind the leader. In contrast to PTT’s suppositions, 
though, the U.S.’ material advantage declined during its period of dominance but then 
witnessed a resurgence. In other words, despite the fact that differential growth rates lead to a 
decrease in the U.S.’ hard power compared the USSR’s, the same mechanism precipitated a U.S. 
recovery and a continuation of it’s dominate position.  
 PTT is also problematized by the USSR’s flirtation with U.S. parity during the late 1960s 
and 1970s. During this period, the USSR pursued a foreign policy based on détente. This runs 
counter to the behavioral predictions of PTT. Rather than pursuing a more revisionist grand 
strategy, the USSR became a status quo power. Its main concern being the stability of its 
Eastern European allies rather than gaining new ones (Selvage, 2009).  
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 Though the U.S. mostly fulfilled the material requirements of a dominate state, that is 
not the concept’s only definitional characteristic. A dominate state also organizes the entire 
international system. In that respect, the U.S. falls short. During most of its period of 
dominance, there was a substantial portion of the globe where the U.S. did not have the ability 
to establish and enforce rules and regulation.           
 Despite the fact that after 1945, the U.S. constructed multinational institutions such as 
NATO, the IMF, GATT/WTO, the World Bank, and the UN, these organizations did not form a 
complete world order (Ruggie, 1994). This is because some of these institutions were regional 
rather than global. Furthermore, Soviet Russia established its own set of political, economic, 
social, and military organizations. These competing sets of rules and regulations were in many 
ways incompatible with the U.S.’ order as they rested on different philosophical foundations. 
The U.S. espoused and sought to promulgate liberal democratic capitalism, while Soviet Russia 
followed the principles of Marxist-Leninist socialism. This ideological and institutional division is 
what precipitated the Cold War as the U.S. and Soviet Russia both aspired to expand their 
institutional authority. As a result, the United States does not fulfill the second characteristic of 
a dominate state as it did not organize the entire international system. Instead, its period of 
supposed dominance is generally understood as an era of intense bipolar competition when 
both Soviet Russia and the U.S. attempted to become the preeminent world power (McMahon, 
2013).              
 
The Problem with Power Transition Theory’s Third Step – Hegemonic War  
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 While PTT’s mischaracterization of a dominate state is problematic, it is not the theory’s 
only deficiency. Rather, its third step – hegemonic war – is not corroborated by the historical 
record. As previously mentioned, the theory argues that once a rising challenger reaches a 
certain position of power, war is likely to occur between the challenger and the dominate state. 
If the challenging state wins, a transition in international order will transpire as the newly 
crowned dominate state establishes and enforces its rules and regulations. This step, however, 
does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Since 1800, rising challengers have not been able to win 
their hegemonic attempts. This is because their actions have led to a counterbalancing 
coalition. Additionally, the only power transition to occur since the dawn of the nineteenth 
century – the transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana – was peaceful.  
 According to PTT, the first half of the twentieth century was characterized by the Anglo-
German rivalry (Chan, 2007). Germany’s first attempt to overthrow Britain as the system’s 
dominate state began at the end of the nineteenth century, when the former started to pursue 
a policy of weltpolitik (Hamilton & Herwig, 2003). With its new revisionist foreign policy, 
Germany became embroiled in a number of international crises. As a result, antagonism against 
German aggression developed not only in Britain but also in other great powers. When 
Germany finally launched its bid to become the system’s dominate state in 1914, it faced a 
balancing coalition of Russia, France, and Britain. Furthermore, an adventurist foreign policy 
during the war led the United States to enter against Germany. Thus, the rising challenger’s 
revisionist behavior leading up to the outbreak of war led to a counter balancing coalition 
which prevented Germany from winning said war and replacing Britain as the new dominate 
state.  
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 For PTT, World War I was Germany’s first attempt at replacing Britain as the system’s 
dominate state (Lebow & Valentino, 2009). Despite the fact that Germany’s attempt failed in 
1914, within twenty-five years it was able to rebuild its economic and military might and launch 
a second bid for dominance – World War II. As in the first attempt, Germany pursued a 
revisionist foreign policy, which first elicited an alliance between Britain and the United States. 
Germany’s decision to invade Russia led to the entrance of the USSR on the side of the two 
Western allies. Consequently, Germany lost the hegemonic war that was WWII.  
Since Germany lost both of its bids to replace Britain as the system’s dominate state, 
one cannot conclude that a challenging state’s attempt to overturn the international system 
through hegemonic war will be successful. Instead, history shows that a rising challenger’s 
revisionist actions will result in a counter balancing coalition that will preclude it from winning 
said war. As a result, PTT’s third step needs to be called into question as a rising challenger will 
most likely not overthrow the dominate state through a hegemonic war.  
To make the point stronger, PTT does conclude that Britain’s dominate position was 
eventually eclipsed and a power transition took place. Rather than through a hegemonic war, 
however, the United States became the system’s dominate state through a peaceful transition 
(Schake, 2017). Materially, the United States started to overtake Britain during the latter-half of 
the twentieth century. Instead of leading to conflict, which PTT predicts, both states developed 
a benign image of the other. This development occurred because both states characterized 
themselves as liberal capitalist. This ideological agreement manifested in their foreign policy 
decisions as both states chose to exhibit restraint and accommodation (Davidson & Sucharov, 
2001)  
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While the United States started to materially overtake Britain during the nineteenth 
century, the transfer of international leadership did not take place until after World War II. 
Once again, this occurrence was peaceful, which goes against the tenets of PTT. There are three 
main reasons as to why. First, as the above paragraph indicates, the United States and Britain 
both developed a benign image of the other and agreed on certain ideological principles 
centering around liberal capitalism. Second, after WWII, Soviet Russia emerged as an increasing 
threat to the liberal powers, including the United States and Britain (Lascurettes, 2020). Third, 
the United States did not pursue a revisionist foreign policy after WWII, thus not indicating an 
expansionist agenda. Instead, it was actually spurred on by invitation by Britain as well as other 





According to PTT, the international system goes through a recurring process which leads 
to a transition in international leadership. A dominate state, defined by its relative power 
advantage, establishes rules and regulations that order the entire system. The law of unequal 
growth rates leads to a loss in the dominate state’s hard power preponderance and the rise of a 
challenging great power. This latter state then grows dissatisfied with the system’s 
configuration, which results in a hegemonic war.   
Despite PTT’s logical coherence and parsimony, it suffers from a fatal flaw. It is not 
corroborated by the historical record. First, its conceptualization of a dominate state – defined 
by a substantial relative advantage in power and its ability to organize the entire international 
system – does not withstand empirical scrutiny. Second, PTT’s third step – hegemonic war – has 
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historically not led to a power transition. Rather, the revisionist foreign policy of a challenging 
great power has precipitated a coalition made up of the dominate state and certain great 
powers that prevents it from winning said war and gaining international leadership. In contrast, 
the only power transition since the nineteenth century began, occurred peacefully. As a result 
of these shortcomings, a new theory needs to be developed that explains how and why the 
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While the last chapter summarized and critiqued PTT, this chapter will flesh out the 
basic assumptions, mechanism, and steps of a newly conceptualized understanding of a power 
transition - Polar Co-option Theory (PCT). As will be stated, there are significant differences 
between PTT and PCT. Foremost among them, is their contrasting understanding of the 
structure of the international system. For PTT, there is a single dominate state that organizes 
the entire international system. In contrast, PCT contends that the system has, for the most 
part, been organized by a number of states – the polar powers. These states, defined by their 
disproportionate amount of authority, segment the system into separate territorial orders. As a 
result of this contrasting understanding of the structure of the international system, PCT seeks 
to explain how and why transitions in the number of polar powers and their requisite territorial 
orders occur, i.e. when the international system transitions from multipolar to bipolar and then 
to a unipolar configuration.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. In congruence with the previous chapter, the first 
section fleshes out PCT’s understanding of the international system and highlights how it is 
different from PTT. The second section identifies the theory’s mechanism and the steps it 
predicts will result in a polar co-option.       
  
Polar Co-option Theory’s Understanding of the International System 
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Before the process of a polar co-option can be understood, the theory’s basic 
assumptions need to be fleshed out. As with the section on PTT, this discussion will focus on the 
“entities and processes that are presupposed by” PCT (Wagner, 2016, p. 31).  
For PCT, the most important actors are poles. The conception of a pole was first 
introduced by Morton Kaplan in his 1957 work System and Process in International Politics (M. 
A. Kaplan, 2005). As a result of this early introduction, the term has become a staple in IR 
theory’s nomenclature. Most importantly, the notion of a pole is generally used as an ordering 
principle when describing the structure of the international system (Zala, 2017). A system with 
three or more poles is understood to be multipolar. When there are two poles, the system is 
bipolar. A unipolar structure has a singular pole.  
For PTT, the dominate power is categorized as having a relative advantage in material 
capabilities – GDP, population size, and CINC score. Rather than material capabilities, PCT 
conceptualizes the polar powers as having a disproportionate amount of authority (D. Lake, 
2013).1  As a result of this authority, poles have institutional power (Grevi, 2009; Van 
Langenhove, 2010). In other words, they have the ability to establish and enforce rules and 
regulations that affect lesser tier states. While a dominate state establishes rules and 
regulations that affect the international system, PCT’s understanding of poles and their effect 
on lesser tier states is markedly different.   
First, for PTT, the dominate state affects state interactions at the international level. In 
contrast, PCT argues that poles establish rules and regulations that affect the internal structure 
 
1 The difference between authority and material capabilities is that the former is an end in itself while the latter is 
a means to an end. For example, within PTT, material capabilities is used as a means to create and maintain an 
international order.  
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of lesser tier states; i.e. at the domestic level. This phenomenon is associated with imperial 
powers. As a result, one can equate PCT’s understanding of a pole with a state that possesses 
an empire; for example, Britain was the pole at the center of the British Empire (Jorgensen, 
2013). Russia ought to be considered a polar power during tsarist and Soviet times.  
Following the literature on empires, PCT argues that poles engage in imperialistic 
practices. Despite this straightforward statement, imperialism is a convoluted term. If empire is 
the unit, then imperialism “is often used to refer to the process whereby empire is maintained 
and expanded” (Kiely, 2010, p. 2).2 Barbara Bush identified four dimensions in which 
imperialism affects lesser tier states. She explained, “Imperial power relationships involve the 
interaction of economic, political, social, and cultural ‘imperialism’” (2014, pp. 43-44). 
Alexander Motyl compiled a comparable list of dimensions the imperial powers affect in lesser 
tier states: “Core elites craft foreign and defense policy, control the armed forces, regulate the 
economy, process information, maintain law and order, extract resources, pass legislation, and 
oversee borders” (Motyl, 2001, p. 15). Similarly, Michel Doyle wrote, “The forces and 
institutions that drive and shape imperialism…are both economic and military, and also 
political, social, and cultural” (1986, p. 19). George Steinmetz’s research on imperialism also 
highlighted the same dimensions. He stated that “earlier theorists tended to foreground 
political, military, or economic causal mechanisms, whereas current work integrates all these 
factors with attention to ideological, linguistic, psychic, and cultural processes” (2013, p. 2). As 
a result of these insights, we can determine that poles affect the internal composition of lesser 
 
2 By shifting the conversation to imperialism, we bypass the important conceptual differences of informal and 
formal empire (M. Brown, 2009; Darwin, 2012, p. 86; Gallagher & Robinson, 1953).  
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tier states along four broad dimensions – politically, economically, militarily, and socio-
culturally.  
It needs to be stated, however, that each pole does not affect every lesser tier state in 
the system. That is the second important difference between PTT’s conceptualization of a 
dominate state and PCT’s notion of a pole. For PTT, the entire international system is organized 
by a single dominate state. In contrast PCT, takes the position that it is historically more 
accurate to describe the international system, before 1990, as populated by a number of poles, 
each acting as a “center of decision” for the lesser tier states they have authority over (James & 
Brecher, 1988). 
When the international system is multipolar, there are at least three polar powers that 
hold authority over a substantial number of lesser tier states. A bipolar system is characterized 
by two poles, each with their own set of rules and regulations and requisite territorial orders. 
Akin to a dominate state in PTT, a unipolar order only has one pole that institutionally leads and 
is tied to most states around the globe.  
 If the international system is divided by the poles into different territorial orders, what is 
the theorized structure of these orders? Simply put, they are conceptualized as a hub-and-
spoke configuration. To be more precise, the poles are viewed as hubs sitting in the center of 
their own institutional web with lesser tier states – spokes – being organized by them 
(Ikenberry, 2011, 2012). This theoretical governing model is not a new formulation, but the 
same hypothetical structure scholars use to describe empires (Galtung, 1971; Motyl, 2001).  
 At this point, it should be recognized that PCT’s understanding of the international 
system is markedly different than PTT. First, for PTT, the dominate state is defined by its 
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material capabilities. In contrast, the polar powers are characterized by their authority. The 
second major difference is PTT’s understanding that the entire international system is 
organized by a single dominate state. In contrast, PCT, takes the position that it is historically 
more accurate to view the system, before 1990, as segmented into different territorial orders, 
which are schematically akin to a hub-and-spoke structure. Poles, acting as institutional hubs 
because of their disproportionate amount of authority, establish and enforce rules and 
regulations that tie them to their spokes. 
This notion that poles are institutional hubs leads to the third major difference between 
PCT and PTT. Within the latter, the dominate states establishes rules and regulations that affect 
the interaction of states at the international level. Polar co-option theory argues that the polar 
powers do not just affect the interactions of lesser tier states at the international level but also 
their domestic structure. In other words, poles are imperial powers that affect their spokes 
along the four dimensions of imperialism: politically, economically, militarily, and socio-
culturally.      
While the above conceptual differences are important, PCT’s and PTT’s basic 
assumptions can be contrasted further. This is because PCT does not adhere to PTT’s 
assumption that self-interest propels state behavior. Rather, PCT subscribes to the assumption 
that states are conditioned by the anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz, 2001, 
2010). To put it another way, since the system does not have an overarching authority to 
protect the wellbeing of states, each state realizes that it needs to fend for its own survival. This 
need to be self-interested, necessitated by the system’s anarchy, is what produces the 
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repetitious conflict between states - including the polar powers (Mearsheimer, 2001). To put it 
succinctly, PTT is based on rational choice, whereas PCT is structural.  
While there are many variants of structural realism, PCT adheres to the tenets of 
offensive realism. As a result, PCT takes a pessimistic approach to international relations (Tang, 
2008). First, it assumes that the fear generated by the anarchic structure in the system and 
states’ uncertainty about the future cannot be mitigated. This leads to a continuous cycle of 
competition as each state is always fearful that any disadvantage can potentially threaten its 
survival. As a result, both offensive realism and PCT argue that states ought to be power 
maximizers. This means that each state should continuously seek out opportunities to increase 
their relative material capabilities vis-a-vis the other states in the system. This is because in a 
self-help anarchic world, where the present and future intentions of other states are not 
known, it is assumed the most powerful state in the system is in the safest position (Elman, 
2004; Tang, 2008).     
 Second, following the tenets of offensive realism, PCT subscribes to the belief that 
states will not only be concerned with the present, they will also have a large amount of 
concern about the future (Rathbun, 2007). Additionally, states will act on a negative perception 
of other states’ future intentions. This leads to the expectation that states will not only desire 
to have a relative advantage in material capabilities in the present but also look to lock-in their 
advantage for the future. Though these assumptions are built into offensive realism, PCT needs 
to fill a hole within the former.       
Offensive realism argues that a state should continually seek out opportunities to 
increase its relative advantage vis-a-vis the other states. As a result of the uncertainty about the 
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future, states are not only concerned about the present but desire to have their advantageous 
position preserved. But as Glenn Snyder pointed out, offensive realism “never explicitly” 
explains how a state establishes an environment where its present relative gains can be carried 
into the future (Snyder, 2002, p. 153). Polar co-option theory provides a supposition to this 
theoretical hole: a state should seek to expand its authority over other states in order to 
establish institutions – i.e. rules and regulations.   
Polar co-option theory makes this assumption because institutions satisfy the goals 
offensive realism subscribes to states. First, a state ensures its survival by becoming the most 
powerful state in the system. It achieves this objective by focusing on relative gains 
(Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 35). Based on the insights of distributive institutionalism (Krasner, 
1991), it is assumed that the best method for a state to ensure unequal gains in comparison to 
the other states is by establishing rules and regulations that provide the fabric of a global or 
territorial order. According to offensive realism, a state’s objective is not just to reap unequal 
benefits vis-a-vis the other states in the present but also in the future (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 
33). This leads PCT to turn to historical institutionalism, which posits that once institutions are 
created, they are very difficult to alter or displace because of lock-in effects (Fioretos, 2011; 
Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). As a result, institutions fulfill the two objectives stated by offensive 
realism: 1) a state ensures it will reap unequal gains and 2) that this advantageous situation will 
persist into the future.  
 In totality, there are four major differences between PTT’s and PCT’s understanding of 
the international system. First, authority rather than material power is paramount. Second, the 
most important actors are not single unit states, but composite imperial entities called poles. 
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Third, within PCT, there is not a single dominate state that organizes the entire international 
system. Rather, poles divide the system by establishing hub-and-spoke territorial orders. 
Fourth, PTT argues that state action is propelled by self-interest. The dominate state and the 
lesser tier states agree to rules and regulations because they believe it will benefit them. Polar 
co-option theory, on the other hand, views the anarchic nature of the international system and 
the fear it produces as the prime mover of state action. The differences between PTT and PCT 




The Process of a Polar Co-option 
 
 
 Transitions in the number of poles and their requisite territorial orders do not occur 
often. This work identifies just five such occurrences since the start of the 1800s. In the 
Table 2.1 
Differences in Power Transition Theory’s and Polar Co-option Theory’s Basic Assumptions 
 Most important 
actors 
Structure of the 
system 






by their material 
capabilities 
Single hierarchy 
led by a 
dominate state 







are defined by 
their authority 
over lesser tier 






orders, each led 
by a polar power 
Authority Fear and                                                                            
uncertainty      
generated by 
the    anarchic 
structure of the 
international 
system 
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Western Hemisphere, the Spanish Empire collapsed, which first led to an increase in Britain’s 
authority (first co-option) and then to the development of a U.S. order (second co-option).3 In 
North Africa and the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned with France and Britain 
gaining authority over a number of spokes (third co-option). After World War II, Britain and 
France lost authority over their territorial orders, which led to the expansion of the U.S.’ and, to 
a far lesser extent, the USSR’s authority (fourth co-option). With the culmination of the Cold 
War, the world witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the further enlargement of 
the U.S.’ territorial order (fifth co-option).    
 Despite the infrequency of polar co-options, each of the above instances followed a 
recurring pattern of events. As a result, this work postulates that all polar co-options will follow 
the same mechanism and succession of steps.  
 
A Stable Environment 
 
 
 Before the polar co-option process begins, a stable environment prevails. This is 
organized by the aforementioned poles. As a result of their disproportionate amount of 
authority, each pole establishes its own territorial order. These orders theoretically take the 
form of a hub-and-spoke configuration with each polar power in the center holding institutional 
authority over lesser tier states - or, spokes (Ikenberry, 2012). In the literature, this hub-and-
spoke configuration is analogous to how scholars describe empires (Motyl, 2001). In fact, one 
 
3 An analysis on the decline of the Spanish Empire in the Western Hemisphere can be found in (Blaufarb, 2007). 
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scholar wrote that “only states, indeed empires, have been considered for ‘pole-hood’” 
(Jorgensen, 2013, p. 49).  
 States that possess an empire practice imperialism, which pertains to when one state 
alters the internal composition of another. For PCT, the poles, or hubs, establish rules and 
regulations that affect lesser-tier states, or spokes, within their territorial order. These 
constraints affect their spokes along four dimensions: politically, economically, militarily, and 
socio-culturally.  
As a result, a system that is stable is divided into different territorial orders that are 
theoretically schematically akin to a hub-and-spoke configuration. At the center, is a pole, 
acting as an institutional hub. Around the pole, will be its spokes. With each pole establishing 
rules and regulations that affect their spokes along the four dimensions of imperialism. 
There are two reasons why this divided environment is stable. First, the authority of the 
poles is not being questioned. This is a two-pronged phenomenon as the poles’ authority is 
recognized at different levels. First, each spoke is adhering to the rules and regulations 
espoused by their pole. Second, the poles in the system are not seeking to co-opt any of the 
spokes of the other polar powers and thus are not destabilizing any of the territorial orders.  
The second reason why this environment is stable is the development of an informal 
structure as each pole calculates the fear produced by the other poles’ territorial order. Rather 
than balance-of-power, this conceptualization is based on balance-of-threat (Stephen M Walt, 
1990; Waltz, 2010). To determine each pole’s position in the informal structure, the other 
poles’ geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions are taken into 
account (Stephen M Walt, 1990). In other words, pole X is in close proximity to pole Y and has 
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malign intentions. On the other hand, pole Z is not geographically close to pole Y and does not 
wish to cause it harm. These factors will lead pole Y to conclude that pole X produces more fear 
than pole Z. Consequently, pole X will place pole Y higher in its informal structure than pole Z. 
 
Polar Co-option Theory’s Mechanism 
 
 
Variability of Authority  
 
 
 After the respective poles establish their hub-and-spoke territorial orders, there is a 
period of relative peace. Rather than the material advantage of the dominate state, PCT’s 
stability is based on two components. The first element is a multilevel understanding of where 
authority resides. At the spoke-to-pole level, lesser tier states adhere to the rules and 
regulations established by the pole that has authority over them. At the pole-to-pole level, 
there is an implicit or explicit agreement as to which spokes are part of which pole’s territorial 
order. The second facet of PCT’s stable environment is each poles’ perception that none of the 
poles and their territorial orders should be feared given their geographical location, offensive 
capabilities, and perceived intentions.  
 This environment, engineered by the polar powers, will not last as PCT predicts that one 
pole will lose authority over its spokes. The mechanism which leads to this decrease is the 
variability of authority. As David Lake explained, “authority is not a constant, but a variable that 
exists in greater or lesser degrees in different times and places” (D. A. Lake, 2009, p. 20). 
Consequently, PCT assumes that the stable environment engineered by the poles will come 
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undone because of the variability of authority, which will lead to fluctuations in each pole’s 
ability to establish and enforce rules and regulations that affect their spokes.    
 In other words, the environment fostered by the poles is stable because the 
segmentation of the international system does not produce an extensive amount of fear in the 
polar powers. These segments, however, are based on a two-levelled understanding of where 
authority lies. As a result of PCT’s sole mechanism - the variability of authority - it is predicted 
that this environment will become destabilized when a pole’s authority over its spokes 
invariably declines.  
 
Steps of the Polar Co-option Process 
 
 
One Pole Loses Authority Over its Spokes 
 
 
   As a result of PCT’s sole mechanism, the variability of authority, it is predicted that there 
will be fluctuations in the amount of authority each pole possesses. This leads to PCT’s first 
hypothesized step in the polar co-option process: one pole, subsequently called a moribund 
pole, loses its authority over spokes within its territorial order. This will be a two-pronged 
process as a moribund pole will lose its authority at both the spoke-to-pole level and the pole-
to-pole level. Polar Co-option Theory assumes these two phenomena are integrally tied 
together.   
Once a pole’s authority is declining at the spoke-to-pole level, PCT predicts certain 
behaviors. First, PCT views cumulative endemic unrest in the territorial order of the moribund 
pole as a recurring feature of the polar co-option process. This is because a pole uses its 
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authority to establish and enforce rules in its spokes. If a pole is losing its authority, then the 
spokes will begin to flout rules and regulations of the territorial order it is a part of, which will 
result in unrest. A pole’s loss of authority can occur because of many reasons but determining 
that is beyond the scope of this work.4 What matters for polar co-option is that the spokes, for 
whatever reason, no longer adhere to their pole’s authority and begin to flout the rules and 
regulations of their territorial order. 
Once a pole’s authority over its spokes is in decline, its spokes’ propensity to comply 
with its rules and regulations will go down. Rather than a singular instance of rule-breaking, 
however, the spokes will continuously flout the rules and regulations of its pole. This is because 
the phenomenon of “a pole losing its authority” is invariably tied not just to a pole losing its 
ability to establish rules and regulations but also to its inability to effectively punish spokes that 
break its rules (D. A. Lake, 2009, 2013).  
Since a pole cannot adequately punish spokes that are breaking its rules, it is expected 
that the unrest within a pole’s territorial order will not be suppressed but grow to an endemic 
level. This expectation should not be altered depending on the kind of unrest that is occurring. 
Scholars have identified a number of reasons why unrest takes place; for example, it can center 
around political issues (Su, 2015), economic concerns (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Smith, 2014), 
and/or ideational problems (Fox, 2004; Sambanis & Shayo, 2013). Furthermore, the unrest can 
be a grassroots uprising, or it can be an elite concern. Regardless of the reasons why and at 
which stratification of society it occurs, it is expected that the unrest will grow to a destabilizing 
level.  
 
4 For that discussion one can look at the works of (Finnemore, 2009) and (Imerman, 2018) 
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This destabilization within the moribund pole’s territorial order, will lead to an 
agreement at the pole-to-pole level that the declining pole’s authority over its spokes is 
lessening. What is meant by the word agreement? It is based on the premise that authority is 
an intersubjective construct (Hurd, 1999). At the spoke-to-pole level, the lesser tier states 
consent to be part of a hierarchical relationship with a particular pole. At the pole-to-pole level, 
hierarchy is not involved because none of the poles are subordinate to another. Rather, the 
poles intersubjectively come to an agreement that a pole exercises authority over certain 
spokes because of strategic calculations. The other poles will agree, however, that a moribund 
pole’s authority over its spokes is in decline when they notice the destabilization within its 
territorial order. In other words, the unrest within a moribund pole’s spokes will alert the other 
poles that it has lost its authority over said spokes.  
PCT stipulates that for the polar co-option process to begin, a pole needs to lose its 
authority over its spokes at both the spoke-to-pole and the pole-to-pole levels. The latter 
phenomenon is predicted to occur as a result of the endemic unrest in the moribund pole’s 
territorial order. To put it more succinctly, the mechanism of a pole losing its authority over its 
spokes and the endemic unrest that is predicted to follow will lead the other poles to the 
intersubjective understanding that the moribund pole no longer has authority over its spokes. 
     
An Increase in the Level of Fear within the Polar Powers  
 
 
 Exclusively, a pole’s loss of authority does not lead to a polar co-option. A second step 
needs to transpire. For PCT, this second step is an increased level of fear. As previously 
mentioned, PCT adopts the basic assumptions of structural realism. This means that poles are 
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fearful of one another because of the anarchic structure of the international system. Within 
structural realism, however, there is a divide centering around the amount of fear this anarchy 
generates.   
For defensive realists, the fear produced by the system’s structure is affected by several 
modifiers. Some examples are: “the offense-defense balance in military technology, geographic 
proximity, access to raw materials, international economic pressure, regional or dyadic military 
balances, and the ease with which states can extract resources from conquered territory” 
(Taliaferro, 2001, p. 137). Based on the understanding that fear is affected by state action, 
defensive realists argue that states should not pursue an aggressive foreign policy because it 
will increase the level of fear and uncertainty of other states. In other words, defensive realism 
argues that a state seeking to expand to increase its power is actually doing itself a disservice 
since its very expansion will decrease its security through the process of alarming other states 
(Jervis, 1978).  
In contrast, PCT adheres to the principles of offensive realism. This variant of structural 
realism takes a more pessimistic approach than its defensive cousin (Tang, 2008). First, it 
assumes that the fear generated by the anarchic structure in the system cannot be mitigated. 
This leads to a continuous cycle of competition as each pole is always fearful that any 
disadvantage can potentially threaten its survival. As a result, both offensive realism and PCT 
argue that the poles ought to adopt power maximizing behavior. This means that each pole 
should continuously seek out opportunities to increase their relative material capabilities vis-à-
vis the other poles in the system. This is because in an anarchic self-help world, where the 
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present and future intentions of other poles are not known, it is assumed the most powerful 
pole in the system is in the safest position (Elman, 2004; Tang, 2008). 
As stipulated by the tenets of offensive realism, once the poles recognize that the 
moribund pole no longer has authority over its territorial order, a polar competition for the 
moribund pole’s spokes will begin. This competition is caused by each pole’s fear that if they do 
not extend their authority over the moribund pole’s spokes, then another pole will. Thus, giving 
the latter pole an advantage that could potentially threaten the other poles’ survival. 
Once fear has ignited a polar competition, PCT expects certain behaviors. First, it is 
known that the most important states do not just affect the behavior of lesser tier states but 
also the behavior among themselves (Jervis, 1985; Mitzen, 2013). This leads PCT to expect that 
once the other poles recognize that the moribund pole no longer has authority over its spokes, 
they will begin to exhibit signaling behaviors (Frankel, 1996). These signals are caused by each 
poles’ desire to seem benevolent and decrease the level of fear it produces.  
These communications can take the form of internal discussions or public statements. 
The messages will focus on the professed stability between the poles, the possibility of 
reinstituting the moribund pole’s authority over its spokes, and assurances that excessive 
relative gains will not be sought. Additionally, each pole will highlight the benefits of their 
institutional authority and stipulate that the spokes which are witnessing unrest ought to be 
part of their territorial order.  
Overall, each pole will use these dialogues to signal that they have benign rather than 
selfish intentions. Their hope is to reduce the amount of fear they elicit in the other poles since 
they know the other polar powers can affect the polar co-option process. In reality, however, 
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each pole will seek out opportunities to reap as much relative gains as they can from the 
moribund pole’s loss of authority. This can occur by helping to further destabilize the spokes 
which are witnessing unrest or attempting to block other poles from extending their authority. 
In other words, the poles will attempt to use their signals to misrepresent their intentions by 
providing altruistic sentiments as they act selfishly.    
Second, upon becoming aware of the unrest in the moribund pole’s territorial order, the 
other poles will have internal deliberations pertaining to how the collapse of the moribund 
pole’s territorial order will affect the distribution of capabilities in the present and future. 
Introducing a unit level feature into the structurally based theory that is PCT might seem 
contradictory or risky (Narizny, 2017). As offensive realism is a variant of structural realism, it 
assumes that a state’s domestic politics can be treated as a black-box (Kapstein, 1995). The 
anarchic nature of the international system, the fear it produces, and the inability to know 
other states intentions, pressures states – regardless of domestic configuration – to enact self-
help policies and seek relative gains or suffer the consequences (Donnelly, 2000). In essence, 
the anarchic structure of the international system cancels out domestic level variables because 
it exerts the same pressure and provides incentives for all states to act the same (Waltz, 2010).  
States are also strategic and pay attention to their external environment. They calculate 
the risk and rewards of certain actions given the structural incentives particular to them 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). For theories that are structural, anarchy is not the only feature of the 
international system. The distribution of capabilities amongst the various units also creates an 
informal structure that structural theorists recognize (Buzan, Jones, Richard, & Little, 1993).  
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In other words, while the overall structure of the international system is anarchic, 
informal positional structures develop (Grieco, 1988; James, 1993). For PCT, each pole 
establishes an informal hierarchy based on the level of fear the other poles produce. Where 
one pole places the others within its informal internal structure affects its foreign policy 
decisions. Additionally, poles fear how changes in the system’s territorial orders and the 
expected shift in the distribution of capabilities will affect them in the present as well as in the 
future. Where they have these deliberations are at the domestic level. This leads PCT to reason 
that once the other poles agree that a moribund pole no longer has authority over its spokes, 
fear will prompt the other poles to have internal discussions to develop a strategy with the 
hope of lessening the effects of the ensuing polar competition and ensure their survival.  
These deliberations will center around perceived long-term power trends, how these 
trends will affect the distribution of material capabilities, and the fear these developments elicit 
(Taliaferro, 2004; Stephen M Walt, 1990). Specifically, there is a high likelihood that at least 
one, if not all of the poles, will discuss domino effect (Jervis & Snyder, 1991; Slater, 1993). 
Furthermore, the conclusions reached during these internal deliberations will manifest 
themselves in the poles’ foreign policy decisions. For example, a polar power that concludes 
that it has the capabilities and ought to expand their authority to prevent another pole from 
expanding theirs, will turn into a prospective co-opting pole.             
These internal discussions will also determine which prospective co-opting pole will be 
one step closer to completing the co-option process. This is because it is imperative that a 
prospective co-opting pole does not meet with resistance from the other poles that it cannot 
overcome. Since each pole is concerned with its own survival, the amount of resistance a 
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prospective co-opting pole will face is determined by the amount of fear it engenders in the 
other poles (Stephen M. Walt, 1988). If a prospective co-opting pole or the spokes it is 
incorporating does not pose a threat to the other poles, then it will receive little opposition 
from them. To determine whether a prospective co-opting pole should be feared, the other 
poles will consider the pole’s geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived 
intentions (Stephen M Walt, 1990). If a pole determines that a prospective co-opting pole’s 
actions are not to be feared, for example because the spokes the latter is trying to co-opt are 
geographically distant, then the pole will act as a status quo pole, which means it is not seeking 
to co-opt the spokes of the moribund pole. This, nevertheless, does not preclude a status quo-
pole from attempting to influence the co-option process or gain concessions for itself.   
To put the argumentation another way, one of the features of the polar co-option 
process is that the other poles will internally deliberate how the dissolution of the moribund 
pole’s territorial order will affect the distribution of power in the present but also in the future. 
This, in turn, affects their informal positional hierarchy based on varying levels of fear. It did not 
say these deliberations will lead the other poles to oppose the prospective co-opting pole with 
the most material capabilities. To the contrary, the other poles will welcome the shift in the 
relative distribution of power, if it is shifting towards the prospective co-opting pole that elicits 
the least amount of fear compared to the other prospective co-opting pole.        
   
The Prospective Co-opting Pole tries to Co-opt Spokes 
 
 
 If the other poles do not fear a prospective co-opting pole, then that pole is one step 
closer to completing the co-option process. It just needs to satisfy the final step – co-option. 
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The reason why a prospective co-opting pole would want to co-opt spokes is their uncertainty 
about the future. As previously mentioned, a pole does not just fear the distribution of material 
capabilities in the present but also possesses a great amount of uncertainty about the future. 
As a result, a pole will desire to lock-in their relative gains. Given the assumptions of distributive 
and historical institutionalism, it is believed that the best way for a pole to lock-in an 
advantageous situation is by establishing institutions – i.e. rules and regulations. As a result, 
during this stage in the polar co-option process, a prospective co-opting pole will seek to 
expand its authority so it can establish rules and regulations that affect the internal 
composition of spokes that were previously tied to a moribund pole.   
 There are three ways a pole can co-opt spokes. These pathways towards co-option 
correspond with the “ideal-type mechanisms of social control” (Hurd, 1999, p. 379). There are 
three reasons why entities adhere to rules established by a hierarchical authority. The reasons 
are legitimacy, incentives, and coercion.  
Despite the term “legitimacy” being ubiquitous in IR, it still needs to be conceptually 
clarified (Steffek, 2007). At its core, it refers to a population’s belief that their ruler’s judgment 
is favorable or in their best interest (Mulligan, 2006). This conceptualization captures an 
important point about legitimacy. It is a relational or social phenomenon (Finnemore, 2009). 
Legitimacy cannot be forced; it can only be earned through a population’s approval of its ruler’s 
policies. The foundation for this approval does not matter as there are many different causes of 
legitimacy (Gilley, 2006). What matters for PCT, is a prospective co-opting pole can use its 
legitimacy to co-opt spokes of a moribund pole. In other words, if the spokes of a moribund 
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pole view a prospective co-opting pole’s rules and regulations to be legitimate, then they will 
not oppose joining the prospective co-opting pole’s territorial order.   
 When legitimacy is not enough, a prospective co-opting pole can use incentives to 
appeal to the self-interest of the spokes it wants to co-opt. During a “rewards” based co-option, 
the prospective co-opting pole grants certain institutional privileges to the spokes it is 
attempting to co-opt (Kruck & Zangl, 2019; Selznick, 1980). In the nineteenth century, this 
usually entailed elevating a particular social group or family. In modern times, a prospective co-
opting pole can use the tactic of “selective accommodations.” For instance, appeasement, 
compensation, or endorsement (Crawford, 2011). In military terms, a prospective co-opting 
pole can use its resources to support an embattled state or a revolutionary group who is trying 
to gain power (David, 1991). In economic terms, a co-opting pole can provide incentives – i.e. 
financial assistance or grant preferential trade terms – to a spoke it hopes will join its territorial 
order and accept its authority.      
   If a spoke is not willing to be co-opted by a prospective co-opting pole, the latter can 
pursue coercive measures. These policies can either be in the military or economic realms. In 
terms of the former, a prospective co-opting pole can take military coercive action to extend its 
authority over a spoke. Examples of coercive military measures, are conducting war or other 
operations, mobilizing troops, and building up arms (Slantchev, 2005, p. 533). Economic 
coercion can also be used by a co-opting pole to gain authority over the spokes of a moribund 
pole. Economic coercion is generally defined “as the threat or act by a sender government or 
governments to disrupt economic exchange with the target state” (Drezner, 2003, p. 643). 
While this definition focuses on the disruption of economic exchange between the sender and 
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target state, a definition of economic coercion should include the ability for a sender 
government to disrupt the economic exchange between a target state and other states in the 
system. Some examples of economic coercion are sanctions and threatening or carrying out 
operations that impede trade. 
 It needs to be stated that the third step of the polar co-option process is not a given. A 
targeted spoke can resist a prospective co-opting pole. In other words, it rejects the pole’s rules 
and regulations and refuses to adhere to them and join the pole’s territorial order. During these 
instances, the pole’s authority is not seen as legitimate nor does it have enough material 
capabilities to either induce or force the spoke into accepting its authority. This means a 
prospective co-opting pole will fail to complete the co-option process and transition into a co-
opting pole. Consequently, for a prospective co-opting pole to become a co-opting pole, it 
needs to be able to overcome any resistance that develops from either the other polar powers 
or the spokes it is seeking to co-opt.  
 If the prospective co-opting pole is able to transition to a co-opting pole and gain 
authority over the spokes of the moribund pole, the polar co-option process is complete. It 
should be evident that the polar co-option process is markedly different than the process of a 
power transition. To make this contrast clearer, Table 2.2 highlights the differences between 
the power transition process and the polar co-option process.  
 
Table 2.2 
Differences Between the Power Transition Process and the Polar Co-option Process  
 Power Transition Theory Polar Co-option Theory 
Mechanism Law of unequal growth rates Variability of authority 
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First Step Dominate power losses its material 
advantage 
A pole losses authority over 
spokes 
Second Step Dissatisfaction Fear 
Third Step  Hegemonic war Co-option 
 
 
Results of a Polar Co-option 
 
 
 After a prospective co-opting pole is able to establish its authority over the spokes of a 
moribund pole, it transitions into a co-opting pole. Once the polar co-option process is 
complete, PCT supposes certain results that affect the international system. First, PCT expects 
there to be a reduction in the number of poles. This is a result of the theory’s understanding of 
the polar powers; if a pole loses authority over its spokes, then it no longer qualifies as a pole. 
In other words, the polar co-option process results in a systemic transition in the system’s polar 
structure. While the United States rose from a great power to a pole, most co-options have 
resulted in the consolidation in the number of polar powers.  
The international system has gone from multipolar to bipolar and then to unipolar. 
International relations theory, however, has not provided an adequate answer as to how and 
why the polar structure of the international system transitions.5 For example, while discussing 
the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, William Wohlforth wrote that there were two poles in 
1990, but now simply “One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2-1=1. The system is unipolar” 
 
5 The singular work I have been able to find which that provides an explanation of how unipolarity developed can 
be found here (Cederman, 1994).   
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(Wohlforth, 1999, p. 10). Polar co-option can fill this void in the literature. It should be seen as 
the main mechanism for which systemic structural changes have occurred. In other words, the 
international system has gone from multipolar to unipolar because there has been a succession 
of polar co-options, which has reduced the number of poles in the system. 
Second, part of the logic of this work has been based on the understanding that a pole 
and its territorial order are intertwined. A state cannot be a pole without authority over a 
territorial order and the latter cannot be without the former. Consequently, since the most 
likely result of a polar co-option is the elimination of a pole, it most follow that there is also a 
reduction in the number of territorial orders.  
Additionally, with the decline in the number of territorial orders there will be an 
enlargement of the co-opting pole’s hub-and-spoke configuration. To move away from theory, 
the United States has been part of four polar co-options, which has made it the unipolar power. 
In becoming the unipole, it has aided in the creation of democratic governments around the 
world and increased the number of states that are integrated into its global capitalist order 
(Biersteker, 1993; Narizny, 2012). In other words, the reason why we “reached the end of 
history” is because the United States’ territorial order outcompeted all of its competitors and 
co-opted the majority of spokes that were previously a part of territorial orders organized by 





 Polar co-option theory seeks to explain how the structure of the international system 
transitions from one polar structure to another, i.e. from multipolarity to bipolarity and then to 
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unipolarity. This is a significant departure from traditional PTT, which assumes that the entire 
system is governed by a single dominate state.  
 The two theory’s contrasting understanding of the structure of the international system 
is not their only difference. While a thorough rehashing is not needed, it is important to 
highlight the other significant points of conflict between the two theories. First, PTT argues that 
the main mechanism of international change is the law of unequal growth rates. Polar co-
option theory, on the other hand, views the variability of authority as the sole mechanism of 
the polar co-option process. Second, for PTT, change in the international system is caused by 
one state’s dissatisfaction, which leads it to challenge the existing international order. Rather 
than self-interest, PCT believes the anarchic structure of the international system and the fear it 
produces directs the actions of poles. Once a moribund pole loses its authority over its spokes, 
the other polar powers will try to co-opt said spokes because they fear the consequences of 
another pole extending its authority.  
 As previously discussed, most polar co-options have led to a reduction in the number of 
polar powers. This has produced the unipolar structure that has been in place since the early 
1990’s. Recently, however, the decline of the United States and the rise of China, as well as 
other non-traditional powers, has precipitated a discussion on whether the system is 
transitioning towards a bipolar or multipolar configuration. Even though minor alterations will 
be needed, as there are no additional polar powers outside of the United States, it is believed 
that PCT can provide an answer to this question. Rather than analyzing the actions of a number 
of poles, the foreign policy decisions of either regional or global great powers will have to be 
used. In other words, while the United States’ actions will be paramount, the foreign policy 
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decisions of states like Japan, India, Turkey, South Korea, Britain, Germany, France, and Russia 
need to be taken into account when discussing whether China or another state is gaining 
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 In the last chapter, PCT was fleshed out. Importantly, four foundational conceptual 
differences between it and PTT were identified. One of the most significant was the difference 
between a dominate state’s effect on lesser tier states in comparison to a pole’s effect on its 
spokes. While the former exclusively alters interactions at the system level, the latter changes 
the structure of their spokes at the domestic level.     
Since this argumentation is such a significant departure from traditional PTT, this 
chapter’s aim will be to provide more specificity to this process. To put the argumentation in 
succinct terms: when a pole has authority over a lesser tier state, it will alter that state’s 
internal structure to make it more ideologically aligned with itself. For instance, if a pole is 
politically liberal, it will instill politically liberal institutions within its spokes. In the military 
realm, a pole will alter the internal security architect of its spokes to make them more 
compatible with its own security institutions.    
The first section will briefly discuss PTT’s understanding of a dominate state and how it 
affects state interaction. The second section fleshes out PCT’s conceptualization of the polar 
powers. To provide more specificity to the concept, several polar attributes will be listed and 
explained. These polar characteristics will correspond to the rules and regulations poles 
establish that alter their spokes along the four dimensions of imperialism.  
    
How Power Transition Theory’s Dominate State affects State Interaction 
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Like most IR theories, PTT’s main unit of analysis and object of observation are single 
unit states (D. Lake, 2008). This is because the theory adheres to the narrative that the Peace of 
Westphalia led to the sovereign state system (Gerard & Croeser, 2013; Kugler & Lemke, 1996). 
What does the “sovereign state system” mean? To understand the term, the concept of 
sovereignty has to be defined. While sovereignty has multiple meanings, it is generally 
understood as a state’s juridical equality and right to determine its internal policies (Krasner, 
2009, p. 179). As Wendt and Friedheim explained, the sovereign state system is based on the 
notion that each state has “juridical equality…[since the] institution of sovereignty constitutes 
all states in the system with equal rights of exclusive territorial authority” (1995, p. 689). As a 
result, we can depict the international system of PTT as composed of single unit states, whose 
boundaries are codified and do not overlap.1 These units, when they do interact, do so with the 
understanding that each are “free, equal and independent entities” (Simpson, 2004, p. 95).  
PTT’s statist ontology corresponds with its assumptions on how international relations 
unfold (De Carvalho, Leira, & Hobson, 2011). A dominate power’s international order is based 
on each state choosing to abide by a set of rules and regulations. These states do so either 
because they are ideologically aligned with the rules and regulations or they desire to reap the 
private goods that the dominate state provides. Peace is attributed to the notion that all states 
are “satisfied” rather than a coerced ideologically uniformity (W. Kim, 1992). In other words, 
PTT’s understanding that the international system is made up of sovereign states that do not 
interfere with each other’s internal affairs, necessitates a self-interest-based mechanism to 
 
1 Yes, the international system is highly interdependent in reality (Keohane & Nye, 1977) but we are discussing 
ideal types at the moment.  
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explain why lesser tier states enter a hierarchical relationship with a dominate state and why 
that system is stable.  
 Despite the concept of sovereignty precluding PTT from arguing that a dominate state 
affects the internal structure of states, the theory does possess an organizing logic. As a result 
of a dominate state’s preponderance of material capabilities, it rewards states that follow its 
rules and regulations. This ability allows it to affect the interactions of states at the 
international level (Tammen et al., 2016 [italics added]). As one prominent power transition 
theorist wrote, “The dominate country establishes an international order with rules that direct 
political, economic, diplomatic and military interactions” (Lemke, 1997, p. 24).  
These rules and regulations that the dominate state establishes are based on its 
ideological predisposition. Since sovereignty precludes it from forcibly altering the internal 
structure of states, it allies and privileges states that already share its ideologically inclinations. 
If a lesser tier state wants to change its internal structure to join the dominate state’s 
international order, it does so through its own sovereign free will because it wants to reap the 
benefits. For example, after World War Two, the U.S. established a liberal capitalist 
international order that provided private goods to states that were aligned with it or states that 
willfully changed their domestic structure (Tammen et al., 2016).  
  
How Polar Co-option Theory’s Polar Powers Affect the Internal Structure of their Spokes 
 
 
 In contrast to PTT’s dominate state, PCT focuses on the polar powers and their effect on 
the internal structure of its spokes. The concept of a pole has had a torrid historiography with 
scholars debating its definability (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Oren, 2016; William R Thompson, 
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1986; R. H. Wagner, 1993). There are two schools of thought. The first, is that a pole is a single 
unit state defined by its material capabilities, which makes it akin to a dominate state 
(Mansfield, 1993; Mearsheimer, 2001; Randall L Schweller, 1998; Waltz, 2010). 
 The second, which PCT subscribes to, focuses on the understanding that the polar 
powers possess a disproportionate amount of authority (Grevi, 2009; Van Langenhove, 2010; 
Wivel & Mouritzen, 2004). This means that poles function as “centers of decision” (James & 
Brecher, 1988). As a result of this role, the polar powers have a polarizing effect as each pole is 
the center of decision for a number of spokes (De Keersmaeker, 2016; Rapkin, Thompson, & 
Christopherson, 1979).  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the territorial order poles establish are theorized 
as hub-and-spoke configurations. This entails the polar powers being in the center surrounded 
by the lesser-tier states it has authority over (Ikenberry, 2011, 2012a). This is the same 
schematic that scholars use to discuss empires (Galtung, 1971; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; 
Motyl, 2001; Tilly, 1997). Consequently, PCT takes the perspective that the polar powers are 
states that possess an empire. Furthermore, the polar powers practice imperialism the same 
way imperial states have throughout history (Burbank & Cooper, 2010). It was identified that 
imperialism occurs within four dimensions: politically, militarily, socio-culturally, and 
economically (Bush, 2014; Doyle, 1986; Steinmetz, 2013).  
To better flesh out PCT’s conceptualization of the polar powers, a number of polar 
attributes will be listed and expounded upon (Gerring, 2011). The aim is to differentiate the 
polar powers from normal states. In other words, not all states are poles; only a state that 
fulfills certain qualities ought to be considered a pole. In correspondence with the argument 
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above, these characteristics are constraints that affect the internal structure of lesser tier 
states. To put it succinctly, a state is a pole if it establishes rules and regulations that affect the 
internal policies of lesser tier states in the four categories of imperialism: political, military, 
economic, and socio-cultural. The main objective of the polar powers is to alter their spokes to 
such a degree that they are all ideologically aligned. In other words, if a polar power is 
economically capitalist then it will instill free trade institutions within its spokes.    
To give empirical weight to the argumentation, the French, British, Tsarist, Soviet, and 
U.S. empires will be used as examples. Table 3.1 provides a list, albeit not an exhaustive one, of 
the attributes a state needs to satisfy to be considered a pole.     
 
Table 3.1 
Examples of Polar Attributes in the Political, Economic, Security, and Socio-cultural Realms 
Political Economic  Security Socio-cultural 
Puts rules on who 
can hold office  
Puts rules on who 
the spokes can trade 
with 
Puts rules on who 
can hold leadership 
positions 
Puts rules on 
behavior which is 
deemed 
inappropriate 
Puts rules on political 
representation 
Puts rules on what 
the spokes can 
produce 
Puts rules on the 
military equipment 
their spokes can 
operate by providing 
equipment to their 
spokes 
Puts rules on ideas 
which are deemed 
inappropriate 
Puts rules on who 
makes up the 
electorate 
Puts rules on tariff 
policies within their 
spokes stationing 
troops on spoke 
territory 
Puts rules on the 
security policies of 
their spokes by 










In the political realm, each pole constructs rules and regulations - the polar attributes - 
which alter their spokes’ domestic political system. For example, one polar attribute is a pole’s 
ability to establish constraints over who can hold political office in its spokes. A second is a 
pole’s ability to determine its spoke’s electorate. From a broad perspective, the rules the polar 
powers establish in the political realm will fall along a spectrum with “liberal” on one side and 
“authoritarian” on the other. Since the polar powers seek to make their spokes’ internal 
structure ideologically aligned with themselves, the spoke’s political system will correspond 
with where their pole falls within this political spectrum.   
On the authoritarian side, poles impose highly restrictive rules on the governing 
apparatuses of their spokes. In contrast, if a liberal scheme is established, the spokes have 
more autonomy and a higher degree of political representation (Go, 2011). Either way, the 
poles provide the rules and regulations which affect the internal structure of their spokes’ 
political structure. This is because even if a representative system is in place, it was established 
because the polar power authorized it. We will now turn to empirical examples to flesh out the 
above points.    
 The political constraints established by France were on the authoritarian side of the 
spectrum (Cooley, 2005; Lewis, 2013; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, & Cederman, 2016, p. 885). 
This meant there was only “a single legal order, defined by the ‘civilized’ laws of Europe. No 
‘native’ institutions would be recognized” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 16). The colonial minister resided 
in Paris and was responsible for the colonial governor-generals. In turn, the latter group 
controlled the budgets of the governors of individual colonies. Paris also had sole authority over 
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colonial legislation (Page, 2003). Ultimately, France was a pole because it determined who 
could hold political office in its spokes and what body held legislative prerogative.    
 After World War II, Soviet Russia established authoritarian political constraints in its 
Eastern European spokes. The main mechanism of control was the Communist Party since local 
leaders had to be a member. As Dominic Lieven explained, “The Soviet federal constitution 
worked only because it was in part mere façade. Real power lay not with state institutions but 
with the Communist Party, which was a centralized and Moscow-dominated institution” 
(Lieven, 2002, p. 326). Through the party, Soviet Russia satisfied a number of political polar 
characteristics. For example, after WWII, Stalin pursued a number of show trials which purged 
the ranks of Communist Party members and local leaders whose loyalty to Moscow was in 
question (A. Brown, 2009). In other words, Russia constrained who could hold political office in 
its spokes. By determining who could be party members, Russia also satisfied the political polar 
attribute of constraining its spoke’s electorate. This is because the party’s congress held 
legislative prerogative. Furthermore, by only allowing Communist Party members to hold office 
and vote, the Soviets constrained who held political representation.      
 Not all poles establish authoritarian political rules and regulations. On the more liberal 
side of the spectrum, Britain constructed a territorial order that gave more power to indigenous 
figures and institutions. Britain, nevertheless, maintained its authority by “identifying and 
cultivating local chiefs and other hereditary rulers, and then using them as intermediaries in 
colonial governance” (Sharkey, 2013, p. 155). As long as corroboration with Britain’s policies 
was maintained, the political constraints the pole imposed did not prohibit local power 
structures and costumes. This led to more indigenous representation in the political process 
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(Go, 2011). As a result, Britain should be considered a pole because it established rules and 
regulations constraining who could hold office and determining how much power said 
individuals had. While Britain’s political constraints were on the more liberal side, they have not 
been the only pole to establish inclusive political rules within their spokes. 
Additionally, the United States has been instilling liberal institutions within its spokes 
since the end of the nineteenth century (Carothers, 2013). After the Spanish American War, the 
U.S attempted to foster democracies in Cuba and the Philippines. During the Woodrow Wilson 
administration, the president “ordered the occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914, the 
intervention in Haiti in 1915, and the takeover of the Dominican Republic in 1916, he justified 
his actions as part of an effort to bring constitutional democracy to Latin America” (T. Smith, 
2012, p. 5). During the Cold War, the U.S. partially promoted the decolonization movement and 
freedom of self-governance. As with all territorial orders, however, the United States imposed 
constrains on who could hold political office. If a democratically elected government was 
perceived as not being in corroboration with the liberal international order the U.S. was 
constructing, it could be toppled by a coup (L. A. O'Rourke, 2018).   
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. continued to promote liberal values and, in 
some ways, it became the center piece of its foreign policy. During the Clinton administration, 
the U.S espoused a new grand strategy. Rather than containment, which was central to U.S. 
Cold War planning, Clinton’s policy was dubbed “enlargement.” Anthony Lake, Clinton’s 
national security advisor, stipulated the four objectives of enlargement: “1) to ‘strengthen the 
community of market democracies’; 2) to ‘foster and consolidate new democracies…where 
possible’; 3) to ‘counter the aggression and support liberalization of states hostile to 
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democracy’; 4) to ‘help democracy…take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern’” 
(Brinkley, 1997, p. 116). 
 The administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama continued Clinton’s policy of 
democracy promotion. After September 11, 2001, George Bush began the “war on terror.” For 
the war to succeed, “Bush insisted, the ultimate goal of U.S. strategy must be to spread 
democracy everywhere” (Gaddis, 2002, p. 53). Obama initially shied away from his 
predecessors’ foreign policy agenda (Lindsay, 2011). After being accused of abandoning 
democracy promotion, however, the Obama administration started to actively pursue it. 
Thomas Carothers explains, “the Obama team moved towards a more public, active 
engagement on democracy issues as a response to the minor firestorm of criticism that their 
initial stepping back set off in the Washington policy community” (2013, p. 202).       
 Historically and currently, poles establish rules and regulations that affect the internal 
composition of their spokes political system. These polar attributes include, but are not limited 
to, constraining who can hold political office in their spokes, the makeup of their electorate, 
and holding exclusive rights on legislation. While all the polar powers impose political 
constraints on their spokes, the institutions themselves can range from liberal to authoritarian. 
The French, tsarist and Soviet empires constructed territorial orders that were on the 
authoritarian side. On the other hand, Britain and the U.S. have installed liberal democratic 
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In the economic realm, poles establish rules and regulations that alter their spoke’s 
economic system. These constraints should be considered polar attributes in the economic 
realm. For example, a pole establishes restrictions that affect its spokes’ trade policies and 
mode of production. In other words, poles constrain who their spokes can trade with and what 
they can produce. As in the political realm, the rules and regulations established by the polar 
powers fall within a spectrum. On one side, a pole’s economic rules can be protectionist/statist; 
on the other end, they can be liberal/capitalist. These opposing economic philosophies have 
been in competition since Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations (A. Smith & McCulloch, 
1838). The economist Bill Dunn wrote, “debates about international trade too often and too 
easily regress to a simplistic antagonism for or against free trade, or between market and state-
led strategies” (2015, p. 2). Even though there are two ends to the economic spectrum, three 
main ideologies have developed. On the more protectionist/statist side, there is mercantilism, 
neomercantilism, and Marxist-Leninism. On the free trade end, there is economic 
liberalism/capitalism. As with the political realm, poles will establish rules and regulations with 
the goal of making their spokes ideologically similar to themselves. Meaning, if a pole is 
capitalist, it will institute liberal/capitalist constraints on its spokes’ economic system.        
 As stated above, mercantilism (mid-seventeenth to the early-nineteenth century), 
neomercantilism (late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century), and Marxist-Leninism are 
economic ideologies that emphasis protectionism and state lead initiatives. Mercantilism “was 
the policy of Europe’s Great Powers as they expanded their empires, and was the universal 
framework by which international trade was understood” (Langdana & Murphy, 2016, p. 8).2 
 
2 For a critique of mercantilism see (Pincus, 2012) 
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States that espoused a mercantilist ideology argued that economic gain was a zero-sum game, 
which meant, when one nation gained another nation lost (D’Anieri, 2011, p. 256; Parboteeah 
& Cullen, 2017).  
As a result, poles that espoused a neomercantilist economic ideology created economic 
constraints that established exclusive colonial markets. In other words, the polar powers used 
their spokes “as suppliers of raw materials and markets for manufactures of the ‘mother 
country’ alone” (Findlay & O’rourke, 2009, p. 228). In most cases, colonies were prohibited 
from processing raw materials themselves (Mukherjee & Chakrabarti, 2016, p. 22; Sargent, 
2008, p. 34; Semmel, 2004, p. 19). The most famous mercantilist constraints were Britain’s 
Navigation Acts. These laws, which were first codified in 1651 and weren’t repealed until 1849, 
created a “complex system of protection and regulation,” especially for British shipping (Milne, 
2000, p. 147). These acts stipulated “that all commodity trade between England [later Britain] 
and its colonies should be conducted in English ships operated by English seamen sailing 
between English ports…This means that European goods could not be imported directly into 
the colonies. It also meant that British and colonial shipping has a monopoly on carrying trade 
within the empire…[One of the primary aims of the acts were to] ensure that the profits of 
trade, plus shipping and harbor dues, benefitted Britain rather than rival foreign centres of 
trade” (Morgan, 2002, p. 168).  
While Britain is usually cited as the prime example of a mercantilist economy, all the 
imperial powers “embodied these ideas in laws and regulations aimed at making their colonies 
complement and support the economy of the” mother country (Anderson, 2014, p. 294). By 
establishing mercantilist rules and regulations, the polar powers of the early nineteenth century 
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satisfied a number of polar attributes in the economic realm. Most importantly, they restricted 
the trade partners of their spokes, which affected the latter’s internal markets. In addition to 
prohibiting certain trade partners, the poles instituted constraints on how trade can be 
conducted, i.e. on which ships goods can be transported on. This rule and regulation affected 
the domestic industries of the spokes.     
From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, most of the poles subscribed to 
a form of economic protectionism that has been dubbed neomercantilism. While similar to 
mercantilism, there are important differences between the two. Bjorn Hettne explained, the 
old mercantilism was “articulated within a national space and took the national interest more 
or less for granted;” on the other hand, neomercantilism related “to a global space, that is, the 
overall shape of the international political economy” (2012, p. 252). Hettne continued, 
neomercantilism “transcends the nation-state logic in arguing for a segmented world system, 
consisting of self-sufficient blocs of large scale and specialized production, on the one hand, 
without falling prey to the anarchy of the world market” (ibid). In other words, the polar 
powers established rules and regulations that prevented their spokes from trading with 
whomever they wanted and from producing certain products. Thus, creating a segmented 
world system of “self-sufficient” blocs based on “specialized production.”  
In the 1870s, France began to instill neomercantilist policies in the spokes they had 
authority over in an attempt to reverse its economic decline. During the Franco-Prussian war of 
1870, France lost control of the industrious province of Alsace-Lorraine. While still behind 
Britain, the country began to lose their relative advantage over Germany and the United States. 
France was also significantly affected by the economic crises of 1873 and 1881 (Wesseling, 
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2001, p. 65). As a result, France adopted the mindset that if their products could not contend 
with “British and German competition in Europe, perhaps with more governmental support 
they might secure new markets in Africa. Beginning in 1877, through discriminatory tariffs and 
increasing contact with inland tribes, France initiated a concerted effort to restrict British trade 
along the West African coast” (Copeland, 2014, p. 391). Overall, France should be considered a 
pole because it established economic constraints that prohibited their spokes from trading with 
a state it deemed a competitor.  
Tsarist Russia also adopted protectionist measures during the late 1870s. Amid tensions 
with the Ottomans, an edict was issued in late 1876, which required costumes duties to be paid 
in gold currency. With the “current value of the ruble, that meant a 30-percent increase in 
duties and a turn toward protectionism in Russian tariff policy” (Polunov, Owen, & Zakharova, 
2015, p. 137). There were three motivations for why such constraints were adopted by the 
Tsars: to support Russian industry, increase State revenue, and the creation of a favorable 
balance of trade (Seton-Watson, 2017, p. 119). In other words, Russia satisfied the polar 
attribute of constraining which states its spokes could trade with. Its aim being to centralize 
trade towards itself to increase state revenue.    
During the latter half of the twentieth century, Soviet Russia imposed Marxist-Leninist 
state led economic rules and regulations in its spokes. One Soviet historian emphasized that 
“the defining feature of the socialist economy was the centralized, planned, and statist nature 
of its organization and administration” (Sandle, 2003, p. 30 [italics in original]). Dominic Lieven 
explained the difference between earlier Tsarist attempts to influence the economy and the 
Soviet Union’s centrally planned administration: “In 1914 the state owned 8.3 per cent of the 
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empire’s wealth and 10 per cent of its industry. The contrast between the tsarist economy, 
especially in its last decades, and Soviet state ownership of all factories, farms, and shops is 
immense…the tsarist regime could only encourage Russia’s economic development within the 
context of private ownership of Russia’s assets…There was a world of difference between this 
and running the centrally planned and state-owed Soviet economy” (Lieven, 2002, p. 303). 
Consequently, Soviet Russia should be considered a pole because it controlled its spokes’ mode 
of production, which affected what they could produce and their supply of goods.  
Mercantilist, neomercantilist, and Marxist-Leninist economies are regarded as 
statist/protectionist economic systems. Each of the ideologies led the polar powers to establish 
rules and regulations in their spokes which constrained the latter’s freedom of trade and modes 
of production. On the other end of the spectrum, there have been poles that have instilled rules 
and regulations that are more liberal/capitalist and established a free trade market economy in 
their spokes.  
While Britain was a neomercantilist pole from the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth 
century, it altered its policies and became a staunch advocate of free trade. Between 1832 and 
1867, the Reform Acts dismantled Britain’s neomercantilist constraints. One historian wrote 
that after the enactment of these rules, “Britain launched herself upon an unprecedented 
course, seeking to lead the world towards a peaceful order based on free commercial exchange 
between individuals and nations” (Howe, 1997, p. 1). When other states moved towards 
mercantilist policies during the latter half of the nineteenth century, “the ideal of a free trade 
empire persisted [in Britain]…Only in 1931, in conditions of national crisis, did the 
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Chamberlainite alternative of tariff reform and imperial preference overturn this deeply rooted 
political consensus” (Ibid).  
As a result of Britain’s adherence to free trade, their spokes were not as restricted as 
lesser tier states that were part of a neomercantilist pole’s territorial order. Britain’s ideological 
adherence led it to lower tariffs in its spokes, thus making them open to imports from other 
states, which affected the spokes’ internal markets. For example, “India, the largest market, 
was served almost exclusively by English mills, but was in fact open to all countries, the only 
barrier being a 3.5 percent revenue tariff on imports” (Clark, 2008, p. 315). Even though Britain 
did not establish constraints on which states their spokes could trade with, they did constrain 
their spokes’ modes of production. The pole was able to do this by the “expansion of both 
plantations and peasant production backed up by imported capital and infrastructure” 
(Tomlinson, 1999, p. 60). Consequently, Britain was a pole because it established rules and 
regulations that prevented its spokes from raising their tariff rates, which affected the internal 
structure of its spokes’ markets. Furthermore, Britain instituted constraints that affected what 
kind of goods its spokes could produce.       
In addition to Britain, the United States has espoused a free trade economic ideology. 
After 1945, it instilled these principles in the institutions it established – the IMF, World Bank, 
and World Trade Organization. These institutions hold tremendous weight in the international 
system and impose a number of constraints on lesser tier states. If a country wants to receive 
funds from either the World Bank or IMF, “it opens up a number of opportunities for the 
institutions and their powerful government members to wield influence through penalties, 
conditionality, and advice” (Woods, 2006, p. 70). The principles of the World Trade 
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Organization provide the legal framework through which international trade is conducted. It 
possesses an effective method to settle disputes and has an extensive jurisprudence (Davey, 
2012). In other words, through the World Bank, IMF, and WTO the United States is able to 
constrain the trade policies of its spokes and their modes of production.  
Economically, poles establish rules and regulations that altered the internal structure of 
their spokes. These restrictions should be categorized as attributes of polar status within the 
economic realm. For example, a pole can constrain its spokes from producing certain products. 
A second characteristic is a pole’s authority over their spokes’ mode of production. While these 
are two economic constraints, the institutions the poles instill in their spokes can be 
understood through a spectrum with protectionist/statist on one end and free trade on the 
other.  
Protectionist/statist poles, like France, Tsarist Russia, and Soviet Russia, have 
established constraints which restricted access to markets they had authority over and 
prevented their spokes from producing certain products. In contrast, poles like Britain and the 
U.S have instilled rules and regulations which are more on the free trade end of the spectrum. 
They, nevertheless, established rules and regulations that affected their spokes’ trade policies 





Poles are different from normal states because they display certain attributes in the 
military realm. Specifically, they establish rules and regulations that affect the internal security 
architecture of their spokes. One such example, is a pole’s ability to instill constraints that 
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restrict who can hold military leadership positions in its spokes. Secondly, the polar powers 
constrain their spokes by stationing troops in the latter’s territory (D. A. Lake, 2009, p. 67). 
Third, poles provide their spokes with military equipment which affects their spokes’ ability to 
buy hardware from other states as a result of compatibility and interoperability requirements.      
 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain’s main imperial force was the 
Indian Army. One historian wrote, “The Indian Army was a core element of the complex, but 
interlinking, structures maintained to provide for the Empire’s local, regional, and international 
security through the use of indigenous military formations” (A. Jackson, 2016, p. 10). Troops 
from the Indian Army participated “in fifteen British colonial wars, including those in China, 
Malaya, Egypt, Sudan, Burma, East Africa, and Tibet” (Buzan & Lawson, 2015, p. 182). Though 
the Indian Army was mainly composed of indigenous soldiers, all of the commissioned officers 
were British (Roy, 2016, p. 18). Thus, Britain satisfied the polar attribute of constraining who 
could hold military leadership positions within their spokes. Additionally, the most advanced 
weapons were imported from British factories. For example, in 1856, Britain introduced rifled 
muskets produced at their Royal Small Arms Factory. The presence of these new firearms led to 
the Indian Army uprising of 1857 because the soldiers believed “its paper-wrapped cartridges 
were greased with tallow derived from beef, offensive to Hindus, and pork, offensive to 
Muslims” (Satia, 2018, p. 365). Partially, as a result, the British Army began stationing its own 
troops in India. These troops remained in the spoke until the latters’ independence in 1947 
(Roy, 2016, p. 19). Consequently, Britain was a pole because it established rules and regulations 
that affected the internal composition of their spokes’ security forces. It constrained who could 
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hold leadership positions in its spokes’ military, it imported weapons and military equipment, 
and it stationed its own forces within the territory of its spokes. 
Unlike Britain’s relationship with India, France did not have a bastion of manpower it 
could use for the defense of its empire. Instead, it had to recruit soldiers from several different 
spokes. From its African colonies, France recruited tirailleurs senegalais, which they used in 
their campaigns in the Sudan, Indochina and Madagascar. When not abroad, these troops were 
garrisoned in North Africa (killingray, 2008, p. 291). Though these soldiers fought in France’s 
imperial holdings in Indochina, a locally recruited force was established within Asia. Beginning 
in the late 1870s, France recruited tirailleur tonkinois to conquer and assist in the policing of 
their possessions in Indochina (Hack & Rettig, 2005, p. 54). Though France technically allowed 
indigenous personnel to rise to the level of officer, in reality these individuals were looked 
down upon and only given authority over indigenous troops. Ultimately, France’s military 
“authorities considered the role of white officers as decisive in all indigenous units. In fact, they 
argued, the quality of the white French personnel entirely determined the value of such units” 
(Fogarty, 2008, p. 98). While French officers provide leadership to their colonial troops, French 
armaments were also supplied. In fact, France was the first pole to introduce magazine and 
smokeless rifles to their imperial forces (Vandervort, 2006, p. 48). National troops were also 
stationed abroad within the French Empire. For example, in Indochina, an army of 30,000 
contained 12,500 Europeans (Hack & Rettig, 2005, p. 54). Overall, France was a pole because it 
constrained who could hold leadership positions within its spokes’ armed forces, provided their 
spokes’ military equipment, and stationed troops within their spokes’ territory. As a result, we 
can conclude that France satisfied the attributes for polar status in the security realm.   
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 After World War II, Soviet Russia had authority over most of Eastern Europe. As a result, 
it was able to put constraints on its spokes in the security realm. Thus, satisfying the necessary 
military characteristics of a polar power. In regards to military leadership, Soviet Russia 
required that even low-level officers in its Eastern European spokes were pro-Communist. 
These officers were then “subordinated to Soviet officers of respective national origins who had 
served, sometimes for years, in the Red Army as Soviet citizens” (A. R. Johnson, 1984, p. 258). In 
addition to constraining who could hold leadership positions in its spokes’ military, Russia 
deployed Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. These forces were used to constrain the actions of 
their spokes and affected their security architecture. In essence, “Soviet military 
forces…serve[d] a very real international policing function” within Russia’s territorial order (A. 
R. Johnson, 1984, p. 257). Consequently, Soviet Russia should be considered a pole because it 
constrained who could hold leadership positions in its spokes’ military. It also stationed its own 
forces within the lesser tier states it had authority over, which affected its spokes’ internal 
security policies.    
 Currently, the United States’ power projection capabilities are unrivaled (Brooks & 
Wohlforth, 2016). The U.S. led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contains twenty-nine 
member states. Additionally, the alliance has various partnerships with non-member states, 
which contribute to NATO’s global reach. In terms of rules and regulations, from its conception 
to the present, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO has been an American. After the Cold 
War, there has been a debate to as whether “the US was using NATO as an instrument of extra-
United Nations (UN) unilateral power” (Song, 2016, p. 2). This position developed after the 
alliance participated in a number of “out-of-area” operations that furthered U.S. interests; for 
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example, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. In addition to providing NATO’s leadership, 
American military personnel are stationed around the globe (Calder, 2010). Officially, “over 
190,000 troops and 115,000 civilian employees are massed in 909 military facilities in 46 
countries and territories (Lutz, 2009, p. 1). To its allies, the U.S. is also the purveyor of advanced 
weaponry. The proliferation of its F-35 aircrafts and Patriot defense system are just two 
examples. As a result, the U.S. ought to be considered a pole because it established rules and 
regulations in the security realm that constrained who could hold military leadership positions, 
it stationed troops in its spokes, and provided the weaponry to lesser tier states within its 
territorial order.     
 For a state to be considered a pole, it needs to demonstrate certain characteristics. For 
instance, a pole provides rules and regulations that constrain who can hold military leadership 
positions within its spokes. It also provides the weaponry to its spokes’ military, which affects 
the latter’s internal structure given interoperability requirements. Furthermore, a pole stations 
its own troops within its spokes’ territory; thus, constraining its spokes internal defense 





In the socio-cultural realm, a state has to exhibit a certain number of polar attributes to 
be considered a pole. In other words, all polar powers set up rules and regulations which affect 
the internal social and cultural composition of their spokes. An example of a polar attribute in 
the socio-cultural realm, is a pole’s ability to establish constraints on behavior it deems 
inappropriate. A second attribute pertains to a pole prohibiting ideas it deems inappropriate. 
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Third, a polar power must have the authority to institute rules that affect the language of their 
spokes. 
While the wording “deems inappropriate” might seem convoluted, it corresponds with 
the notion that imperial powers justify their expansion through the narrative of a civilizing 
mission. In general, “advocates of the civilizing mission ideology sought to capture the 
attributes that separated industrialized Western societies from those of the colonized peoples” 
(Adas, 2004, p. 79). Once characteristics of value are identified, it “implies the identification of a 
community of value, and civilization can also become the means of marking the Self from the 
Other” (Duara, 2004, p. 1). In other words, poles assign value to certain characteristics that they 
possess, which are then used to differentiate themselves with their spokes.     
Once a pole has developed a “self/other” conceptual divide between itself and its spoke, 
rules and regulations are then imposed. The pole’s aim for establishing these constraints is to 
curtail the characteristics of its spokes that it does not designate value. This is because, as 
Michael Foucault pointed out, it is “differentiations which permits one to act upon the actions 
of others” (1982, p. 792). These rules and regulations will target the spokes’ “immediate 
everyday life,” the characteristics that marks it of its “own individuality,” in an effort to make it 
more like the polar power (p. 781). To put it another way, characteristics within spokes that do 
not correspond with the socio-cultural values espoused by the poles’ civilizing mission will be 
subject to rules and regulations. This will invariably affect spokes’ internal behavior, ideas, and 
language.       
  This is in correspondence with the literature on empires. Alejandro Colas stated that 
empires establish “socio-economic and political institutions which codify the inferiority of 
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‘Others’ and organize their subjection to imperial power along racial categories, phenotypical 
taxonomies and ethnographic classifications” (2008, p. 117). Additionally, Frederick Cooper and 
Ann Stoler declared, “The most basic tension of empire lies…namely, that the otherness of 
colonized persons was neither inherent nor stable; his or her difference had to be defined and 
maintained” by the imperial power (1997, p. 7). In essence, each pole ideationally creates an 
ideal type individual which acts, thinks, and speaks in a way that is approved by the polar 
power. If a spoke is exhibiting traits the pole does not value, the latter establishes constraints 
which affects that spoke’s population’s behavior, thoughts, and language. The goal of said 
constraints is to eradicate the behavior, ideas, and language deemed inappropriate when 
juxtaposed against each pole’s ideationally created ideal type.     
While this was the general notion of the civilizing mission, each pole’s territorial order 
has had their own particularities. For the British, “the civilizing mission meant many things, 
including bringing the benefits of British culture…in the form of free trade and capitalism as 
well as law, order and good government” (Watt, 2011, p. 1). In terms of satisfying the polar 
attributes in the socio-cultural realm, Britain prohibited behavior which it deemed opposed to 
its civilizing mission. For example, Britain established constraints on the use of Indian medicine 
which it viewed as superstitious, unscientific, and irrational. As one historian put it, “At the 
outset, [the medical field] was a highly contested field between Indian knowledge and 
European ‘science’” (Mann, 2004a, p. 14). Britain also established rules and regulations which 
affected the language of their spokes; for instance, “English [became] the language of law and 
upper-level bureaucracy in their most important Asian dependencies.” Furthermore, Britain 
standardized “certain indigenous languages for lower-level official use” (Bayly, 1999, p. 450). 
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Consequently, Britain was a pole because it established socio-cultural constraints that affected 
their spokes’ behavior and language.     
The term “civilizing mission” actually comes from the French mission civilisatrice. 
France’s civilizing mission “rested upon the twin fundamental assumptions of the superiority of 
French culture and the perfectibility of humankind…Since the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the French had aimed at institutionalizing universal principles, thus exporting the ideas and 
concepts of the Enlightenment and French Revolution.” (Mann, 2004b, p. 4). France’s civilizing 
mission manifested into rules and regulations that affected the internal socio-cultural relations 
within its spokes. Specifically, it constrained behaviors, ideas, and languages it deemed 
antithetical to its ideal Frenchman. In Algeria, for example, France sought to restrict the 
behavior and ideas of its spoke through “the destruction of [Algeria’s] system of education and 
its replacement by the French school system” (Gafaiti, 2003, p. 199). Regarding the polar 
characteristic of constraining the behavior and language of its spokes, France “insisted that 
newly conquered countries also adopted its language along with its laws. Only the laws and 
language created in Paris were acceptable” (Ager, 1995, p. 43).           
In addition to Britain and France, Tsarist Russia also promulgated a civilizing mission that 
advocated their way of life and ideal type - Russification. In discussing Tsarist Russia, one 
historian wrote, “For the Russian imperial elite…the mission of civilizing the peripheries meant 
sedentariness and orthodoxy in the first place. It further implied the spreading of Russian 
language and culture, and thereby the overall attempt to accustom foreign peoples to the 
Russian way of living, including food, trade, and sexual mores” (Vulpius, 2012, p. 26). 
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Like other poles, Russia’s civilizing mission led them to institute constraints which 
affected its spoke’s behavior, ideas, and language. For instance, Russian became the official 
language of Poland and Russian jurisprudence was extended. This led the tsars to require 
Russian be taught in Polish schools since their “Polish subjects could neither communicate with 
the officials who governed them nor understand the laws and administrative rules that so 
profoundly affected their lives unless they were competent in the official language of the 
empire” (Thaden, 2014, p. 28). In regards to ideas, Russia established a number of rules and 
regulations on the religiosity of its spokes. In other words, tsarist religious “intervention 
involved greater codification of religious rules, which inevitably entailed their reworking in 
order to bring them into conformity with the state’s own sense of morality and progress” 
(Werth, 2008). Thus, Russia was a pole because it established socio-cultural constraints that 
affected its spoke’s behavior, language, and ideas.  
Beginning in the late-nineteenth century, the United States started to promulgate its 
civilizing mission outside its continent. In comparison to other pole’s civilizing mission, the U.S.’ 
focused on its conception of liberalism (Hartz, 1991). In addition to spreading its own ideals, 
“American liberalism is intolerant of competing political ideologies. And it has sought 
preemptively to discredit, and suppress, them in order to maintain its domestic intellectual and 
ideological ascendance. American liberalism operates the same way abroad as it does at home” 
(Layne, 2007, p. 120). 
In terms of rules and regulations within the socio-cultural realm, after the Spanish-
American War of 1898, the U.S. constrained Cuban behavior, thoughts, and language. This 
occurred through the establishment of a “US-style” education system and by the fact that 
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English supplanted “Spanish as the official language of Cuban government offices” (Gronbeck-
Tedesco, 2015, p. 29). In the Philippines, the U.S. also tried to prohibit behavior it deemed 
contradictory to its conception of an ideal American. For example, the opium trade was an 
established part of Southeast Asian culture (Wertz, 2013). In their spoke, however, the U.S. 
tried to limit opium’s use and eventually outlawed it. The U.S. instituted this constraint because 
drug use went against “what an American-made colonial state should look like (Wertz, 2013, p. 
470). Overall, the U.S used its civilizing mission to justify rules and regulations which affected 
the internal behavior, ideas, and languages of its spokes   
 In the socio-cultural realm, the polar powers established rules and regulations that 
affected their spokes’ behavior, ideas, and languages. These constraints correspond with each 
pole’s civilizing mission. While there are variations regarding each poles’ civilizing mission, the 
concept generally entails the ideational construction of an ideal type. This ideal type is then 
contrasted with a spoke’s population. Rules and regulations are then established to constrain 
behaviors, ideas, and languages that are deemed inappropriate by the pole but common in its 





 Polar co-option theory’s concept of a pole is markedly different than a dominate state in 
PTT. The contrast between the two theories’ main units of analysis ultimately comes down to 
their view on state sovereignty. For the latter, its adherence to the concept precludes it from 
adopting the notion that the dominate state affects the internal structure of lesser-tier states. 
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This necessitates a self-interest-based explanation for why lesser-tier states adhere to the rules 
and regulations of a dominate state.  
 PCT does not adhere to the belief that the international system is populated by 
sovereign states that do not interfere with one another’s internal structure. Its main units of 
observation – the polar powers – practice imperialism. This means they establish rules and 
regulations that alter the internal structure of their spokes. In line with the literature on 
imperialism, these attributes of polar status occur in four realms: politically, economically, 
militarily, and socio-culturally. In other words, for a state to be considered a pole, it has to 
establish and enforce rules and regulations which affect their spokes’ internal structure along 
the four dimensions of imperialism.      
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 In chapter three, a pole’s effect on the internal structure of its spokes was theorized. In 
other words, how a pole alters the domestic structure of the lesser tier states it has authority 
over. Since the international system is dynamic, it would be wrongheaded to give the 
impression that a pole's ability to establish rules and regulations within its spokes is static. To 
the contrary, given the mechanism that is the variability of authority, it is assumed that each 
pole’s ability to establish and enforce rules and regulations will fluctuate.         
 To address the variability of a pole's authority, this chapter will introduce a typology of 
poles. In chapter two, four terms regarding the polar powers were specified but not expounded 
upon: moribund pole, status quo pole, prospective co-opting pole, and a co-opting pole. The 
aim of this chapter will be to provide more specificity to these terms.   
The underlining determinates of these categorizations are based on two criteria. First, is 
the directionality of a pole’s authority, i.e. whether its ability to establish rules and regulations 
is going up or down. Second, is a pole’s desire to either increase or decrease its authority in the 
international system.  
If a pole's authority over its spokes is waning, then it is categorized as a moribund pole. 
A polar power that is not witnessing any movement in its authority is a status quo pole. A pole 
that desires to increase its authority but is unable to is a prospective co-opting pole. This is in 
contrast, to a co-opting pole, which can successfully complete the co-option process and extend 
its authority.   
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 To ascertain the directionality of a pole's authority, a two-step process needs to be 
employed. First, it has to be determined how well a pole satisfies chapter three’s polar 
attributes within its own territorial order. For example, a moribund pole’s decline will be 
observable by it losing the ability to establish and enforce rules and regulations that affect its 
spokes.1 A status quo pole, a prospective co-opting pole, and a co-opting pole will not see any 
changes to its authority.  
 Second, it needs to be determined if a pole is gaining polar attributes that are affecting 
the internal structure of spokes that were previously a part of a moribund pole’s territorial 
order. For instance, a prospective co-opting pole will be able to gain authority over at least one 
of the dimensions of imperialism. A co-opting pole, on the other hand, will be able to gain the 
authority to satisfy all the polar attributes that were identified in chapter three.     
To flesh out these points, this chapter will proceed as follows. The first section provides 
a review and brief critique of PTT’s typology of states. As PCT is a variant of PTT, the latter’s 
categorization of the most important states provides the theoretical foundation for PCT’s 
typology. In the second section, a typology of poles is presented. Once again, these 
categorizations are based on the directionality of a pole’s authority and their desire to gain 
authority over additional spokes. 
 




1 For instance, a moribund pole’s decline in authority will be discernable by it losing the ability to 
constraint what its spokes can produce (economic realm) or it will be losing the ability to establish and 
maintain bases in its spokes (military realm).  
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 As previously indicated, PCT should be considered a variant of PTT. The latter, however, 
recognizes two different typologies of states. While the first is consistent with the theory’s 
foundational focus on material capabilities, the second centers around a different criterion that 
runs counter to the theory’s assumption on how international relations unfold. This second 
typology is more in line with PCT. 
 PTT’s first typology focuses on the distribution of material capabilities among the states. 
On the lower end of the spectrum, there are colonies, small powers, and middle powers (Kugler 
& Organski, 1989). The great powers and the dominate state populate the upper tiers of the 
system (B. Zhang, 2015, p. 153). As we have discussed, PTT is primarily concerned with the 
dynamics between the most powerful states. This leads it to have a secondary typology that 
only pertains to the dominate state and the great powers.  
Within this second typology, material capabilities are not the sole factor for determining 
a state’s categorization. Instead, it is a state’s satisfaction with the international order and the 
movement of each powers’ influence (W. Kim, 1992). Within this typology, PTT stipulates that 
the most powerful states can fall into three categories: a retrenching power, a status quo 
power, and a revisionist power. Table 4.1 provides PTT’s typology of states and great powers as 
well as their expected behaviors. 
 
Table 4.1 
Power Transition Theory’s Typology of States 
 Retrenching  Status Quo Revisionist 
Dominate Power A retrenching 
dominate 
power will be 
A status quo dominate 
power will not want the 
international system to 
A revisionist dominate power 
will seek to alter the 
international system by 






change and might use 
coercive measures to 
prevent it from 
occurring  
expanding its influence. It 
might employ coercive 
measures to achieve this end  
Great Powers  A status quo great 
power will support the 
existing international 
system and possibly aid 
the dominate state in 
upholding the status 
quo.  
A revisionist great power will 
seek to alter the international 
system by expanding its 
influence. If its preferences are 
not met, a revisionist great 
power might resort to coercive 
measures to achieve its goals.   





A retrenching power adopts policies that curtail its influence in the international system. 
While it is generally argued that a great power or a dominate state will pursue this foreign 
policy because of a decline in material capabilities, it does not have to be the case. There are at 
least three reasons why a state pursues retrenchment. First, it is hoping to decrease the cost of 
its foreign policy. This could entail cutting military spending and/or personnel, reducing 
overseas commitments, or trying to shift burdens to allies (MacDonald & Parent, 2018, p. 8).  
Second, a retrenching state can be reorienting its global forces to a particularly vital 
area. For example, in the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain pursued retrenchment in 
the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific. It did so because it wanted to concentrate its 
resources in continental Europe and the North Sea to counter a rising Wilhelmine Germany 
(Gilpin, 1981). This reason for retrenchment is not necessarily associated with an absolute 
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decline in the material capabilities of a great power or dominate state but the “growing 
material power and influence” of another power (Ward, 2017, p. 46).      
The third reason why a retrenching power pursues policies that curtail its influence in 
the international system is not associated with material decline in either relative or absolute 
terms. Scholars have recognized that a great power or dominate state might pursue 
retrenchment as a result of electoral politics, i.e. politicians’ domestic political concerns. For 
instance, the United States has pursued policies that have been described as retrenchment. 
Charles Kupchan has commented that both the Obama and Trump administrations have 
“accurately perceived that the electorate is looking to scale back overseas commitments” 
(Kupchan, 2019, p. 8). This is because of the U.S’ “public disillusionment with the results of long 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Lieber, 2016, p. 35).    
 In addition to a retrenching power, there are status quo powers. These states are 
satisfied with the existing international order (Shimko, 2012, p. 64). As a result of this 
satisfaction, they do not want to see an alteration in the international system. In order to 
prevent change, status quo powers might be willing to use coercive measures to defend the 
status quo (Miller, 2009, p. 89). After its wars of unification, Bismarckian Germany is an 
example of a status quo power (Lebow, 2003, p. 235).  
In contrast to a status quo power, a revisionist power is not satisfied with the global 
order. As a result of this dissatisfaction, a revisionist state, often called a “rising challenger,” will 
seek to increase its influence in the international system. It does so by attempting to alter the 
system’s “distribution of goods (territory, status, markets, expansion of ideology, and the 
creation or change of international law and institutions)” (Davidson, 2016, p. 14). In IR, it is 
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predominantly assumed that a revisionist power is a rising great power and witnessing an 
increase in its material capabilities. For instance, Wilhelmine Germany and Hitler’s Germany are 
often cited examples of revisionists states, albeit ones that failed.  
This does not need to be the case. For a state to be considered a revisionist power, it 
just needs to possess the desire to alter the system’s international order. There is no 
requirement as to where a revisionist power is within the hierarchy of states. Indeed, even the 
state with the most material capabilities – the dominate power - can be considered a revisionist 
power. As Steven Chan points out, “the U.S. wants to promote changes in the domestic politics 
and economies” of other countries in order to make the system more congenial to itself (Chan, 
2007, p. 38). This is not the behavior expected from a status quo power but a revisionist one.      
Overall, for PTT, the dominate state and the great powers can fall into three categories. 
The determining factors are each power’s satisfaction with the international order and the 
directionality of their influence. A retrenching power’s influence is receding. A status quo 
power is satisfied and is not seeking to increase its influence. A revisionist power is not satisfied 
and desires to increase its influence.  
 
Polar Co-option Theory’s Typology of Poles 
 
 
 In the previous section, PTT’s typologies of states were discussed. As indicated, the 
second typology of PTT, which focuses on the most powerful states, does not adhere to the 
theory’s focus on material capabilities. Rather, it centers around two factors – satisfaction and 
the directionality of the great powers’ or a dominate state’s influence in the international 
system. This recognition that material capabilities does not explain international relations 
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means that PTT’s typology of states needs to be updated and amended. Additionally, its 
concentration on a great power’s or a dominate state’s influence is akin to PCT’s theorized 
typology of states, which emphasis a pole’s authority.  
Polar co-option theory’s typology of poles contains four different characterizations. 
Similar to a retrenching power’s loss of influence, a moribund pole’s authority is retracting. A 
status quo pole is like a status quo power in that it’s authority is static and it is not looking to 
gain authority over new spokes. Unlike PTT, PCT does not have a single categorization that is 
comparable to a revisionist power. This is because it is believed the concept ought to be 
bifurcated. There are states that desire and are attempting to expand their authority but are 
unable to complete the co-option process.  
For PCT, these states are considered prospective co-opting poles. These are poles that 
want to expand their authority over additional spokes but cannot because of two reasons. The 
first is that their desire to co-opt certain spokes elicits too much fear in the other poles. This will 
result in the other poles blocking the prospective co-opting pole from co-opting its targeted 
spokes. The second reason why a prospective co-opting pole will not be able to complete the 
co-option process, is that the spokes reject the pole’s authority.  
In contrast, co-opting poles, are able to complete the co-option process. This is because 
their actions do not engender the same amount of fear in the other poles and the targeted 
spokes ultimately adhere to the pole’s rules and regulations. As a result, a co-opting pole can 
extend its authority and co-opt the spokes of a moribund pole.  
 As previously discussed, there is a clear process for delineating the categorization of a 
pole. The determining factors is the movement of a pole’s authority in the international system 
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as well as whether it has the desire to increase its authority. In order to ascertain whether a 
pole’s authority is either decreasing, increasing, staying the same, or it’s attempting to expand 
an analysis has to be conducted focusing on how well that pole satisfies the polar attributes 
discussed in chapter three. For example, if a pole is a co-opting pole, it will be discernable as it 
begins to satisfy certain polar characteristics regarding specific spokes. In contrast, when a pole 
no longer satisfies the attributes of being the polar power of a specific spoke, it should be 








Direction of a 
pole’s authority  
Ability to instill authority over the spokes of the 
moribund pole 
Moribund pole Authority is in 
decline.  
 
Status quo pole  Authority is 
stable and there 
are no attempts 
at expanding 
A status quo pole is not seeking to expand its authority 




stable but it is 
attempting to 
expand.  
A prospective co-opting pole is seeking to extend its 
authority over the spokes of a moribund pole. It will only 
be able to affect one or two of the dimensions of 
imperialism. It will not be able to complete the co-
option process because its actions either elicit too much 
fear in the other poles or the targeted spokes put up too 
much opposition.   
Co-opting pole Authority is 
expanding. 
A co-opting pole has the desire to expand its authority 
over spokes of the moribund pole. They are able to 
achieve this goal because of two reasons. First, its 
actions do not elicit enough fear to where the other 
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poles view their actions as a threat. Second, the spokes 






 Like a retrenching power, a moribund pole’s authority in the international system is 
rescinding. In PTT, to determine whether a great power or the dominate state is retrenching 
the dynamics of the entire system need to be analyzed. With PCT, only a pole’s authority within 
its territorial order needs to be examined. If a pole is moribund, then it is losing authority over 
the spokes within its territorial order. This will be discernible by analyzing the spoke’s 
adherences to its pole’s rules and regulations within the four dimensions of imperialism. For 
instance, polar power A has political authority over spokes X, Y, and Z and establishes political 
rules and regulations that are more on the authoritarian side of the spectrum, i.e. the spokes 
are not indigenously administrated in a representative fashion. When these same spokes begin 
to demonstrate more self-rule, then it is an indication that polar power A is moribund.  
 While the above is a hypothetical, a number of empirical examples can highlight the 
point. When Spain’s authority over its spokes in the Western hemisphere began to decline in 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, it led to Britain’s co-option of the region. One sign that 
Spain was a moribund pole was its inability to reinstitute a closed market economy in Latin 
America like it had before the Napoleonic Wars. Instead, Britain, being the only naval power in 
the western hemisphere, instituted a free trade economic system that it dominated (Blaufarb, 
2007). In this instance, the moribund pole – Spain – previously satisfied a polar attribute in the 
economic realm. Namely, the ability to establish rules and regulations that prevented its spokes 
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from trading with certain states. Britain, being the co-opting pole, was able to expand its 
authority over the region; thus, gaining the ability to economically organize its Latin American 
spokes to its liking based on the principles of free trade.    
The decline of the Ottoman Empire led to a polar co-option that began during the 
nineteenth century but culminated in the twentieth century. In terms of a polar attribute in the 
security realm, a pole needs to have its own indigenous arms industry. This is because a polar 
power provides the military equipment of its spokes. If a pole is reliant on another pole or a 
great power to achieve those aims, it cannot be concluded that it satisfies that characteristic of 
a polar power. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, its domestically produced arms industry 
declined precipitously over the course of the nineteenth century. By 1914, it was “almost 
completely dependent on imports” (Grant, 2002, p. 9). As a result, it cannot be concluded that 
the Ottoman Empire satisfied this polar attribute in the security realm, which gives an 
indication that it was moribund.  
Overall, a pole is moribund when it no longer satisfies polar attributes that it previous 
did. These characteristics of a polar power can be in any of the four dimensions of imperialism. 
The empirical and hypothetical examples in this section focused on the political, economic, and 
security realms.      
 
Status Quo Pole 
 
 
 In PTT, a status quo power is satisfied with its place in the international system. 
Furthermore, it desires the system’s balance of power remain static. As a result, it is not looking 
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to extend its influence and might take coercive measures to prevent another state from 
extending theirs. 
In conjunction with a status quo power, a status quo pole is not looking to expand its 
authority over the spokes of a moribund pole. In contrast, though, a status quo power in PTT is 
not seeking to expand its influence because it is satisfied with its place in the system. As a result 
of the basic assumptions of PCT, a pole is never “satisfied” but always seeking opportunities to 
expand. In reality, there are simply times when a pole cannot extend its authority over certain 
spokes. This is because the pole does not have the resources to do so or the spokes are too 
geographically distant. On a theoretical level, here is an example: moribund pole A is losing 
authority over spokes X, Y, and Z. While these spokes are “up for grabs,” pole B does not try to 
co-opt them because they are too geographically remote. This does not prevent pole B, 
however, from trying to influence the co-option process.  
 For instance, Latin America has witnessed two co-options (Paz, 2012). The first occurred 
after the Napoleonic Wars when the moribund pole Spain lost authority over its spokes in the 
Western Hemisphere. During this transition, tsarist Russia ought to be considered a status quo 
pole. This is because it could not act unilaterally in Latin America since Russia’s geographical 
location and capabilities prevented such measures. Despite these limitations it was not 
precluded from attempting to influence the co-option process through an alliance with France 
and the United States. Rather than co-option, tsarist Russia’s objective was to influence the co-
option process by gaining economic concessions and preventing the UK from extending its 
authority over the newly independent nations of Latin America (Bartley, 1978; Blaufarb, 2007).  
Polar Co-option Theory’s Typology of Poles Justin Tepper 
112 
 
 The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire occurred throughout the long nineteenth 
century. During its final phase, which took place after WWI, Britain and France divided the 
Ottoman’s territorial order. While the British and French were the co-opting poles, the United 
States should be categorized as the status quo pole. This is because it reasoned that it was too 
far to co-opt any of the spokes of the moribund empire and did not even want to attempt to 
extend its authority. As one historian wrote, “The problem with [the proposed] U.S. mandates 
for Armenia, Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, or Ottoman Turkey writ large was, of course, that the 
Americans themselves wanted no part of them” (McMeekin, 2015, p. 421). Despite this 
reluctance to co-opt any of the spokes of the Ottoman Empire, the United States still influenced 
the actions of the two co-opting poles during the post-WWI peace negotiations.  
Overall, a status quo pole’s authority is not changing. It is not losing authority over its 
territorial order nor is it seeking to expand its authority over a moribund pole’s spokes. Rather 
than satisfaction, however, a status quo pole is not in the geographical position or its 
capabilities preclude it from co-opting a moribund pole’s spokes. It will, nevertheless, seek to 
influence the co-option process.   
    
Prospective Co-opting Pole 
 
 
 In PTT, there is not a clear differentiation between a successful and a failed revisionist 
power. This is because for a state to be categorized as revisionist, it only needs to desire to alter 
the system’s international order. It does not matter whether that state is successful. In 
contrast, PCT does make the distinction between a pole that is able to co-opt spokes and one 
that is not.  
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A pole that desires to co-opt certain spokes but is unable to complete the co-option 
process is a prospective co-opting pole. Despite the fact that a perspective co-opting pole will 
not be able to satisfy all of the polar attributes, it will generally be able to affect at least one of 
the four realms of imperialism. For example, prospective co-opting pole A might only attempt 
to extend its authority in the security realm by satisfying the polar attribute of establishing 
bases in spokes X, Y, and Z. It will not be able to affect the other dimensions of imperialism 
because its actions either arouse fear in the other poles or the spokes reject its authority.  
 As previously discussed, when Spain lost authority over its spokes to Britain, tsarist 
Russia was a status quo pole. This is because it could not co-opt the spokes of the moribund 
Spanish Empire due to their geographical location in the Western Hemisphere. The best Russia 
could hope for was to work in concert with the United States and France to prevent a British co-
option. France, on the other hand, was a prospective co-opting pole since it acted unilaterally 
to affect the political systems of the newly independent Latin American republics. It did so by 
consistently trying to establish “independent Bourbon monarchies in Latin America” 
throughout the nineteenth century (Blaufarb, 2007, p. 749). As a result, France continually 
attempted to satisfy the political polar attribute of only allowing a political leader of its 
choosing within its spokes. It was unable to do so, however, because of resistance from the 
spokes. 
While tsarist Russia was a status quo pole during the above-mentioned co-option, it was 
a prospective co-opting pole during the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas France and 
Britain co-opted Ottoman spokes in North Africa and the Middle East, Russia attempted to 
satisfy polar attributes in the security and economic realms in the Ottoman’s Danubian 
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Principalities. It was unable to do so, however, because of the opposition of the other poles – 
France and Britain – and of Austria, which was a regional great power. For example, the Treaty 
of Adrianople signed in 1829 stipulated that Russia could occupy the Danubian Principalities 
and its troops appeared at the river’s delta. This occurrence greatly affected the security as well 
as the economic policies of the Ottoman’s moribund spokes and furthered the process of 
Russian’s co-option. The Austrian Chancellor Metternich understood as much when he rebuked 
the Russian ambassador in Vienna by saying, “you wish to make these provinces independent of 
the [Ottomans] and, to this end, establish a new order, which you will then insist on being 
regarded as the status quo” (ŠŠedivýý, 2011, p. 634). Ultimately, however, tsarist Russia was 
unable to co-opt the Danubian Principalities and agreed to withdraw its troops from the region 
after gaining some political concessions. Both France and Britain believed their “intransigent 
anti-Russia policy” led to the Tsar recalling his troops, while Metternich believed Austrian 
opposition was the deciding factor (Ššedivýý, 2011, p. 640). In other words, Russia was a 
prospective co-opting pole because it desired to co-opt spokes from the moribund Ottoman 
Empire, which resulted in it satisfying polar attributes in the security and economic realms. It 
was unable to complete the co-option process, however, because it could not overcome the 
opposition from the other polar powers and a regional great power.  
 Ultimately, a prospective co-opting pole desires to co-opt certain spokes. It attempts to 
do so by first satisfying one of the attributes of polar status. The examples above discussed a 
hypothetical in the security realm and two empirical illustrations in the political, economic, and 
security dimensions. A prospective co-opting pole will not be able to satisfy all of the polar 
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attributes and complete the co-option process because of at least one of two reasons. First, its 
actions elicit too much fear in the other poles. Second, the spokes do not accept its authority.  




 Unlike a prospective co-opting pole, which cannot co-opt its targeted spokes, a co-
opting pole successfully completes the co-option process. This is because it either overcomes 
the resistance of the spokes and/or the opposition of the other poles or neither of these 
occurrences transpire. As a result, a co-opting pole is able to extend its authority over the 
spokes of a moribund pole. Furthermore, the extension of a co-opting pole’s authority will alter 
the internal composition of the spokes they are co-opting as the latter begins to satisfy an 
increasing number of polar attributes. This phenomenon will ultimately occur in all of the 
dimensions of imperialism: politically, economically, militarily, and socio-culturally.  
Here is a hypothetical example: At T1 moribund pole A institutionally organizes spokes X, 
Y, and Z. It does so through the establishment of liberal political constraints, rules which 
promote a free market economy, by supplying the military equipment and maintaining bases in 
all three spokes, and affecting the spokes’ official language and education system. At T2, the 
moribund pole’s authority over spokes X, Y, and Z have been co-opted by co-opting pole B. As a 
result, co-opting pole B begins to impose new polar constraints on spokes X, Y, and Z, which 
affects their internal structure. For instance, now those spokes are governed under a more 
authoritarian set of political constraints, rules are established which lead to a closed market 
economy, the military bases are now housed with personal from pole B and its military 
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equipment is replacing pole A’s, and the spokes’ education, official language and jurisprudence 
is being altered to fit pole B’s civilizing mission.  
To turn to an empirical example, at the end of the nineteenth century, a second co-
option occurred in the Western Hemisphere. During this transition, the United States co-opted 
the Latin American spokes from the moribund Britain. While a complete co-option might take 
decades to unfold, the signs that one is occurring are evident by the fact that the moribund 
pole stops satisfying certain polar attributes. 
Regarding the polar attributes in the security realm, the Venezuela Crisis of 1895-96 is a 
critical moment. The international incident was primarily caused by a border dispute between 
Venezuela, Britain, and British Guiana. In an effort to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, the United 
States demanded that Britain relent from trying to expand their territorial holdings in the 
Western Hemisphere and instead submit to arbitration. Britain, however, did not want to 
adhere to the constraint and disputed the fact that the Monroe Doctrine was international law 
and declined arbitration. Surprisingly, the United States’ “response was to threaten war” 
(Combs, 2015, p. 12). Already facing a revitalized Russia and a rising Germany, Britain reasoned 
that it was not in its best interest to be on bad terms with the U.S. since the latter “posed the 
least danger to Britain’s vital interests” (Combs, 2015, p. 15). The Venezuela Crisis of 1895-96 
ultimately led to the British withdrawing “their navy from the Western Hemisphere” and tacitly 
recognizing that the region “fell within [the U.S.’] sphere of influence” (Gamble, 2017, p. 98). In 
essence, Britain satisfied the polar security attribute of having their armed forces present in the 
region. After the crisis, however, the moribund pole removed their navy, leaving the United 
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States to occupy the void, which meant it now satisfied one of the security attributes of a polar 
power.    
 While the Venezuela Crisis of 1895-1896 affected an attribute in the security realm, the 
Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 affected polar attributes in the economic dimension. The Corollary, 
issued by Theodore Roosevelt, was also in response to an international crisis involving 
Venezuela. Since the first crisis, the country had accumulated an increasing amount of debt to 
the European powers. Once the country defaulted on its loans in 1902, Britain, Germany, and 
Italy blockaded Venezuelan ports and seized customhouses. After the International Court of 
Arbitration delivered a decision in favor of the European powers, Roosevelt believed a 
dangerous precedent was set which stood against U.S. interests. This prompted Roosevelt to 
issue his famous Corollary, which indicated that the U.S. would use its superior naval position in 
the Western Hemisphere to police the nations of Latin America in order to “protect the 
interests of European investors” and ensure the repayment of sovereign debts (Mitchener & 
Weidenmier, 2005, p. 663).  
Ultimately, after the Corollary, the U.S. would continue the free market economic 
policies the British had put in place in Latin America. It now, however, replaced British authority 
in the region in the economic realm. For instance, Britain no longer had the authority over its 
spokes in the Western Hemisphere to ensure the free flow of capital and to enforce the 
repayment of debt obligations. Those attributes of polar status were now satisfied by the co-
opting pole that was the United States.  
 As the U.S.’ economic influence increased, so too did its impulse to bring “its way of life” 
to the peoples of Latin America. As one historian put it, “By the late nineteenth century, the 
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dynamism of American capitalism and a growing sense of racial superiority had fortified the 
missionary impulse” of the United States (Grandin, 2006, p. 17). As expected by PCT, once the 
U.S. began to instill rules and regulations in the socio-cultural realm, it started to fulfill that 
category’s polar attributes. For example, when the U.S. was the occupying force in the 
Dominican Republic, it established a number of behavioral constraints that were designed to 
impose “the superiority of U.S. customs and morality” (Tillman, 2016, p. 135). For instance, 
through U.S. backed constabulary efforts and military courts, prostitution and gambling were 
made illegal (Tillman, 2016). In other words, the U.S. constrained behaviors it deemed 
inappropriate in its spoke.  
Additionally, the U.S. constrained the ideas of the spokes it was co-opting. In Cuba, the 
U.S. had authority over the state’s school system and affected its population’s education. 
Before the U.S. gained the ability to establish socio-cultural constraints in Cuba, the island had a 
religiously based education system (Langley, 2001). Once it gained authority, United States 
officials adjusted Cuba’s education to emphasize more practical skills. As one historian wrote, 
the “model curriculum, written by an officer on the governor’s staff, was patterned on the 
‘Ohio Plan’ and emphasized preparation for citizenship and the acquisition of skills or the 
learning of a trade” (Langley, 2001, p. 10). As a result, by the early twentieth century, the 
United States was fulfilling the attributes for polar status in the socio-cultural realm by 
establishing rules and constraints which affected its spokes’ behavior, thoughts, and language. 
At this point, the U.S.’ co-option in the military, economic, and socio-cultural realms 
have been covered. The U.S.’ affect in the political realm, still needs to be discussed. As the 
United States’ authority began to increase in the above categories during the turn of the 
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twentieth century, so too did its promotion of democracy. While the Theodore Roosevelt 
administration pursued democratization, the presidency of Woodrow Wilson made establishing 
democracies and inhibiting revolutionary movements established policy (Ferguson, 2005, p. 53). 
His overall logic was that it was in the U.S.’ national security interest to have stable 
constitutional democracies in Latin America. This led the Wilson administration to establish 
rules and regulations on who Latin American states can have as their political leader, the 
size/membership of their electorates, and who could be politically represented. For example, 
ten days after Wilson took office, the U.S. president developed constraints which prevented 
General Victoriano Huerta from assuming office in Mexico. Wilson took these actions because 
he believed that the general was an illegitimate usurper who was “setting a precedent for 
Mexico that Wilson believed could only perpetuate instability” (T. Smith, 2012, p. 69).  
In Haiti, the U.S. also satisfied the political attributes of polar status by controlling the 
level of representation in the spoke. A clear instance of this occurred when the Haitian 
legislature desired to impeach a U.S. backed president. In response, the head of U.S. forces on 
the island imposed the dissolution of the spoke’s legislature. This action would have long lasting 
effects since for “many years to come, there would be no national legislature, only a rump 
client state headed by a president and kept in power by the marines” (McCormick & LaFeber, 
1993, p. 73). In other words, the U.S. established constraints on the representation Haiti  
Regarding the establishment of rules and regulations on a spoke’s electorate, one 
prevalent example comes from the U.S.’ occupation of Nicaragua. After ridding the country of 
its leader, the U.S. attempted to run efficient elections. While supporting a democratically 
elected government, the U.S. imposed the constraint that some supporters of the former 
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Nicaraguan leader could not vote in upcoming elections (McCormick & LaFeber, 1993, p. 87). In 
other words, the U.S limited its spoke’s electorate by banning individuals from voting and 
participating in the democratic process.  
Overall, a co-opting pole is able to complete the co-option process and gain authority 
over the spokes of a moribund pole. As a result, it will begin to satisfy an increasing number of 
polar attributes in association with its newly acquired spokes. This will be observable by the 
phenomenon of the spokes’ internal structure being altered. The examples above focused on 
how the United States affected the spokes they were co-opting in the Western Hemisphere 
from a moribund Britain.   




This chapter put forward a typology of poles. Polar co-option theory argues that a pole 
can fall into four distinct categories based on its varability of their authority and their desire to 
expand. A moribund pole’s authority is decreasing. A status quo pole’s authority is static. 
Prospective co-opting poles desire to extend their authority but will not be successful. These 
poles will not be able to complete the polar co-option process because they cannot overcome 
the objections of the other poles or the spokes they are attempting to co-opt do not accept 
their authority. In contrast, a co-opting pole is able to expand its authority over the spokes of 
the moribund pole.  
There are a number of reasons why providing a typology of the polar powers is 
important. First, typologies can help clarify theory. By specifying the distinct categories a pole 
can fall into and what each category represents, the narrative of polar co-option can be made 
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clearer and the theory understood more thoroughly. Second, since the polar co-option process 
is dynamic and pertains to the rise and fall of the polar powers, it is important to have a way of 
delineating what kind of pole each polar power is during the co-option process and how their 
actions change as the process unfolds. Third, the typology highlights the role of the polar 
attributes specified in chapter three. Furthermore, it stresses that a pole’s ability to satisfy 
these attributes are not static but subject to change and thus bolsters the theoretical specificty 
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The Decline of France’s and Britain’s Authority 




 This chapter will demonstrate the plausibility of PCT. It includes a case study that 
focuses on the post-World War II international system. Specifically, when France and Britain 
lost authority over their territorial orders, which set off a polar competition between the United 
States and Soviet Russia – the Cold War. Ultimately, the U.S. was able to co-opt more spokes 
from the moribund poles than Russia. As a result, the actions of the former will be highlighted 
more than the latter.   
 The chapter will follow PCT. First, the stable environment that was in place before the 
start of the polar competition will be described. The second section will survey the loss of 
authority of the moribund poles and the endemic unrest that followed. The third section will 
detail the fear that developed between the polar powers. It will include a survey of the two 
features of the polar co-option process: benign signaling and internal discussions. The fourth 
section discusses the methods used by the United States and Soviet Russia to co-opt the spokes 
of the moribund poles. The final section details the results of the polar co-option process, which 
includes a transition in the number of polar powers and their requisite territorial orders.          
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 Before the polar co-option process begins, a stable environment prevails. This includes 
each pole having authority over a territorial order.     
 Prior to France and Britain transitioning to moribund poles, each had authority over 
their own territorial order. France’s territorial order was the second largest in the system. Its 
rivalry with Britain, dating back centuries, shaped the development of not only the European 
sub-system but the world (Tombs & Tombs, 2007). Beginning in the 1830s, France embarked on 
its second era of empire building. At its zenith, the pole had authority over approximately 12 
million square kilometers and more than 100 million people (Gregory, 2000, p. 9). Its territorial 
order comprised parts of North Africa, the Levante, and Southeast Asia. Its spokes included a 
number of contemporary states, such as Lebanon, Syria, Vietnam, Cambodia, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco, Senegal, Mali, Chad, Cameroon, and Madagascar (Aldrich & Connell, 2006, p. 36). 
 The only territorial order larger than France’s was Britain’s. At its height, the British 
Empire comprised one-fifth of the globe and governed 400 million people (Johnson, 2002). It 
contained parts of North America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific. In terms of 
contemporary states, Britain’s territorial order included Canada, Australia, Kenya, South Africa, 
Iraq, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, and India.  
 While France and Britain had authority over territorial orders that spanned the globe, 
Soviet Russia’s order was primarily confined to Eastern and Central Europe. Though different 
from the maritime empires, the USSR was a polity that possessed “quite sufficient imperial 
characteristics to make comparisons between it and other empires” (Lieven, 1995, p. 608). In 
terms of size, the Soviet Union was around 8,600,660 square miles, which was only 50,000 
square miles less than its tsarists predecessor (Cohen, 2003, p. 198). It stretched from the 
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Pacific Ocean to the middle of Europe and from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus. Within this 
colossal empire, there were a number of contemporary states, such as Ukraine, Poland, 
Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Hungary, Georgia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania.       
 In comparison to the above territorial orders, the United States’ authority manifested 
itself in a different way. While the U.S. practiced direct imperialism in a few spokes – for 
example, in the Philippines - for the most part, its rules and regulations were imposed through 
informal mechanisms. Rather than incorporate its spokes into one empire, the United States 
had a sphere of influence over Latin America in the Western Hemisphere. A sphere of influence 
is defined as “a region in which a major power has hegemony or preeminence, and from which 
other major powers are excluded” (Molineu, 2019, p. 37). Reasoning that “European-style 
colonies were expensive and unnecessary,” the United States held authority within its sphere of 
influence through its “economic weight and judicious use of military intervention” (Livingstone, 
2013, p. 12). Contemporary states that fell within the U.S.’ sphere of influence include but are 
not limited to Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Brazil, and 
Argentina. 
 Overall, each of the four poles had authority over a defined territorial order. This 
environment was stable because each pole’s authority was recognized by their spokes as well 
as the other poles. Furthermore, none of the orders elicited enough fear to where conflict 
developed.           
 
Decline in a Pole’s Authority 
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 For the polar co-option process to begin, the environment described above needs to 
become destabilized. This occurs when at least one pole loses authority over its spokes.    
 During this polar co-option, the moribund poles were France and Britain. The first signs 
that both poles were losing authority over their territorial orders occurred after World War I. 
During the war, a substantial number of colonial troops were called into action. For France, 
around 550,00 soldiers were recruited from the empire; 440,000 of whom served in Europe (A. 
Jackson, 2017, p. 24). Britain also used their vast colonial manpower to aid its war effort. From 
India alone, Britain was able to garner 1.4 million soldiers with 1.1 million fighting outside of 
the subcontinent (ibid). Additionally, their “dominion” colonies like Canada and Australia, 
contributed 1.2 million soldiers with two thirds stationed in Europe.  
 In addition to being a source of military manpower, the spokes of the two poles 
contributed a vast amount of labor and resources. For example, France imported over 200,000 
colonial laborers to work on French farms and factories (Morrow, 2016). As a result of the need 
for both soldiers and laborers, Britain and France had to mobilize a significant number of 
people from their spokes, which negatively affected the two pole’s authority. As John Darwin 
explained, after WWI the colonial populations of the two poles became “resentful of new 
burdens and rules that broke the old ‘bargain’ of colonial politics. It tore apart the myth of 
Europe’s uniquely progressive culture, loosening the grip of older cultural elites and the ideas 
they had championed” (2008, p. 368). In other words, because France and Britain needed more 
out of their spokes’ populations during WWI, the two polar powers began to negatively affect 
individuals’ lives more broadly, which lead to greater discontent and a loss of polar authority.                                           
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Despite the fact that World War I negatively affected the populations of both polar 
powers’ spokes, the two poles were able to maintain their authority.1 After World War II, 
however, the authority of France and Britain was irrevocably damaged. Once again, the spokes 
were used as sources of military and labor manpower which increased their resentment. For 
example, it is estimated that around 50,000 East and Central Africans were killed or injured 
during the conflict (Owino, 2018, p. 364). In regards to labor, in order to meet the demands of 
the war, British spokes “witnessed an intensification” of raw material production that greatly 
affected their populations (A. Jackson, 2017, p. 49).  
 As a result of these developments, WWII ought to be viewed as the critical juncture for 
when France and Britain transitioned into moribund poles. Polar co-option theory predicts that 
once there is a decline in a pole’s authority, endemic unrest develops in their territorial order. 
As has been discussed, this should be expected given that the polar power’s spokes no longer 
recognize their pole’s authority and begin to flout their rules and regulations. Furthermore, one 
component of a pole losing its authority is its inability to enforce said constraints. In other 
words, when a pole’s authority is declining, its ability to enforce its rules and regulations will 
also be diminishing. As a result, it is expected that unrest will become endemic within a 
moribund pole’s territorial order.  
 
1 While this chapter does not want to get into the interwar years explicitly, during this time period, a dual process 
was underway. France and Britain continued to extend their authority over their spokes which began with the 
mobilizations that occurred during WWI (Levine, 2013; Chapter 10; Thomas, 2017). On the other hand, nationalist 
movements sprung up and a number of decolonization leaders were either being educated in metropolitan 
universities or learning how to maneuver their political environments. These same individuals would become 
leaders during the decolonization period following WWII. For example, India’s Nehru (Louro, 2018) and Vietnam’s 
Hoe Chi Minh (Goebel, 2015).      
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 France’s territorial order started to witness unrest at the elite level shortly after World 
War II. During this time, nationalist leaders and parties began to establish themselves as 
influential domestic power brokers whose discontent needed to be satisfied. Understanding 
that their authority was waning, France first attempted to quell nationalist sentiments by 
proposing a new French Union. Despite the fact that their spokes were granted additional 
freedoms, France’s reforms did not go far enough.2 By the 1950s, it was clear that France’s new 
union would not survive.  
One of the first instances of substantial unrest started in 1946, when fighting broke out 
between French forces and the newly dubbed “associated state” of Vietnam. The conflict would 
continue for a decade, proving to be endemic. It ended in 1954, when the defeated moribund 
pole agreed to the Geneva Accords, which partitioned Vietnam into North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam (Logevall, 2012).  
 In Morocco, an independence party, Istiqlal, was founded in 1943. Its efforts were 
largely at the elite level, until the end of World War II. At that point, the organization “moved 
towards mass politics,” which lead to the spoke witnessing “significant changes between 1945 
and 1949” (Zisenwine, 2010, p. 88). Despite the fact that a nationalist movement was gaining in 
popularity, “France did not initiate a new approach to Morocco and did not adapt to the 
postwar international reality” (Zisenwine, 2010, p. 181).  
 
2 While the French Union was supposed to further integrate pole and spokes, it led to administrative confusion. 
Most of France’s spokes in Africa were categorized as “overseas territories,” but former protectorates like 
Indochina, Morocco, and Tunisia were identified as “associated states” (Semley, 2017, p. 260). In addition to the 
administrative categorizations, the French Union conferred a different form of citizenship (French Union 
citizenship in comparison to French citizenship), which contributed to nationalist discontent. Under the new 
French Union, spoke populations were granted individual rights like “the right to free speech” and “protection 
from arbitrary arrest” (Cooper, 2016, p. 127). They did not, however, gain representation in Parliament. Thus, 
France wanted to retain the polar political constraint of who can be represented, which its spokes soundly 
rejected.        
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Consequently, by late 1952, substantial rioting developed in the city of Casablanca. The 
following year, France apprehended and deported Morocco’s Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef 
because of his support for nationalism. This action only exasperated the unrest in the spoke.3 
For the next two years, “the country became locked into a spiral of violence and counter-
violence” (Evans, 2012, p. 111). Thus, by the early 1950s, France’s territorial order was 
witnessing substantial unrest in both Vietnam and Morocco.  
 In late 1954, France’s territorial order witnessed another instance of instability, when 
unrest erupted in Algeria. At first, France connected the events in Algeria with the “nascent 
insurgencies in Morocco and Tunisia”  (Connelly & Connelly, 2002, p. 69). Over time, however, 
the unrest in Algeria surpassed the events in the other spokes. Hardened after its loss of 
Vietnam, France decided to participate in a protracted war to prevent Algeria from leaving its 
order. The conflict would ultimately last eight years until Algeria gained its independence in 
1962. Despite the difficulties in gauging the costs of the unrest, it is estimated that 500,000 
individuals lost their lives. This is in addition to the economic losses which affected both the 
French treasury and the Algerian countryside and its people (Stora, 2001: chapter nine).  
 While we briefly examined the unrest that occurred in Morocco, Vietnam, and Algeria, 
there was also large-scale instability in places like Madagascar and Syria (Little, 1990; Schayegh, 
2013). Additionally, most of France’s African spokes witnessed either elite or popular 
destabilization in the decades following World War II. As one historian wrote, “Demands for 
independence remined strong [throughout the 1950s]…and in 1960, France was forced to yield 
political independence to most of its African territories” (Schmidt, 2013, p. 20).  
 
3 The French were attempting to exercise their political constraint of determining who can be a political leader of 
their spoke.    
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Overall, through the duration of World War II until the early 1960s, France’s territorial 
order witnessed endemic unrest. This transpired because its spokes no longer adhered to its 
authority and it was unable to enforce its rules and regulations. The occurrence of significant 
instability in a moribund pole’s territorial order is expected by PCT. As a result, the events that 
transpired within France’s spokes should be viewed as a corroborative instance for the theory.  
 As previously stated, France was not the only moribund pole in the international system 
following World War II. Britain’s territorial order also witnessed a vast amount of unrest. While 
the disintegration of Britain’s territorial order took place over a decade, significant instability 
occurred shortly after the war.  
First, was the unrest that developed in India. The “jewel” of the British Empire had a 
long history of nationalism (Chatterji, 2013). In 1935, it reached a preliminary agreement to 
attain dominion status and “its main nationalist party, the Indian National Congress, controlled 
the governments in a majority of the Indian provinces” (White, 2014, p. 28). After WWII, India’s 
independence finally arrived as Britain, in the midst of a difficult economic situation, declared 
that the spoke would receive its independence after a protracted negotiation. During this time, 
however, ethno-religious unrest erupted between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. As one historian 
wrote, “through swathes of north India disorder was already rife during the spring and summer 
of 1946” (Brendon, 2008, p. 410). By 1947, India was granted its independence but partitioned 
in an attempt to prevent further ethno-religious turmoil.  
 Two other early examples of instability within Britain’s territorial order occurred in 
Turkey and Greece. Before World War II, Britain had been economically and militarily 
supporting the two states. After the conflict, it faced significant unrest in both locations. 
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Regarding Turkey, Soviet Russia challenged Britain’s authority and pressed to gain control of the 
strategic Dardanelles.4 To achieve this objective, the USSR attempted to intimidate the country 
by amassing “200,000 Soviet soldiers in Bulgaria, 500,00 in Romania, and about 175,000 in the 
Trans-Caucasian region” (Mark, 2005, p. 116). Understanding the significance of controlling the 
Straits, the U.S. sent warships to demonstrate its resolve against Soviet aggression.5  
While Turkey’s instability was caused by the Soviet’s threat of invasion, domestic 
discord led to unrest within Greece. During World War II, Greece was occupied by Nazi 
Germany. After the war, Britain reinstalled Greece’s former monarchy. Stability was not 
maintained, however, because roughly 20,000 pro-communist guerillas began destabilizing 
northern Greece. As a result, by the winter of 1946, the country was on the verge of full-scale 
civil war (Leebaert, 2018). The fighting would continue, with the U.S. providing financial and 
logistical support to the monarchy until 1949.   
  The third significant instance of unrest within Britain’s territorial order, occurred in 
British Malaysia. During the war, Japan overran Britain’s forces and expelled them from the 
region. After the conflict, however, Britain was able to reoccupy its wayward spoke. In an effort 
to reinstall its authority, Britain introduced rules and regulations that gave the indigenous 
population more rights. This did not work as ethnic unrest broke out between Malaysia’s 
Chinese, Malayan, and Indian populations. By June 1948, Britain attempted to put down the 
unrest by declaring a state of emergency and mobilizing troops. At one point, Britain deployed 
 
4 To put it another way, Britain’s authority over Turkey was challenged at the pole-to-pole level rather than the 
spoke-to-pole level. 
5 In other words, Britain lost the ability to military constrain a prospective co-opting pole – the USSR - from 
threatening one of its spokes – Turkey. As a result, the U.S. acted to prevent the USSR from co-opting Turkey (or at 
least, gaining some authority over the spoke) and in response instituted its own constraint. Thus, satisfying a 
security indicator and acting as a co-opting pole.  
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“some forty thousand outside troops as well as twenty-eight thousand Malay soldiers and 
police and thirty-nine thousand special constables” (Reynolds, 2000, p. 64). The unrest proved 
to be endemic as the pole was not able to end the instability until the mid-1950s. 
 Even though Britain’s territorial order witnessed a vast amount of instability during the 
late-1940s, the moribund pole still had authority over a number of important spokes. These 
spokes would become destabilization in the subsequent decades. Specifically, in the 1950s, 
Britain’s spokes in the Middle East started to disregard their pole’s rules and regulations.  
One of the most significant examples, occurred in Egypt. In July 1952, instability at the 
elite level developed as the “Free Officers Movement” overthrew Britain’s supported political 
leader, King Farouk. Even though the revolution was first led by Mohamed Naguib, the 
movement’s second leader, Gamal Nasser, would intensify the unrest after he assumed power 
in 1954. Nasser’s main goal was to eliminate Britain’s authority by expelling them from Egypt 
(Gerges, 2018). This desire led to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, when Nasser nationalized the 
Suez Canal Company and demanded Britain leave the country. In response, Britain, France, and 
Israel invaded Egypt in an attempt to remove Nasser. Their plan did not succeed, and Nasser 
remained in control of the former spoke.6  
 Around the same time, another British spoke in the Middle East, Iran, was witnessing 
significant unrest. Iran’s main grievance was the administration and policies of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, which “had run the southern parts of the country very much as a colonial 
 
6 The British, French and Israeli’s plan did not succeed for a number of reasons. First, the Soviet Union threaten to 
intervene if the three states did not withdraw (Nichols, 2012). Second, after not being consulted about the 
invasion, president Eisenhower worked to undermine the British and French by “withholding financial aid and oil” 
(Nichols, 2012, p. 262). Third, there was a run on the pound sterling, which was compounded by the fact that the 
Eisenhower administration ensured that Britain could not receive aid from the IMF (Kirshner, 2014, p. 147).  
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power” (Westad, 2005, p. 120). Capitalizing on the popular disdain for the company, the leader 
of the National Front party, Mohammad Mossadegh, called for its nationalization. After 
becoming prime minister in 1951, Mossadegh was able to fulfill his promise of nationalizing the 
oil company. What followed was around two years of instability and economic decline as the 
Western powers organized a boycott of Iranian oil. Ultimately, Britain and the United States 
were able to sponsor a coup in 1953, which removed Mossadegh from power.  
 By the middle of the 1950s, endemic unrest was plaguing Egypt and Iran. In a third 
location, Iraq, Britain’s authority was preserved but rapidly declining. In the early 1950s, Iraq 
witnessed numerous bouts of unrest. In 1952, there was an urban uprising that had to be put 
down by the army firing on demonstrators (Haj, 1997, p. 105). The following year, strikes broke 
out in the city of Basra, “where the British were reported to have fired on the striking workers” 
and subsequently imposed martial law (Haj, 1997, p. 106). In 1954, a wave of repression took 
place as political parties, unions, and the press were suppressed. Two years later, another 
popular uprising occurred in a number of provincial cities. Just like the unrest in 1952, the mass 
uprising of 1956 “was brutally put down by the government” (Haj, 1997, p. 107). After 
witnessing significant instability, Britain’s authority over Iraq came to an end in 1958, when a 
military led coup toppled the pole’s supported government - the Hashemite monarchy.  
  As polar co-option theory expects unrest in the moribund poles’ spokes became 
endemic. Within France’s territorial order, important spokes like Algeria, Vietnam, Syria and 
Morocco faced years of political, social, and economic turmoil. Britain’s order also witnessed 
substantial instability. In the late 1940s, British spokes such as India, Malaysia, Greece, and 
Turkey became destabilized. In the proceeding decade, Britain’s authority continued to decline, 
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which lead to significant unrest in strategic spokes like Iran, Egypt, and Iraq. Overall, it has to be 
concluded that PCT’s predicted behaviors occurred.  
While the authority France and Britain at the spoke-to-pole level declined at different 
rates, by the 1960s most of the spokes tied to the moribund poles had been destabilized. While 
this is what transpired at the spoke-to-pole level, it mirrors what occurred at the pole-to-pole 
level.  
During the 1940s and 1950s, the United States was forced to walk a foreign policy 
tightrope. On the one hand, it had to publicly champion self-determination because it could not 
lose the support of the nationalist leaders emerging from France’s and Britain’s wayward 
spokes. The fear being that the nascent leaders would gravitate towards Russia. On the other 
hand, the U.S. could not alienate its two Western allies, which meant it had to support their 
attempts to reinstitute their authority over their crumbling territorial orders (Ryan & Pungong, 
2000). For example, in Vietnam, France was able to secure “American military and economic 
aid” for their attempted reconquest (Statler, 2007, p. 21). Regarding the Middle East, during the 
late 1940s, U.S. policymakers recognized that the “cornerstone of our thinking is to maintain 
the British position in the Middle East area to the greatest possible extent.”7   
As the territorial orders of the two moribund poles continued to be destabilized, 
however, the U.S. was left with no choice but to recognize that their allies’ authority was in 
decline. For example, in 1954, France and Vietnam signed the Geneva Accords against the U.S.’ 
wishes. This agreement between the French and Vietnamese ended their conflict and 
 
7 Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State. (1971). In S. Everett Gleason (Ed.), Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1947, The Near East and Africa, Vol. V. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.   
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partitioned Vietnam and created Cambodia and Laos. Another ramification of the accords was 
the “transition from French to American involvement” in the country (VanDeMark, 1995, p. 5). 
Regarding Britain’s position in the Middle East, despite the fact that the U.S. supported 
their ally’s regional authority in the late 1940s, by the 1950s, a reassessment was made. 
Recognizing that Britain’s position was tentative, U.S policymakers concluded that Britain “lacks 
both manpower and resources successfully to defend the area.”8 As a result, the United States 
should make a “unilateral public statement that the US has a vital security interest in the 
defense of the Middle East as a whole…[and] is prepared to assist the countries of the Middle 
East in the defense of the area against aggression” (ibid).   
Even though it is difficult to determine when exactly the United States came to the 
conclusion that France and Britain no longer had authority over their territorial orders, it is safe 
to say that by the 1960s, the United States fully recognized that their allies were no longer polar 
powers. One of the clearest indications of this is when the U.S.’ shifted away from “mutually 
assured destruction” and towards “flexible response.” The former policy centered around 
defending Europe from a Soviet attack by threatening an overwhelming nuclear response. The 
latter, on the other hand, focused on the U.S.’ ability to counter guerilla activity in former 
French and British spokes. This change in U.S. posture “placed the United States in direct 
competition with the Soviets for the soul of the Third World” (Donaldson, 2017, p. 141). This 
foreign policy shift would not have occurred if the U.S. still believed that France and Britain had 
authority over their spokes and could defend them against Russia’s attempts to co-opt them.       
 
8 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to 
the Secretary of State. (1982). In William Z. Slany (Ed.) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East 
and Africa, Vol. V. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.    
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 In addition to the U.S., Soviet Russia did not immediately question the authority of the 
moribund poles. After WWII, Stalin increased Soviet authority over Eastern Europe. He also 
attempted but failed to encroach on Turkey and Iran. Regarding France’s and Britain’s spokes in 
Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, Stalin did not attempt to displace the moribund 
poles’ authority. As Alvin Rubinstein explained, Stalin did not assist Third World countries 
“either bilaterally or in the United Nations…Ignorance of local conditions, the absence of 
meaningful contacts with national liberation movements, a preoccupation with Soviet-bloc 
stability and orthodoxy, and military caution” all lead the Soviet chairman to not attempt to co-
opt the spokes of France and Britain (Rubinstein, 1990, p. 85).  
 After Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev ascended to power. Despite this change, 
Soviet policy towards the spokes of Britain and France did not immediately shift. During his first 
years in office, Khrushchev’s stance towards national liberation movements has been described 
as “calculated caution” (Rubinstein, 1990, p. 92). For example, he did not want to question 
France’s authority over Algeria. It was only after a “wave of decolonization brought Africa into 
the limelight in the early 1960s did his policy begin to address this issue” (Rubinstein, 1990, pp. 
85-86). Ultimately, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, “Khrushchev was supporting so-called 
movements of national liberation and socialist regimes throughout the third world, from sub-
Sahara Africa to Latin America (Zubok, 2009, p. 339). As a result, it should be concluded that 
Soviet Russia did not initially challenge France’s and Britain’s authority over their spokes. As 
PCT predicts, however, Soviet Russia eventually came to the conclusion that the moribund 
poles’ authority over their territorial orders was no more as their instability persisted.  
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 Overall, the stable environment established by the polar powers became destabilized as 
France and Britain continued to lose their authority over their territorial orders. As their spokes 
started to flout their rules and regulations, unrest within their spokes became endemic. This 
lead both the United States and Soviet Russia to conclude that the moribund poles no longer 
had authority over their spokes.   
 
An Increase in the Level of Fear within the Polar Powers  
 
 
 Once the stable environment is destabilized, PCT theory predicts that a polar 
competition will develop. This will lead to an increased amount of fear among the poles, which 
will be evident through certain recurring behaviors: benign signaling and internal discussion.    
After France and Britain transitioned into moribund poles, benign signaling developed 
between the polar powers. The role of the United States within these discussions was 
problematic, however, as it was caught between two competing foreign policy agendas. This is 
because France and Britain were “indispensable allies of the United States in its competition 
with the Soviet Union. Possession of empire seemed crucial to their post war” recovery (Fry, 
2002, p. 143). This meant that the U.S. could not fan the flames of nationalism within the 
moribund poles’ spokes for fear that if its allies lost control over their territorial orders, it would 
negatively affect the system’s balance of power.    
On the other hand, if the U.S. did not support moderate nationalist movements in Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East, “the USSR and radical nationalist regimes…would benefit” (Fry, 
2002, p. 143). As a result, the U.S. could not fully endorse nationalism because it did not want 
to contribute to the weakening of their allies; but it also could not completely support the 
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authority of their moribund allies for fear that the Soviet Union would benefit. Ultimately, the 
U.S.’ foreign policy decisions were in line with what PCT predicts. In private correspondence 
and sometimes in public pronouncements, it told the moribund poles that it supported their 
authority. Privately, however, the U.S. acted out of its own self-interest to ensure its position in 
the moribund poles’ spokes.  
For example, regarding French North Africa, the United States and France had 
discussions about its wayward spokes. While the U.S. implored France to make reforms that 
would satisfy the spokes’ nationalists, the U.S’ stated position was that it “unequivocally 
support continuation of French presence” (W. B. Smith, 1983, p. 148). In other words, the U.S. 
was trying to convince France that its preferred outcome was a continuation of France’s 
authority. Thus, signaling benign intentions. As this was occurring, however, the U.S. was 
securing its position in the region by obtaining basing rights in Morocco (Dorman, 1983). This 
led France to be suspicious of U.S. motives, believing the U.S. was in fact encroaching on a 
spoke it still had authority over.   
In addition to the U.S.’ contradictory behavior of benign signaling while seeking to gain 
authority, both the U.S. and the USSR highlighted the benefits of their territorial orders. The 
U.S. touted liberty, self-determination, and free market capitalism. On the other side, Soviet 
Russia extoled their Marxist-Leninist ideology. As one historian wrote, by the 1960s, it was clear 
that both the U.S. and Soviet Russia “saw their mission as part of a world-historical 
progression” (Westad, 2005, p. 72). In other words, both poles argued that it would be better 
for humanity if their territorial orders expanded and more spokes followed their rules and 
regulations.  
U.S. Co-option of French and British Spokes                                                                         Justin Tepper 
142 
 
Ultimately, the U.S. and Soviet Russia proclaimed the benevolence of their actions while 
attempting to co-opt the spokes of the moribund poles, which is what PCT expects. As two 
historians have written, both the U.S. and the USSR “publicly opposed imperialism but practiced 
forms of it nonetheless” (Judge & Langdon, 2018, p. 1). To put it another way, both the U.S. and 
Soviet Russia proclaimed benign intentions regarding the spokes they were trying to co-opt but 
acted along the lines of past polar powers, which is to say, imperialistically.   
In addition to benign signaling, PCT predicts that once the polar power’s fear is rising, 
they will have internal discussions that focus on the developments within the international 
system and how they will affect the balance of power. This predicted behavior came to pass as 
the prospective co-opting poles – the U.S. and the USSR - had internal discussions. These 
domestic deliberations within the poles centered around ascertaining long-term power trends, 
how these trends would affect the competition between the prospective co-opting poles, and 
the fears these expected developments elicit.  
 Once the United States recognized that France’s and Britain’s territorial orders were 
destabilized, it started to internally discuss how these events would affect the international 
system. As expected, the United States’ chief concern was how the loss of French and British 
authority would affect its competition with Soviet Russia. As a result, the U.S. found itself 
focused on preventing the Soviet Union from extending its authority over the moribund poles’ 
wayward spokes.     
 In North Africa, France’s loss of authority over Morocco and Tunisia worried the United 
States. The region’s prime importance was its geographical location and network of bases. The 
U.S. reasoned that whichever pole held authority over North Africa could exercise “control of 
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the Western Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches,” stage “invasion operations within the 
Mediterranean basin,” and launch “air operations against Europe, the European USSR, and the 
Middle East” ("National Intelligence Estimate," p. 155). This led the U.S. to conclude that its 
central objectives for the region was to “insure that the area and its resources are available to 
the United States and its allies…[and] To prevent the extension of Soviet Influence and 
communist ideology within the area” ("Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National 
Security Council Planning Board," p. 151). Overall, the U.S.’ assessment of France’s loss of 
authority over North Africa mirrors what polar co-option predicts. The U.S. focused on the polar 
competition and expected dire consequences that would negatively affect its position in said 
competition.   
 While the U.S. was gauging how the loss of French North Africa would affect their 
competition with the USSR, there were also internal discussions about France’s diminished 
authority in Indochina. The U.S. viewed the situation with dire consequences because 
“Indochina was considered intrinsically important for its raw materials, rice, and naval bases” 
(Rotter, 2010, p. 23). As expected by PCT, the internal deliberations within the U.S. centered 
around long-term power trends, took an overly pessimistic tone, and invoked domino effect 
(Zhang, 1992, p. 153). The U.S. believed that “the loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition 
to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious 
repercussions on U.S. and free world interest in Europe and elsewhere” (Lay, 1982, p. 971). 
 In addition to internal deliberations about France’s destabilized territorial order, the 
U.S. considered the ramifications of the dissolution of Britain’s order. Once again, the 
conclusions reached during these deliberations were in line with what PCT expects. In regards 
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to the loss of Britain’s authority over Greece and Turkey, the U.S. was overly pessimistic and 
invoked domino effect. A State Department report came to the conclusion that if Turkey and 
Greece fell their “loss to the western world would undoubtedly be followed by further Soviet 
territorial and other gains in Europe and in the Near and Middle East” (Henderson, 1971, p. 51). 
These losses would immediately be followed by the weakening of the strategic and economic 
position of the United States vis-a-vie the USSR.      
 Though the U.S.’ concerns regarding the Middle East did not occur as expected, within a 
few years the region was destabilized. As discussed above, in the early 1950s, two important 
British spokes rejected its authority – Egypt and Iran. This led the U.S. to internally deliberate 
the importance of the region. It reasoned that if the Soviets could instill their authority, it would 
have significant ramifications. In regards to Egypt, U.S. officials concluded that the spoke “is of 
great political and strategic importance because of its geographical position, its natural 
defensive barriers, its sites for military bases, its position with respect to transportations 
routes, [and] its petroleum resources” ("Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security 
Council," p. 222).  
The U.S.’ assessment of the importance of Iran was even more dire. A special report 
stipulated that if Iran “should come under Soviet domination, the independence of all other 
countries of the Middle East would be threatened. Specifically the USSR could (1) control or 
limit the availability of a Middle Eastern oil upon which the economy of Western Europe 
depends; (2) acquire advance bases or subversive activities or actual attack against a vast 
contiguous area including Turkey, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula (hence the Suez Canal), 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan” ("Study Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council," p. 
11).  
 Overall, the U.S held internal deliberations that centered around the expected effects of 
the dissolution of France’s and Britain’s territorial orders. As stipulated by PCT, these 
discussions focused on the polar competition between the U.S. and USSR, and overly 
pessimistic conclusions were reached. Whether it pertained to French North Africa or Britain’s 
declining authority in the Middle East, the U.S.’ deliberations concluded that if Soviet Russia 
were to gain more authority through the cooption of former French and British spokes then it 
would surpass the United States and gain strategic locations that threated other areas of 
interest. As a result of the latter point, on numerus occasions the U.S. became fearful of 
domino effect, which is in line with the expectations of PCT.   
 The internal discussions predicted by PCT do not just occur within the prospective co-
opting poles. The other poles in the system also need to determine which pole they want to co-
opt the newly independent spokes. This preference will correspond with the amount of fear 
each of the prospective co-opting poles elicit.  
 During this polar co-option, the moribund poles that were France and Britain had to 
determine whether the Soviet Union or the United States was more of a threat. Ultimately, 
they would decide that the former was more dangerous to their survival than the latter. The 
main factors that lead to this conclusion were geographical as well as ideological.  
 With its location in Eastern Europe and its superior land army, France and Britain feared 
the possibility that an emboldened Soviet Russia would overrun Continental Europe (Rosato, 
2010). The United States, on the other hand, was situated across the Atlantic and was viewed 
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as an offshore balancer. Rather than conquest, its main objective was to “prevent the Soviet 
Union from dominating the Eurasian land mass” (Art, 2013, p. 178). Consequently, both 
moribund poles actually sought out security guarantees from the United States and supported 
the expansion of its authority (Lundestad, 1986).    
 In addition to the material fears, there were also ideological concerns (Kramer, 1999). 
France, Britain, and the United States were all liberal democratic states that followed the 
economic tenets of capitalism. In contrast, Soviet Russia espoused a totalitarian governing 
ideology based on the principles of Marxist-Leninism. Furthermore, the USSR was not a 
capitalist country but a communist one that believed in the efficiency of a command economy. 
As a result of these ideological differences, France and Britain were more concerned with a 
growing Soviet Russia than the United States. After taking into account the ideological and 
geographical factors, the two moribund poles were less fearful of the U.S. than they were of the 
Soviet Union. This led them to support the former’s desire to complete the co-option process 
while working to impede Soviet Russia.     
 Overall, once France and Britain lost their authority over their spokes, the level of fear 
within the international system rose. In an attempt to alleviate this fear, the prospective co-
opting poles started to signal their benignity. Additionally, the polar powers had internal 
discussions that focused on determining how the polar competition between the United States 
and Soviet Russia would affect the international system’s balance of power.   
  
The Prospective Co-opting Poles Attempt to Co-opt Spokes     
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The final step of the polar co-option process is a pole co-opting spokes. There are three 
ways a pole co-opts spokes of a moribund pole: legitimacy, incentives, and coercion.   
In regards to legitimacy, nationalist leaders in the moribund poles’ spokes viewed the 
United States as a benevolent polar power. This led to the belief that the U.S’ rules and 
regulations were legitimate. There are a number of reasons why this perception of the U.S. 
developed. First, the United States was never a significant colonial power. While France and 
Britain had sprawling territorial orders that included large portions of the Middle East, Asia, and 
Africa, the United States’ order was primarily confined to the Western Hemisphere and 
operated through informal mechanisms. Furthermore, the U.S.’ only formal colony, the 
Philippines, was granted independence in 1947 without any bloodshed. This allowed U.S. 
officials to make the argument that they were never a colonial power.9  
In addition to not seeing the United States as a colonial power, it was perceived as a 
champion of independence and individual liberty. There were two reasons why nationalist 
leaders in former French and British spokes saw the U.S this way. First, was the United States’ 
history of liberalism and self-determination. These foundational principles were codified in the 
U.S.’ Declaration of Independence, which was being imitated throughout the world (Armitage, 
2007). Secondly, the United States reinforced its support for individual freedom and rights 
when it advocated for the Atlantic Charter, which states that Britain and the U.S. will “respect 
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.”10       
 
9 For example, in The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffrey) to the Department of State – May 12, 1953; Memorandum of 
a conversation, department of state, November 13, 1957 
10 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp 
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When the United States’ legitimacy was not enough, it used its immense material 
capabilities to incentivize spokes to join its territorial order. For example, during the late 1940s, 
the United States extended aid to a number of spokes that were rejecting the authority of 
France and Britain. One of the first instances of U.S. aid replacing British assistance occurred in 
Turkey and Greece. After the moribund pole informed the U.S. that it could no longer financially 
and militarily support the spokes, the latter agreed to grant $400 million in aid (Rizas, 2018, p. 
8). Furthermore, the U.S.’ pledge of assistance led to the ascension of both Greece and Turkey 
joining the U.S. led NATO alliance. Greece’s and Turkey’s ascension into the alliance provided 
both spokes with a number of benefits. For example, both countries were protected from 
further Soviet aggression. Second, both spokes were strengthened against regional rivals. As 
one historian pointed out, “an arms race between Bulgaria and Greece led to a hardening of 
Greek and US thinking on the desirability of expansion of the Greek armed forces” (Rizas, 2018, 
p. 10). Regarding Turkey, once the U.S. recognized that the spoke was now part of its territorial 
order, it started to receive benefits. It is estimated that “from 1948 through 1964 Turkey 
received $2.6 billion in military and financial aid, a sum that helped successive Turkish 
governments to retain a high rate of development” (Rizas, 2018, p. 12). 
In addition to the “rewards” the U.S. used to incentivize Greece and Turkey into joining its 
territorial order, a program of technical assistance for underdeveloped spokes was devised – 
the Point Four Program. Its primary purpose was to “combat the spread of communism in the 
Third World by ameliorating the effects of poverty” (Powaski, 1997, p. 86). This entailed 
improving the health and education of individuals in former French and British spokes. By the 
early 1950s, U.S. money and technical advisors were contributing to over 200 projects in 34 
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countries, many of which were in newly independent spokes in Africa and Asia. Some of the 
initiatives of the Point Four program were to improve on “artificial fertilizers, irrigation and 
ecology, health and malaria control, and strengthening research and educational curricula” 
(Whitesides, 2019, p. 110). 
While the Point Four program affected a large number of states, the United States also 
devised aid packages that induced individual spokes into joining its territorial order. Regarding 
Iran, the U.S. supported the Pahlavi family and Reza Shah. Between 1953 and 1960, the U.S. 
invested around $567 million in economic aid and another $450 million in military aid (Bill, 
1989, p. 114). Pakistan also received an individualized aid program. In 1954 alone, the U.S. 
“decided to increase economic help to $105.9 million for the current fiscal year” (Kux, 2001, p. 
68)  Militarily, the U.S. pledged $50 million in aid to Pakistan’s armed forces. Additionally, the 
prospective co-oping pole committed to cover the equipment for “4 army infantry and 1.5 
armored divisions, to provide modern aircraft for 6 air force squadrons, and to supply 12 
vessels for the navy” (Kux, 2001, p. 69). This latter program was estimated to be worth $171 
million.        
 When it came to attempting to co-opt spokes through the use of “rewards,” the United 
States was not alone as Soviet Russia also utilized this approach. For example, after the 
Egyptian revolution of 1952, the latter used its economic and military assets to entice Britain’s 
former spoke into joining its territorial order. The Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia, 
engaged in a cotton-for-arms deal that entailed the USSR supplying around $200 million worth 
of military equipment to Egypt (Yaqub, 2004, p. 40). To counter Soviet penetration, the U.S. 
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tried to use its economic might by reopening discussions about financing Egypt’s Aswan Dam – 
a project intended to produce hydroelectric power and regulate the flow of the Nile. 
At this point, both prospective co-opting poles were attempting to co-opt Egypt through 
“rewards.” The U.S., however, grew increasingly frustrated with Egypt as the latter opened 
diplomatic relations with communist China and threatened to turn to the Soviets for Aswan 
Dam funding if the West’s offer did not materialize (Yaqub, 2004, p. 46). Once the United States 
fully decommitted from funding the Aswan Dam, Soviet Russia filled the void. In 1958, Moscow 
extended a “$175 million loan, the largest it had yet granted to a Third World state, as well as 
an additional $100 million for the Aswan Dam” (Golan, 1990, p. 54). This led to Egypt moving 
closer to the Soviet Union’s territorial order until the early 1970s.  
 A second example of the Soviet Union using its resources to entice a spoke into joining 
its territorial order occurred in Africa. In 1958, France offered independence to its African 
colonies. The only spoke that chose not to remain within the French Union was Guinea. In 
response, France “denied Guinea military and economic assistance, [and] ordered French 
administrators, teachers, doctors, and technicians to leave” the wayward spoke (Tatum, 2002, 
p. 84). In an attempt to fill the vacuum, Guinea first appealed to the U.S. for aid but was denied 
since the U.S. did not want to harm its relationship with France. Afterwards, Guinea appealed 
and began to receive substantial aid from the Soviet Union. Between 1959 and 1961, the 
Soviets spent over $100 million in Guinea and provided technical and military assistance 
(Natufe, 2011). With the Soviet’s willingness to extend aid to Guinea, the spoke became “the 
first of many African countries to emerge as a Cold War battleground” (Rakove, 2012, p. 312).  
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 If legitimacy and incentives are not enough to co-opt a particular spoke, the polar 
powers can always use coercion. As previously discussed, once Egypt started to move toward 
the Soviet Union, the United States tried to use coercive measures by withdrawing its aid for 
the Aswan Dam. It was not the only time the U.S. would attempt to co-op spokes through these 
means.  
 One of the most famous uses of coercion during this polar co-option centered around 
Iran. When Mohammed Mossadegh was elected prime minister and nationalized Britain’s oil 
interests, the U.S. joined the British led-oil embargo. With the support of these two poles, Iran 
was prevented from accessing a significant proportion of the world’s tanker fleet and refining 
capacity (Marsh, 2014, p. 100). In addition to the embargo, the U.S. and Britain worked to 
overthrow Mossadegh in a coup. As one historian put it, the “oil embargo on Iran during the 
Anglo-Iranian oil crisis…helped secure Iran as a U.S. cold war client state” (Marsh, 2014, p. 102). 
 Overall, during this polar co-option, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Soviet 
Russia were able to co-opt spokes from the moribund poles that were France and Britain. In 
order to complete the co-option process, both poles used the three methods of gaining 
authority over lesser tier states: legitimacy, incentives, and coercion. 
 
The Results of the United States Co-opting French and British Spokes   
 
 
After the polar co-option process is complete, PCT expects two results. First, the number 
of poles within the system will change. Second, the configuration of territorial orders will be 
altered.    
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Regarding the first expected result, during this polar co-option, the international system 
transitioned from multipolarity to bipolarity as not one but two moribund poles - France and 
Britain – lost their polar status and became great powers. As previously indicated, following 
World War I, the spokes within Britain’s and France’s territorial orders started to question their 
poles’ authority. After World War II, however, both polar powers transitioned into moribund 
poles as they “were forced to recognize that they were no longer world powers” (Chafer, 2002, 
p. 11). In other words, Britain’s and France’s loss of authority over their spokes led to the 
dissolution of their global territorial orders. For example, between 1945 and 1964, twenty-six 
countries declared their independence from the British Empire (Brendon, 2008, p. 605). During 
the same period, roughly twenty-three states left France’s order.  
  With this decrease in the number of polar powers, the second expected result of PCT 
occurred, i.e. an alteration in the number of territorial orders. After World War II, the moribund 
poles that were France and Britain lost their authority over their orders. This led the two 
remaining poles - the U.S. and USSR - to compete for the moribund poles’ former spokes. Even 
though Soviet Russia was able to extend its authority over a number of spokes, its territorial 
order laid primarily in Eastern Europe. In most cases, it was the U.S. that prevailed as the co-
opting pole. Thus, the number of territorial orders decreased from four to two. This process 
was lopsided, however, as the U.S. was able to co-opt more spokes than Soviet Russia. As a 
result, the following will focus more on the U.S.’ expansion rather than the USSR’s. 
 In the political realm, the moribund poles satisfied the polar attributes presented in 
chapter three. While Britain established more politically liberal rules and regulations when 
compared to France, both poles affected their spokes’ political representation, the makeup of 
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their electorate, and who could hold political office. After France and Britain lost their 
authority, however, they could no longer enforce their political constraints. Rather, the co-
opting poles started to alter the political structure of spokes formally tied to the two moribund 
poles.   
In terms of representation, the former spokes of France and Britain varied in their 
degree of representation. At the internal level, most of the spokes of the moribund poles were 
not represented on the world stage. The United States, by advocating for independence and 
national self-determination, altered the spokes’ representation in the international community. 
For instance, a significant portion of the spokes formally under Frances’s and Britain’s authority 
were colonies or mandates and represented in the League of Nations by their polar powers. 
That is why the League, at its height, only had 58 members, but the United Nations has 193 
(Anheier & Juergensmeyer, 2012, p. 1055).11 With these changes, the spokes’ internal 
composition was changed as a result of having to bolster or develop their own foreign affairs 
staff or representatives.   
In addition to altering the spokes’ international representation, the U.S. pursued a policy 
of spreading democracy. As Farid Zakaria has written, “In 1900 not a single country had what 
we would today consider a democracy: a government created by elections in which every adult 
citizen could vote. Today 119 do, comprising 62 percent of all countries in the world” (Zakaria, 
2007, p. 13). This shift to democracies has affected the internal representation and electorates 
of spokes that were formerly part of France’s and Britain’s territorial orders. Additionally, the 
extension of U.S. authority also entailed the prevention of political leaders whom the U.S. did 
 
11 “Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present,” https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-
states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html 
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not approve. For example, in the 1950s, the U.S. constrained Iran, a former spoke of Britain, 
from having the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh maintain his political position.       
Economically, before World War II, both France and Britain established economic rules 
and regulations which were on the protectionist side of the spectrum. They controlled their 
spokes’ modes of production, which led to their spokes primarily producing raw materials. They 
also constrained who their spokes could trade with by imposing high tariff policies. For 
example, as one historian wrote, before the Cold War, French and British “imperialists has 
hitherto maintained exclusive control over African trade” (Kalu, 2018, p. 667).   
The United States, on the other hand, believed France’s and Britain’s protectionist 
economic constraints contributed to the Great Depression and the outbreak of World War II 
(Gowa, 2015, p. 23). Consequently, as the moribund poles lost their authority over their 
territorial orders, the U.S. started to establish new economic rules and regulations that 
liberalized monetary and trade policies of the spokes it was co-opting. In terms of the polar 
attributes in the economic realm, the U.S. instituted rules and regulation which ensured 
“nondiscrimination in the conduct of trade and spearhead[ed] efforts to liberalize trade 
through the reduction of tariffs, which fell from double-digit levels to 4 percent over six rounds” 
of negotiations (Kim, 2010, p. 3). In other words, the U.S. established economic polar 
constraints which prevented its spokes from practicing preferential trade practices and altered 
the spokes’ tariff rates.    
In the security realm, the moribund poles previously had the ability to establish rules 
and regulations that altered their spokes’ security architecture. Namely, they constrained who 
could hold leadership positions in their spokes’ military, who their spokes could procure 
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weapons from, and they housed their own military personal within their spokes. After WWII, 
however, the two moribund poles’ territorial orders disintegrated as the U.S.’ expanded. As a 
result, France and Britain no longer satisfied the security realm attributes of polar status as the 
U.S.’ authority in the international system increased. Furthermore, with the extension of U.S. 
authority, it began to constrain the spokes it was co-opting and started to satisfy the polar 
attributes in the security realm. In terms of military leadership, during the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the U.S. constrained who could hold officer positions by instituting training programs. 
Thousands of “foreign military officers attended special United States-run counterinsurgency 
training schools in the United States…Panama…Okinawa and Germany” (Grammy & Bragg, 
1996, p. 51).  
In addition to these specialty training regiments, the United States established The 
Military Assistance Training Program. Under this system, the U.S. trained 450,000 military 
personnel and officers from 70 different countries between 1950 and 1975 (Lefever, 1976, p. 
85). One of the main objectives of this program was to “introduce thousands of actual or 
potential foreign leaders to American life and institutions” (Lefever, 1976, p. 88). In terms of 
basing rights, before the U.S. began to co-opt their spokes “Britain had by far the largest global 
basing and military deployment structure, followed in turn by France” (Harkavy, 1989, p. 3). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the two moribund poles had to shutter most of their 
foreign bases (Vine, 2015, p. 338). In response, the U.S. expanded their basing rights and 
military presence to include former French and British spokes. At one point, the “U.S. military 
had around 752 military installations in more than 130 countries” around the world (Ferguson, 
2005, p. 13).   
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 In addition to constraints in the political, economic, and security dimensions, the polar 
powers also establish rules and regulations that affect their spokes’ population’s thoughts, 
behavior, and language. During this polar co-option, France and Britain lost their ability to instill 
these constraints in their former spokes. Conversely, as the U.S. started to gain authority over 
former French and British spokes, it started to impose its own socio-cultural constraints. For 
example, in Iran, the U.S. attempted to use its Point Four aid to alter the spokes’ population’s 
thoughts and behaviors. In terms of education, the U.S. set out to “reform Iran’s existing, 
centralized, and rigid education system” (Shively, 2018, p. 423). In order to do this, U.S advisors 
trained hundreds of villagers to become teachers, whose new curriculum focused on 
“vocational homemaking, childcare, family health, textiles, family relationships, and personal 
hygiene in addition to modern educational philosophies” (ibid).            
 These changes in education coupled with additional economic opportunities, led to 
alterations in Iranian behavior. For instance, the U.S. was able to foster a new consumerist 
culture. Regarding the Iranian, the introduction of “new appliances, furniture, and building 
materials led to the construction of modern neighborhoods and houses and also to the 
refurbishing the extant traditional domestic structures” (Karimi, 2013, p. 100).  
These changes in the domestic lives of Iranians led to even more behavioral 
developments. With these new homes, the role of women in Iran needed to evolve. Through 
the Point Four’s education system, the U.S. tried to accomplish this goal by instilling the 
practices in Iran that were popular in the pole. In terms of completing housework, “women no 
longer performed typical household chores in ‘inefficient’ traditional ways, for example, 
sweeping the floor with a short broom or cooking while squatting on the floor” (Karimi, 2013, p. 
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93). Consequently, through the constraint of potentially withholding Point Four aid, the U.S. 
established rules and regulations which altered the behavior and thoughts of its spokes.  
  Overall, PCT predicts two results from the polar co-option process. First, the most likely 
result is a reduction in the number of polar powers. While this is not always the case, most 
polar co-options have led to a decrease in the number of poles in the system. During this polar 
co-option, France and Britain declined from polar statues and became great powers.  
The second predicted result affects the configuration of territorial orders. First, the 
moribund poles will lose their ability to establish and enforce rules and regulations over their 
spokes. In conjunction, the co-opting pole will see an expansion of its territorial order as it 
begins to satisfy polar attributes that affect the internal structure of the spokes it is co-opting. 
This polar co-option witnessed the collapse of France’s and Britain’s territorial orders while the 





 Before the two world wars, France, Britain, Russia, and the United States partitioned the 
international system into different territorial orders. These orders entailed each pole having 
authority over a number of spokes. After World War II, however, this environment became 
destabilized as France and Britain lost authority over their territorial orders and endemic unrest 
developed in their spokes.   
 Their loss of authority led to a polar competition between the United States and Soviet 
Russia as they attempted to co-opt as many spokes as possible. As a result of this competition, 
the level of fear within the international system increased. As PCT expects, both the U.S and 
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Soviet Russia asserted that their intentions were benign. As they did, however, the United 
States was predicting dire consequences if Soviet Russia was able to successfully co-opted the 
spokes of the moribund poles.  
Additionally, France and Britain had to determine which of the two prospective co-
opting poles they would support. After taking into account geographical and ideological 
concerns, the two moribund poles came to the conclusion that an expansion of the United 
States’ authority provoked less fear than a successful Soviet Union. 
   In addition to the other poles, the prospective co-opting poles needed to gain the 
support of the spokes they were trying to co-opt. In order to do this, the United States and the 
Soviet Union employed three methods. First, the spoke needed to view the authority of the 
United States’ or the Soviet Union as legitimate. Second, both prospective co-opting poles used 
their immense economic and military resources to incentive spokes into joining their territorial 
orders. Third, if the prospective co-opting poles could not induce the spokes into joining their 
orders, they forced them to through coercive measures.  
 After the polar competition came to an end, two results followed. First, there was a 
reduction in the number of polar powers as France and Britain lost their polar status and 
became great powers. Second, there was an alteration in the number of territorial orders as 
both moribund poles’ lost their authority over their orders. In conjunction, the United States, 
and to a far lesser extent, Soviet Russia expanded their territorial orders. As a result, the 
international system transitioned from having four polar powers and their requisite territorial 
orders to only having two orders centering around two poles.   
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The argument of this work has been that the most important states in the international 
system – the polar powers – hold a disproportionate amount of authority. They use this 
authority to impose constraints on their spokes (Lake, 2009). Rather than adhere to the 
principles of state sovereignty, a pole’s rules and regulations affect the internal structure of the 
lesser tier states they have authority over. As a result, PCT’s conceptualizes the polar powers as 
states that practice imperialism (Bush, 2014; Doyle, 1986). 
 In corroboration with the literature on empires, poles affect their spokes along four 
dimensions: politically, economically, militarily, and socio-culturally (Steinmetz, 2013). Poles, 
thus have certain attributes that make them distinct from normal states. For example, a polar 
attribute in the political realm, is a pole’s ability to establish rules and regulations that limit who 
can hold political office in their spokes. Economically, a pole implements constraints that affect 
access to their spokes’ market. Regarding the security dimension, a pole has to satisfy the 
military requirement of stationing its own troops within its spokes. In the socio-cultural realm, a 
pole limits the ideas and behaviors it deems counter to its civilizing mission.        
 Consequently, a multipolar international system has at least three polar powers that 
have authority over a number of spokes. This authority manifests in rules and regulations that 
alter the spokes’ internal structure along the four dimensions of imperialism. A bipolar system 
has two poles that divide the world into competing territorial orders. In a unipolar structure, 
one pole establishes constraints that affect the domestic configuration of most of the states in 
the system. 
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 While certain periods can be described in these terms, the structure of the international 
system has not been static. After World War II, the system transitioned from multipolar to 
bipolar (R. Brown, 1993). Following the Cold War, the system shifted to unipolar (Waltz, 2000). 
In regards to these broad categorizations, PCT argues that the number of poles and their 
requisite territorial orders have gradually decreased over the last two hundred years (Painter, 
1999; Westad, 2005). During the early nineteenth century, there were five polar powers: Spain, 
Britain, the Ottomans, France, and tsarist Russia. As the century progressed, the first co-option 
saw Britain expand its authority over the moribund spokes of the Spanish Empire in the 
Western Hemisphere.  
 With the loss of Spain, the system contained four poles. It would return to a five polar 
structure, however, with the rise of the United States. During the second co-option, Britain lost 
its authority over its newly acquired spokes in Latin American. In conjunction, the U.S. was able 
to extend its authority over lesser tier states in the region and ultimately reach polar status. The 
only great power to transition to a pole since 1800.  
 The third co-option witnessed the decline and demise of the Ottoman Empire. During 
the nineteenth century, Britain and France expanded their authority over a number of Ottoman 
spokes in North Africa. Despite these developments, the final dismantling of the Ottoman’s 
territorial order would not occur until after World War I. At that point, the co-opting poles that 
were Britain and France gained authority over the remaining Ottoman spokes in the Levant and 
the Middle East.  
Just as World War I lead to the third co-option, World War II precipitated the fourth. 
Unlike the previous co-options, which were generally regional, the fourth co-option occurred at 
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a nearly global level. This is because Britain and France had authority over spokes in Africa, the 
Middle East, and Southeast Asia. When they lost their authority, the U.S. and Soviet Russia 
engaged in a decades long struggle to co-opt the most spokes from the moribund poles. 
Ultimately, the U.S. was able to complete the co-option process at a higher rate than Soviet 
Russia and extend its authority over more spokes.  
 The fifth and final co-option marked the end of the Cold War and brought about a 
unipolar structure in the international system. During this co-option, Soviet Russia lost its 
authority over lesser tier states in Eastern Europe. In conjunction, the U.S. would ultimately see 
its authority expand as Russia’s former spokes joined the liberal international order the U.S. had 
been building since World War II.  
   While these five co-options led to the U.S.’ supremacy, the debate highlighted in the 
introduction calls into question whether this preeminence is still intact. In other words, is the 
system still unipolar? Polar co-option theory has sought to provide a blueprint for examining 
this question. As a result, the rest of this conclusion will briefly discuss whether there is a 
transition away from unipolarity and a sixth polar co-option is occurring.  
 To put it succinctly, it is too early to tell. Full co-options can take decades to complete. 
But there are signs that the unipole’s authority has been in decline, which is the first step in the 
polar co-option process. While this might signify that a transition has begun, the phenomenon 
does not just entail the decline of a polar power. Rather, another pole or a great power needs 
to gain authority over a substantial number of spokes. This change will be evident by the 
alteration of said spokes’ internal composition. At present, this has not occurred. In other 
words, the system’s unipolar structure is still intact because another pole has not constructed a 
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competing territorial order. Unipolarity is destabilized, however, as the system’s sole pole has 
witnessed a decline in its authority. 
This decrease in the U.S.’ authority has been caused by at least two factors. The first is 
the Iraq War of 2003 and the subsequent War on Terror (Rapkin & Braaten, 2009). Regarding 
the Iraq War, the U.S. was unable to gain a supporting security council resolution as its 
intelligence, which has proven to be incorrect, was questioned (Kameel, 2015; Shannon & 
Keller, 2007). It is also generally agreed that the U.S.’ War on Terror has “ destabilized the 
Middle East while doing little to protect the United States from terrorism” (Thrall & Goepner, 
2017, p. 1).  
The second occurrence was the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Beginning as a housing 
market collapse in the U.S., the economic losses spread to the global banking system (Friedman 
& Posner, 2011). It is estimated that over $11 trillion in household wealth was wiped away just 
in the United States (Nelson & Katzenstein, 2014). Internationally, approximately 4 percent of 
the world’s GDP was written off (Lybeck, 2011). Politically, the financial crisis led to the further 
questing of the U.S.’ liberal international order and a decrease in the pole’s authority (Tooze, 
2018).  
 This decline in U.S.’ authority is discernible when examining the attributes of a polar 
power. In the political realm, the United States has, for the most part, pursued a policy of 
imposing rules and regulations in their spokes that foster democratic governance (T. Smith, 
2012). In recent years, however, there has been a backsliding as these constraints are starting 
to be flouted. Across the globe, democratically elected leaders have been staying in power 
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longer.1 There have also been proposed or actual constitutional changes to extend these 
political figures time in office.2 Additionally, a new form of illiberal democracy has been 
developing (Shattuck, 2018). This is when a state has elections, but these elections are so tightly 
controlled that they cannot be viewed as the legitimate will of the people (Levitsky & Way, 
2010). These changings have been altering the spokes’ electorate and representative facets.  
In conjunction with significant evolutions in the political realm, there have also been 
alterations in the socio-cultural aspects of some of the unipole’s spokes. First, there has been a 
push back against the internationalist ideal of liberalism. This has given rise to nationalist and 
populist leaders that find it advantageous to criticize globalization (Copelovitch & Pevehouse, 
2019). One particular characteristic of this shift has been an increase in the demonization and 
scapegoating of immigrants (Hooghe, Lenz, & Marks, 2019). Additionally, these leaders have 
sought to demonize news outlets and curtail the liberal tenet of freedom of the press (Repucci, 
2019).       
Economically, the narrative has been mixed. While a definite tilt towards protectionism 
has occurred in recent years, there has also been significant progress regarding free trade 
agreements. Coinciding with the rise of nationalist/populist leaders, there has been an increase 
in criticism of the free trade globalized economy (Hooghe et al., 2019). This has led to a number 
of threatened or carried out trade wars.3 These conflicts have partial resulted in changes to 
international trading patterns. The most significant trade war has occurred between the two 
 
1 (Carter, 2019; Holmes, 2019; Murakami, 2019) 
2 ("China's Xi allowed to remain 'president for life' as term limits removed," 2018; "LDP execs support Abe staying 
on beyond 2021 to get Constitution amended," 2019; Osborn & Ivanova, 2020; "Turkey referendum grants 
President Erdogan sweeping new powers," 2017) 
3 (Alderman, Tankersley, & Swanson, 2020), (Negishi & Jeong, 2019), ("Trump and EU's Juncker pull back from all-
out trade war ", 2018), (Swanson & Tankersley, 2020) 
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states with the largest economies – the U.S and China. On the other side of the coin, several 
free trade agreements are being pursued. Two prominent examples are the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)4 in Asia and a trade agreement between the EU 
and Latin America’s Mercosur.5  
This brief analysis indicates that there has been a decline in the adherence to the rules 
and regulations the U.S. has established and championed since WWII. The problem is that since 
2016 the most influential revisionist state has been the United States itself. In other words, the 
U.S. has led the assault against the constraints it previously imposed on the system.  
 Within the confines of PCT, this only reaffirms that the international system is still 
unipolar. In fact, it leads to the conclusion that the unipolar moment will be extended into the 
future. While this might seem counterintuitive, the argument is as follows.  
 As a result of the events mentioned above, it should be concluded that the authority of 
the United States has declined. This led to the spokes questioning the rules and regulations of 
the only pole in the system. Rather than a prospective co-opting pole taking the lead and 
initiating the co-option process, the United States itself has rejected said rules and led the 
transition away from them. In other words, rather than fight the rise of illiberalism, which 
would leave the political space open for a rising great power to develop a counter territorial 
order, the unipolar power itself has become the leader rebelling against its own international 
order.  
 
4 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
5 https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/28/world/mercosur-eu-trade-agreement-intl/index.html 
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Some may ask what role does China play in the international system and how will it 
develop? Within the confines of PCT, China is a great power rather than a pole. Its place in the 
system is analogous to Wilhelmine Germany – a great power seeking to gain authority over 
spokes to ascend to polar status. As with Wilhelmine Germany, the tenets of PCT conclude that 
China will be unable to complete the co-option process and develop into a pole. 
There are a number of reasons why. First, China’s growing influence has been 
predicated on its economic success. The problem is that since the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, 
China’s economic growth has been largely driven by debt accumulation. As one economist put 
it, “Apart from the speed of debt accumulation, it is worth noting also that China’s debt ratio is 
far in excess of other countries with the same level of income per head” (Magnus, 2018, p. 77). 
It is estimated that China’s debt is over 300% of its GDP.6 This number will probably rise if it 
continues to pursue its Belt and Road initiative that will cost an approximate $8 trillion dollars 
(Hurley, Morris, & Portelance, 2019).      
 While China’s debt is growing to unsustainable levels, there are other reasons why it is 
predicted that it will not be able to develop into a pole. The second reason is that its rise will 
invoke too much fear not only in the U.S. but also in its neighbors. Over the proceeding 
decades, China has been a part of approximately twenty three territorial disputes (Fravel, 
2008). Recently, it has been attempting to instill its authority over the majority of the South 
China Sea (Singh, 2017). This valuable maritime territory is the location of more “than half of 
the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage…and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide” 
(Kaplan, 2015, p. 9). It also contains a vast amount of natural resources. It is estimated that 
 
6 ("China's debt tops 300% of GDP, now 15% of global total: IIF," 2019) 
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there are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas (Corr, 2018). While these 
resources are important to China, which is the second largest oil consumer in the world and a 
net importer, the region also falls within the exclusive economic zone of a number of other 
countries. As a result, it is argued that as long as China continues to claim the entire South 
China Sea and pursue its policy of militarizing the area, the other states in the region will 
balance against it and towards the United States, which has been happening. As one scholar 
wrote, “The bottom line is that as China is rising, key Southeast Asian states appear even more 
determined to preserve the ‘layered hierarchical security order’ in America’s favor” (Lee, 2015, 
p. 6). 
 In addition to China’s geopolitical behavior, it is predicted that most populations will 
reject China’s mode of governance. Unlike the United States’ liberalism, China is not a 
champion of freedom of expression. To the contrary, China’s one-party government has 
developed a sophisticated censorship system that is used to inhibit collective expression (King, 
Pan, & Roberts, 2013). To further limit individual freedoms, China has been attempting to 
develop a social credit system that will incentive conformity; thus, upholding the ruling party’s 
monopoly on power  (Hoffman, 2018).  
Taking all of the above into account, it is the position of this work that the authority of 
the U.S.’ international order has been in decline, which has led to a decrease in adherence to its 
rules and regulations. Rather than a great power progressing the co-option process, however, 
the United States itself that has been rebelling against its own order. In conjunction, the most 
significant rising power – China – has economic, geopolitical, and governance issues which will 
prevent it from gaining authority over spokes and developing its own territorial order. As a 
Conclusion                                                                                                                                Justin Tepper 
171 
 
result, the system has not transitioned away from unipolarity. Rather, the system’s structure is 
still unipolar, it is just destabilized as the unipole’s authority has been in decline Furthermore, 
there is not a high likelihood that a rival territorial order will develop that would transition the 
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